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How Can Restorative Justice and the Unified Theory of Punishment 
Help Us Make Sense of Corporate Crime and Punishment? 
Reem Radhi 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The supposed deterrent and retribution ‘tough on corporate crime’ model may have 
been promising when corporate criminal liability was recognised over a century ago, 
but it is not working today. The response to ‘controlling corporate crime’ should not 
be a simple hefty fine, a simple apology, or a pinky promise. The starting point lies 
in gaining an understanding of the justifying aims of punishment before determining 
how punishment should be distributed. 
 
The thesis moves away from the ‘soft on crime’ vs. ‘tough on crime’ debate, towards 
a ‘smart on crime’ approach. It goes back to the foundations of corporate criminal 
law to assess its aim(s) and purpose(s): why should we punish corporations? Why 
do corporations violate the law? How should corporations be brought to justice when 
they violate the law? If corporations cannot be imprisoned, how should they be 
punished? 
 
The thesis explores existent theories of punishment and responses to crime 
(retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, restoration) to assess whether they are well-
suited, or badly-suited, to dealing with corporate crime. It advances proposals and 
recommendations for improving corporate criminal liability standards, and how 
punishment of corporations might be reformed. The thesis brings new insights to 
corporate crime and punishment through the concept of ‘restorative justice.’ 
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Introduction 
 
 
It should not be surprising to read that companies have been subject to criminal 
liability for over a century.1 After all, The Supreme Court of the United States 
granted companies the constitutional right to bring a claim in federal court and equal 
protection as individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment2 well before allowing 
women to practice law3 and African Americans to have equal rights under the law.4  
 
Corporate misbehaviour, whether defined as a civil law violation or a criminal law 
violation, can have long-lasting impacts on individuals and communities. Companies 
have rights and obligations as ‘persons’ under the law, hence should be held 
accountable to any act or omission that is in violation of the law.5 
 
Yet, recurrent calls for being ‘tough on corporate crime’ have not necessarily 
resulted in a reduction in the rate of crime nor have produced norm-compliant 
behaviour by companies. Reports suggest that although the level of reported crime 
has increased, the rate of prosecutions has decreased.6 Elizabeth Warren 
compellingly states, 
 
[While] we have one set of the law on the books, we really have two different 
judicial systems. One just system is for the rich and the powerful. In that 
system…giant companies that break the law walk away with a small fine and 
pinky promise not to do again…The second justice system is for everyone else.7 
 
                                                           
1 John Hasnas, 'The Century of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability' (2009) 
46 American Criminal Law Review 1329, 1329; Kathleen F. Brickey, ‘Corporate Criminal 
Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation’ (1982) 60 Washington ULQ 393, 393. 
2 See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 US 61 (1809); Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific 
Railroad Company, 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
3 Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. 16 Wall. 130 (1872) 
4 United States Constitution, 14th Amendment, section 2 (United States). 
5 Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd (1896) UKHL 1, (1897) AC 22; Arthur W. Machen, ‘Corporate 
Personality’ (1911) 24 Harvard Law Review 347, 347-353; Susan M. Watson, ‘The Corporate Legal 
Person’ (2018) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1, 30; Brenda Hannigan, Company Law (4th edn, 
OUP 2015) 77.  
6 Financial Times, ‘White Collar Prosecutions Plummet even as Crime Rises’ (Financial Times,  July 
2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/8751e754-6e3e-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa> accessed 24 July 2017. 
7 Elizabeth Warren, ‘Senator Warren Urges Congress to Reject Bad Judicial Nominees’ (Youtube.com, 
31 October 2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rJTEHN2WfiA> accessed 30 March 2019. 
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The law as it stands provides avenues for ‘negotiated justice’ and for companies to 
‘buy their way out of a crime,’8 thus placing companies at a different legal position 
than individuals. 
 
Recent proposals and debates have covered foundational issues that ought to have 
been resolved when corporate criminal liability has been recognised, including 
debates on whether companies should be subject to liability for mens rea offences, 
and piecemeal reforms establishing different standards of liability for similar 
misconducts.9 From here, a notable quote by Fisse in 1982 is worth considering,  
 
[M]odern corporate criminal law owes its origin and design more to crude 
borrowings from individual criminal and civil law than to any coherent 
assessment of the objectives of corporate criminal law and how those 
objectives might be attained.10 
 
The theoretical coherency of the law is paramount to its development in practice. 
Many questions and concerns emerge: why are companies subject to criminal 
liability? What differentiates companies from individuals? Why do companies 
violate the law? If the corporate entity cannot be imprisoned, how should companies 
be brought to justice when they violate the law? What is the process of bringing them 
to justice and what is the amount and form of punishment that should be imposed? 
 
The United States Sentencing Commission (Hereinafter ‘the Sentencing 
Commission’) has included the following statement in its sentencing guideline 
manual, 
 
A philosophical problem arose when the Commission attempted to reconcile 
the differing perceptions of the purposes of criminal punishment. Most 
                                                           
8 Colin King and Nicholas Lord, Corporate Crime: The Legitimacy of Civil Recovery Orders and 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements (Palgrave Macmillan 2018) 7. 
9 For e.g., The Criminal Finances Act 2017 introduced an offence of failure to prevent tax evasion. In 
January 2017, there has been a call for evidence concerning a new standard of liability for economic 
crime; Ministry of Justice, ‘Corporate Liability for Economic Crime: Call for Evidence’ (UK 
Government, 13 January 2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/corporate-liability-for-
economic-crime-call-for-evidence> accessed 10 July 2018; Criminal Finances Act 2017, sections 45-
46; Washington Examiner, ‘Senators Give Criminal Justice Reform Another Try’ (Washington 
Examiner, October 2017) <http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/senators-give-criminal-justice-
reform-another-try/article/2636541> accessed 22 June 2018. 
10 Brent Fisse, ‘Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and 
Sanctions.’ (1982) 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1141, 1143. 
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observers of the criminal law agree that the ultimate aim of the law itself, 
and of punishment, in particular, is the control of crime. Beyond this point, 
however, the consensus seems to break down. Some argue that appropriate 
punishment should be defined primarily on the basis of the principle of ‘just 
deserts.' Under this principle, the punishment should be scaled to the 
offender's culpability and the resulting harms. Others argue that punishment 
should be imposed primarily on the basis of practical ‘crime control' 
considerations. This theory calls for sentences that most effectively lessen 
the likelihood of future crime, either by deterring others or incapacitating 
the defendant. Adherents of each of these points of view urged the 
Commission to choose between them and accord one primacy over the other. 
As a practical matter, however, this choice was unnecessary because in most 
sentencing decisions the application of either philosophy will produce the 
same or similar results… 
 
Those who adhere to a just deserts philosophy may concede that the lack of 
consensus might make it difficult to say exactly what punishment is deserved 
for a particular crime. Likewise, those who subscribe to a philosophy of 
crime control may acknowledge that the lack of sufficient data might make 
it difficult to determine exactly the punishment that will best prevent that 
crime. Both groups might, therefore [recognise] the wisdom of looking to 
those distinctions that judges and legislators have, in fact, made over the 
course of time. These established distinctions are ones that the community 
believes or has found over time, to be important from either just deserts or 
crime control perspective.11 
 
The Sentencing Commission accepts that the main aim of punishment is ‘crime 
control,’ yet finds through ‘empirical results’ that choosing between just deserts or 
deterrence is not necessary because the sentences based on either theory would 
produce the same or similar results. The Commission goes further to assert that the 
guidelines formed ‘the first step in an evolutionary process,’ and it is subject to 
improvement even though they may not be acceptable to those wishing to ‘adopt a 
single philosophical theory, and then work deductively to establish a simple and 
                                                           
11 United States Sentencing Commission, ‘Guidelines Manual 2016’ (United States Sentencing 
Commission 2016) <http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-
manual/2016/GLMFull.pdf> accessed 8 February 2017, Ch. 1 Pt. A, 4-5. 
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perfect set of categorisations and distinctions.’12 They also do not provide details on 
the legitimacy of the empirical data used to evidence the lack of distinctions between 
the theoretical approaches to retribution and deterrence; how sentencing decisions 
‘would produce the same or similar results’; and whether it could be scaled to a larger 
extent to apply to federal crimes that guide state crimes; or whether such data would 
be applicable to changing circumstances and in the long term. Nevertheless, the 
penal aims could work together as part of a broader framework if the theoretical 
approaches and the methods of distribution are defined. 
 
There is no one theory of deterrence or retribution.13 It is inevitable that failing to 
understand how these aims work together would mean one would prevail over the 
other when they are in conflict.14 Empirical evidence finds that different judges have 
their personal liability and punishment philosophies, prioritise punishment goals 
differently, and resultantly impose different sentences.15  
 
Accordingly, the thesis starts with the following contentions:  
 
First, companies and individuals are both legal persons under the law, yet a company 
is an autonomous entity that is generally created for the purposes of profit. The 
globalisation of businesses and increasing variety of corporate management 
structures present new challenges to controlling corporate misconduct. Attitudes 
towards compliance vary with changing economic circumstances. 
 
Second, if the supposed ‘tough on crime approaches’ are not working, then perhaps 
moving away from the ‘tough on crime’ vs. ‘soft on crime debate’, and alternatively 
adopting a ‘smart justice’ or ‘smart on crime’ approach (Hereinafter ‘SOC’), is a 
starting point to any meaningful reforms in this area of law. Agreeing on the 
philosophical foundations of the criminal justice process is important, and is a 
starting point to the SOC approach, which can be described as  
 
[Creating] smart policies that will ensure continued public safety while also 
preventing unnecessary incarceration. These policies range from making 
sure that we have a sound, predictable, tough yet rational sentencing 
                                                           
12 ibid Ch. 1 Pt. A, 5-6. 
13 See Thom Brooks, Punishment (Routledge 2012) 16, 35. 
14 Paul Robinson, Distributive Principles of Criminal Law (OUP 2008) 2. 
15 ibid. 
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structure to diverting more people to innovative [programmes]...These 
reforms will require changes in laws.16   
 
SOC necessitates considering the existent philosophies of punishment and responses 
to crime; which include retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and restoration, to 
understand corporate misbehaviour and how the criminal justice system could be 
reformed to address it. 
 
The rest of the introduction will define key terms, before setting out the aims of the 
thesis and its structure. 
 
Definitions  
 
Jurisdiction  
 
The thesis comparatively analyses the law in England and Wales and the United 
States for two particular reasons. First, many common law jurisdictions like 
Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and India have closely followed or replicated their 
models.17 Studying the selected models would provide insights to needed reforms to 
corporate criminal liability laws at an international level.  
 
Second, from a historical standpoint, the recognition of corporate criminal liability 
in the United States followed legal developments in England and Wales. Particularly, 
in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company v. United States,18 one of 
the first cases establishing corporate criminal liability, cited an English case to 
support its decision.19 Nevertheless, each jurisdiction adopts a distinctive liability 
and sentencing framework today.   
 
                                                           
16 Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Nichole Fortier, and Inimai Chettiar, ‘Federal Prosecution for the 21st 
Century’ (Brennan Center for Justice 2014) 1. 
<https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Federal_Prosecution_For_21st_Centu
ry.pdf > accessed 6 April 2019.  
17 Luke Tolaini, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability’ (Clifford Chance, 26 April 2016) 
<https://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2016/04/corporate_criminalliability.html> accessed 22 
June 2018). 
18 New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
19 ibid 493. 
  
- 7 - 
Thus, comparatively studying the selected jurisdictions assists in evaluating the 
advantages and disadvantages of different standards of liability and sentencing 
models.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Company, Crime, and Corporate Crime 
 
A crime can be defined as an act or an omission that the state recognises as a criminal 
law violation.20 A company21 is a form of a business organisation that undergoes the 
‘incorporation’ process to form an entity with a separate legal personality under the 
law.22 There are different types of companies.23 A distinction between ‘individual 
accountability’ and ‘corporate accountability’ should be drawn.24  Corporate crime 
can be defined as conducts or omissions committed by a company that the state 
recognises as a criminal law violation by the company.25 
 
Theory of Punishment  
 
Herbert Hart states that any theory of punishment could be classified through the 
definition of punishment, the aims or justifications of punishment, and the 
distribution of punishment. The elements are interconnected.26 Brooks follows 
Hart’s classification, clarifying that ‘any theory of punishment must first satisfy the 
definition of punishment. We must then identify the general justifying aim of 
punishment and how this aim may be achieved through the distribution of 
                                                           
20 The definition of a ‘crime’ is contested; David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith, Hogan, and 
Ormerod’s Criminal Law (15th edn, OUP 2018) 3-4. 
21 Company, corporation, corporate entity, corporate body will be used interchangeably. 
22 Salomon (n 5); Machen (n 5); Watson (n 5); Hannigan (n 5).  
23 The thesis recognises that further research could be conducted in relation to the viability of the 
proposals of this thesis in relation to specific types of companies. What is important for the present 
purposes is that a company is a form of an entity that has a separate legal entity under the law.  
24 Note: The thesis focuses on punishing the corporate entity, although arguments made throughout the 
thesis may be applicable to holding individuals within the corporate entity in certain circumstances. 
Exploring the theoretical approaches to corporate criminal liability and punishment is required to define 
what counts as a violation of the law; and the circumstances where a violation of the law should be 
attributed to the corporate entity, individuals within the corporate entity, or both. 
25 Ormerod and Laird (n 20) 245-7. 
26 Brooks, Punishment (n 13) 6. 
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punishment.’27 Punishment is a response to crime. The justifying aim of punishment 
and the distribution of punishment must adhere to the definition of punishment as a 
response to crime.28 
 
Following a broad interpretation of Hart’s and Brooks’ proposals, the following 
understanding of a theory of punishment is advanced: 
 
The justifying aim of punishment defines the reasons for punishing companies; 
provides guidance on the scope of liability (i.e. the standards of liability or what 
conducts or omissions ought to be criminal and who should be held responsible when 
violations of the law occur) and explains the causes of crime. 
 
The justifying aim of punishment determines the distribution of punishment. The 
distribution of punishment is interpreted broadly to include how companies are 
brought to justice once they violate the law (the process), and the amount of 
punishment that should be imposed once a company is brought to justice (the 
sentence). Again, all of the elements adhere to the definition of punishment as a 
response to crime.29  
 
Objectives 
 
The thesis generates new thinking and contributes to knowledge in two contested 
areas, restorative justice and corporate crime.30 Particularly, the thesis studies the 
following: 
 
(a) How did companies become ‘criminal subjects’ and why does it matter 
today?: examine corporate criminal liability and sentencing from a 
historical and theoretical perspective to advance three contentions relating 
to the law’s failure to achieve retribution and deterrence and a theoretical 
basis of corporate criminal liability. 
(b) When should companies be punished?: assess current criminal standards 
of liability to advance a theoretical and practically coherent model that 
accounts for different types of crimes and corporate management structures. 
                                                           
27 ibid. 
28 ibid 5-6. 
29 ibid 37. 
30 See Chapters 1 and 5. 
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(c) Why should companies be punished? How should they be punished?: 
assess the suitability of various approaches to retribution, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and restoration to explain (i) the justifying aim of punishment:  
Why should companies be punished? What acts and omissions should be 
punished under criminal law?; and (ii) the distribution of punishment:  How 
should companies be punished and/or be brought to justice when they violate 
the law?  
 
In relation to (c), the thesis distinctively examines mixed models that combine 
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and/or restoration.31 It uniquely advances 
knowledge on the punitive restoration form of the Unified Theory of Punishment 
(Hereinafter ‘the UTP’)32 in the context of companies. It distinctively advances and 
defends an innovative and original understanding and contextualisation of 
restorative justice. 
 
Chapter by Chapter Breakdown  
 
Chapter 1 places the thesis in a historical context. It examines various theoretical 
bases of corporate criminal liability and punishment by exploring the development 
of corporate law, corporate civil liability, and corporate criminal liability in the 
                                                           
31 Note: There is no agreement on what the purposes of criminal law are, and their contextualisations 
within the criminal justice system are contested in literature. Retribution and deterrence drive current 
procedures, policies, and laws governing corporate crime in England and Wales and the United States. 
The thesis focuses on four theories: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and restoration. See United 
States Sentencing Commission, ‘Guidelines Manual 2016’ (n 11) Ch. 1 Pt. A, section 2; Sentencing 
Council, ‘Environmental Offences: Definitive Guideline’ (National Archives 2015) < 
http://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/Final_Environmental_ 
Offences_Definitive_Guideline_web2.pdf> accessed 7 January 2017; Sentencing Council, ‘Fraud, 
Bribery and Money Laundering Offences: Definitive Guideline’ (National Archives 2014) < 
https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Fraud_bribery_and_money_laundering_offences_-_Definitive_guideline.pdf> 
accessed 8 February 2017; Sentencing Council, ‘Health and Safety Offences, Corporate Manslaughter 
and Food Safety and Hygiene Offences: Definitive Guideline’ (National Archives 2015) < 
http://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/HS-offences-definitive-guideline-FINAL-
web1.pdf> accessed 7 January 2017; Ormerod and Laird (n 20) 4-5; Brooks, Punishment (n 13) 11; 
Robert M. McFatter, ‘Purposes of Punishment: Effects of Utilities of Criminal Sanctions on Perceived 
Appropriateness’ 67 Journal of Applied Psychology 255, 255; Albert W. Alschuler, ‘The Changing 
Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts about the 
Next’ (2003) 70 The University of Chicago Law Review 1, 1; Esther Van Ginneken, ‘The Pain and 
Purpose of Punishment: A Subjective Perspective’ (2016) Howard League What is Justice? Working 
Papers 22/2016 <https://howardleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/HLWP-22-2016.pdf> 
accessed 1 April 2019, 3.  
32 Thom Brooks, ‘Stakeholder Sentencing’ in Julian V. Roberts and Jesper Ryberg (eds), Popular 
Punishment: On the Normative Significance of Public Opinion for Penal Theory (OUP 2014) 183; 
Brooks, Punishment (n 13) 83. 
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United States and England and Wales. It also assesses the current standards of 
liability and sentencing practices, including other ways of responding to violations 
of the law (e.g. Deferred Prosecution Agreements (Hereinafter ‘DPAs’). 
Accordingly, it advances a theoretical basis of corporate criminal liability and a 
standard of liability model and discusses the possible flaws in current sentencing 
aims in theory and practice. 
 
Chapters 2 to 5 examine the suitability of retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and 
restoration to deal with corporate crime. Recognising the various theoretical 
approaches, understandings, and contextualisations of retribution, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and restoration in theory and practice, each chapter historically and 
theoretically analyses the development of the theories and evaluates the advantages 
and disadvantages of their applications and/or incorporations to laws and policies to 
respond to non-corporate crimes and corporate crimes. After critiquing the current 
application of the theories (as pure models and as part of mixed models) to deal with 
corporate crime in literature and/or practice, the chapters argue for alternative 
approaches that are aligned with the theoretical basis of corporate criminal liability 
and standard of liability model set out in Chapter 1.  
 
Chapter 6 builds on the proposals in Chapters 2 to 5 in relation to retribution, 
deterrence, rehabilitation and restoration. A one size fit approach is not theoretically 
nor practically coherent, necessitating the discussion of the UTP, a prominent theory 
of punishment that is in line with the theoretical basis of corporate criminal liability 
and standard of liability models advanced in Chapter 1. The chapter explores the 
foundational principles of the UTP in the context of companies, studies its merits in 
the context of corporate crime, and thereby advances a new theory of punishment for 
companies. This includes proposals for changing the aims of punishment and 
distribution of punishment.  
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Chapter One 
 
Corporate Crime  
 
 
1 Introduction  
 
Corporate criminal liability has been recognised in England and Wales and the 
United States for over a century.33 Today, recurrent calls for tougher laws have not 
necessarily resulted in a reduction in the rate of crime nor produced norm-compliant 
behaviour by companies. Recent reports suggest that although the level of reported 
crime has increased, the rate of prosecutions has decreased.34   
 
In England and Wales, there has been a trend of piecemeal legislative reforms and 
calls for establishing new liability standards for similar criminal activities.35 In the 
United States, debates have considered issues like the basis of corporate criminal 
liability for non-strict liability offences, which are foundational issues that should 
have been resolved in the early cases recognising corporate criminal liability.36  
 
The stagnant development of corporate criminal law can be traced back to the 
following interrelating reasons:  
 
(a) uncertainty surrounding the theoretical justification(s) for holding companies 
liable under the criminal law;  
(b) the divergence of views regarding the suitable standards of liability, which 
includes (i) the circumstances in which the criminal acts of employees and/or 
agents should be implicated to the companies, and (ii) whether it is theoretically 
sensible and practical to hold companies liable for crimes other than strict 
liability offences that require proving the mens rea of intent, recklessness, or 
negligence; and  
                                                           
33 Hasnas (n 1) 1329; Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation’ 
(n 1) 393. 
34 Financial Times (n 6). 
35 For e.g., The Criminal Finances Act 2017 introduced an offence for failure to prevent tax evasion. In 
January 2017, there has been a call for evidence concerning a new standard of liability for economic 
crime; Ministry of Justice (n 35); Criminal Finances Act 2017, sections 45-46; Washington Examiner 
(n 9). 
36 Washington Examiner (n 9). 
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(c) the current methods of punishment and existent alternative processes for 
bringing companies to justice once they have violated the law. 
 
Accordingly, referring to (a) above, Section 2 takes a step back to explore the basis 
of corporate criminal liability from historical and theoretical perspectives. The first 
cases recognising corporate criminal liability have not coherently assessed the 
objectives of criminalising companies nor have addressed how the objectives can be 
achieved, resulting in laws that cannot cope with new challenges to regulating 
companies in an increasingly globalised and fast-changing market. A number of 
theoretical justifications for the basis of companies are not practically coherent nor 
aligned with current liability and sentencing frameworks. The section will advance 
a theoretical justification that overcomes these difficulties.  
 
Referring to (b) and (c) above, Section 3 investigates current standards of liability 
and mechanisms for sentencing companies. Based on the findings in Section 2, the 
section advances an appropriate standard of liability model that is theoretically and 
practically coherent. This sets the scene for investigating (c) in the following 
chapters (investigating current methods of punishment and existent alternative 
processes for bringing companies to justice once they have violated the law). 
 
2 The Basis of Corporate Criminal Liability  
 
Defining ‘crime’ and the ‘company’ requires addressing ‘how does a company 
commit a crime?’ and ‘what are the benefits of using the criminal law to regulate 
corporate activities?’37 Mays states,  
 
The importance of finding the most appropriate method of ascribing liability 
cannot be overstated. Not only does it represent the intellectual foundation of 
corporate criminal liability, it also may…determine whether or not any system 
of corporate criminal liability engenders widespread public support. Only in 
circumstances where the basis of liability is seen to be fair and justifiable can 
broad endorsement be expected.38 
 
                                                           
37 David Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 155. 
38 Richard Mays, ‘Towards Corporate Fault as the Basis of Criminal Liability of Companies’ (1998) 
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies 31, 31. 
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The standards of liability set the parameters for corporate criminal liability, which is 
essential in gaining an understanding of the justifying aims of punishment and the 
causes of corporate crime. The section aims to find a theoretically and practically 
coherent basis of corporate criminal liability, through historically examining the 
development of corporate law and criminal law as applied to companies, and 
theoretically examining academic literature on the imposition of corporate criminal 
liability.  
 
2.1 The Historical Recognition of Corporate Criminal Liability  
 
Wells compellingly states, ‘[i]n truth…there is no easy history of corporate criminal 
liability.’39 History shows that in search of a coherent application of the corporate 
form and separate legal personality to corporate liability, different standards of 
liability were adapted, notably the respondeat superior and the identification 
doctrine standards.40  
 
Section 2.1 evaluates the development of the corporate form, separate legal 
personality, and two notable standards of liability in England and Wales and the 
United States. The discussion will at times place more focus on UK company law, 
but references to US corporate law will be made where needed. The reason for this 
approach is clear. Kershaw states,  
 
[Both] jurisdictions started from the same place. In both jurisdictions…in several 
instances, for a period in the mid-nineteenth century, the leading cases in the 
United States and the United Kingdom were English eighteenth- and nine-teenth-
century corporate cases, fashioned from English non-corporate legal 
borrowings.41  
 
The development of US corporate law was largely influenced by UK law.   
 
2.1.1 The Corporate Form, Separate Legal Personality, and Corporate Liability 
 
                                                           
39 Celia Wells, Companies and Criminal Responsibility (2nd edn, OUP 2001) 99. 
40 Mays (n 38) 32. 
41 Kershaw (n 37) 3. 
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In the Fourteenth century, companies in the United Kingdom were lawfully 
incorporated by authority of the Parliament, by royal charter, or by prescription.42 
Companies were created as a result of concessions by the state.43 A company for a 
limited purpose could be created by implication.44 Early companies were primarily 
formed to manage church property, but that was later extended to further types of 
associations, like universities and hospitals. The Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries 
witnessed the recognition of joint stock companies. Given that most business 
associations were not incorporated, some engaged in fraud scandals without 
incurring any liability, resulting in wide social and economic harms.45  
 
The Bubble Act of 172046 was subsequently passed to regulate and punish 
individuals for violating laws in corporate settings, labelling them as ‘public 
nuisances.’47 Particularly, it regulated individuals who undertook projects under 
false pretences, miscommunicated information about the transferability of their 
shares, and acted on behalf of corporate bodies without legal authority.48  
 
Concurrently, section 19 of the Interpretation Act 1889 defined a ‘person’ as 
including ‘any body of persons corporate or unincorporate.’ English courts also  
recognised companies as ‘legal individuals.’ They invented a separate ‘imaginary 
human personality to the associated which is distinct from its members,’49 as 
confirmed in Salomon v Salomon.50 Three fundamental principles were accordingly 
established: (a) a company is an entity separate from its members; (b) corporate 
property is separate from the property of its members, and (c) a judgment against a 
company could only be executed against the property of the company not the 
property of its members.51 Importantly, Salomon52 changed the requirement for 
incorporation from petitioning the state, to following a process of incorporation as 
required by statute.53  
                                                           
42 Kathleen F. Brickey, ‘Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation’ (n 
1); WS Holdsworth, ‘English Company Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries’ (1922) 31 The Yale Law 
Journal 382, 382. 
43 Watson (n 5) 3. 
44 Holdsworth (n 42) 383. 
45 Brickey, ‘Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation’ (n 1) 398. 
46 (6 Geo. 1 c. 18). 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid. 
49 M V. Sankaran, ‘The Criminal Liability of Companies in Anglo-American Law’ (Seminar on 
Criminal Law 1978) 1,1. 
50 Salomon (n 5) 
51 Machen (n 5). 
52 Salomon (n 5). 
53 Watson (n 5). 
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Nevertheless, the coherent application of these principles to civil and criminal 
liability was difficult: a company, an imaginary human personality, can only commit 
acts that it is legally empowered to do; cannot intend to commit an act and cannot be 
imprisoned.54  Blackstone Commentaries stated, ‘a company cannot commit treason 
or felony or other crime, in its corporate capacity, though its members may in their 
distinct individual capacity.’55 Companies were said to ‘have no souls,' and as 
artificial entities, could not stand trial or serve many punishments as individuals 
can.56 
 
The way in which courts recognised corporate criminal liability for different types 
of offences tested the theoretical and practical coherency of corporate criminal 
liability. There was no challenge to imputing corporate criminal liability on 
regulatory offences because many of these regulatory offences were strict liability 
offences, where crimes do not require a mens rea.57 The greater challenge lied in 
extending corporate criminal liability to offences requiring proof of mens rea. Two 
standards of liability that emerged are notable, the respondeat superior standard and 
the identification doctrine standard.58  
 
2.1.2 Liability for Regulatory Offences  
 
Criminal liability for regulatory offences was established without much challenge. 
Pinto and Evans assert, ‘encouraged, no doubt, by of the Interpretation Act (1889), 
by the turn of the Nineteenth century, the criminal courts accepted that a company 
could be liable for a wide range of criminal offences within the regulatory sphere.’59 
The application of the corporate criminal liability for regulatory offences followed 
from a straight application of s.2(1) of the Interpretation Act 1889. 
 
Companies in the UK began to incur criminal liability for a limited range of offences, 
including public nuisance, criminal libel, and breach of statutory duties.60 Several 
                                                           
54 Brickey, ‘Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation’ (n 1) 401.    
55 Sankaran (n 49) 3. 
56 W. R. Thomas, ‘How and Why Companies Became (and Remain) Persons Under the Criminal Law’ 
(2016) Florida State University Review, Forthcoming 1,1. 
57 Ormerod and Laird (n 20) 143, 248. 
58 ibid. 
59 Amanda Pinto and Martin Evans, Corporate Criminal Liability (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 
33. 
60 G. Stessens, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Perspective’ (1994) 43 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 493, 496.  
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cases addressed liability for nuisance arising out of non-repair of highways or 
bridges by counties.61  This was later extended to cover the liability of railway 
companies.62 In Regina v Birmingham and Glouster Railway Company,63 a company 
was held indictable for failing to comply with a legal mandate requiring the removal 
of a bridge erected over a road.64  
2.1.3 The Respondeat Superior standard 
 
The courts overcame the challenge of imputing criminal liability to a company for 
failing to meet a statutory duty set out in the law through the civil law legal principle 
of vicarious liability.65 Under respondeat superior, the criminal act of any employee 
or officer is imputed to the company if the employee or officer had the express or 
implied authority to commit the act, and they committed the act for the benefit of the 
company. The company is held to be vicariously liable for the acts of the employee 
or officer.66 
 
In The Queen v. Great North of England Railway Company,67 a company was found 
criminally liable for misfeasance when it illegally cut through and obstructed a 
highway in the county of Durham.68 The defendants argued that a company could 
not be held for misfeasance, relying on dicta of Holt C.J in Anonymous case.69 
Prosecutors, on the other hand, relying on Birmingham and Glouster Railway 
Company70 and Rex v The Severn and Wye Railway Company,71 contended that Holt 
C.J.’s dictum is not the law as it stands.72  The case sided with the prosecution, 
holding that a company is liable under criminal law for nonfeasance and 
misfeasance.73  
 
The case is notable for holding companies criminally liable for non-strict liability 
offences. It justified its decision as a matter of public policy:  ‘[the] tendency of 
                                                           
61 For e.g., Russell v Man of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). 
62 The King v Mayor and Company of Liverpool (1802) 3 East 86; The King v Company Stratford Upon 
Avon (1811) 14 East 348; The King v Severn & Wye Railway (1819) 2 B. & 645. 
63 (1841) 3 Q.B.R. 231. 
64 Sankaran (n 49) 1. 
65 Mays (n 38) 33. 
66 Anca I. Pop, ‘Criminal Liability of a Companies-Comparative Jurisprudence’ (King Scholar Program 
thesis, Michigan State University College of Law 2006) 23. 
67 The Queen v. Great North of England Railway Company (QB 1846) 9 QB 315, 319. 
68 ibid 319. 
69 12 Mod. 559 (K.B. 1701) 559. 
70 Glouster Railway (n 63) 
71 The King v Severn & Wye Railway (n 62). 
72 Great North of England Railway Company (n 67). 
73 ibid 325. 
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modern decisions has been to make companies, civilly as well as criminally, 
amenable like individuals.’74 Moreover, the court maintained there is ‘[a relaxation 
of] a rule established in a state of society very different from the present, at a time 
when companies were comparatively few in number and upon which it was very 
early found necessary to engraft many exceptions.’75 Without considering the 
theoretical coherence of its decision, it extended the tort law principle, vicarious 
liability, to criminal law, to support corporate criminal liability for ‘misfeasance’. 
Misfeasance is ‘an intentional tort, where the relevant intention is bad faith.’76 The 
respondeat superior doctrine, holds principals liable for the wrongful actions of 
agents if completed for the benefit of the principal and is within the express or 
apparent scope of their duties.77 
 
Given that the railway company had ordinary powers to interfere with roads, any 
illegal acts of members of the company in relation to such powers could be imputed 
to the company. The members of the company authorised a criminal act in the name 
of the company, and such could be implicated to the company benefiting from this 
act.78 This has established a standard of liability where the criminal acts of any 
employee acting on behalf of the company could be imputed to the company. With 
regards to the punishment, the court stated that ‘the common law punishment for a 
nuisance is a fine, imprisonment, or both. The first of these can be inflicted on a 
company.’79 Given that a corporate entity cannot be imprisoned as an individual can, 
a fine would be imposed as punishment.  
 
The United States followed the English jurisdiction’s development of corporate 
criminal liability in the early 1900s. The Supreme Court in New York Central & 
Hudson River Railroad Company v. United States80 relied on the respondeat superior 
doctrine to recognise corporate criminal liability.81 In the case, a railroad company 
and two of its agents (the general traffic manager and assistant traffic manager) were 
                                                           
74 ibid 319. 
75 ibid 320. 
76 Mark Aronson, ‘Misfeasance in Public Office’ < 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/app/uploads/2016/01/apb_tort.pdf> accessed 1 April 2019, 1.  
77 Kathleen F. Brickey, ‘Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation’ (n 1) 
401-3. 
78 Great North of England Railway Company (n 67) 321. 
79 ibid 322. 
80  New York Central (n 18). 
81 M. H. Baer, ‘Organizational Liability and the Tension Between Corporate and Criminal Law’ (2010) 
19 Journal of Law and Policy 1, 2; Edward B. Diskant, ‘Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: 
Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine through Comparative Criminal Procedure’ (2008) 118 Yale 
Law Journal 126, 139. 
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held liable for paying rebates to sugar refining companies upon shipments of goods 
between states, which was in violation of the Elkins Act.82 It provides, 
 
(a) Anything done or omitted to be done by a company common carrier subject 
to the act to regulate commerce…which, if done or omitted to be done by any 
director or officer thereof, or any receiver, trustee lessee, agent, or person acting 
for or employed by such company, would constitute a misdemeanour under said 
acts, or under this act, shall also be held to be a misdemeanour committed by 
such company 
(b) In construing and enforcing the provisions of this section, the act, omission, 
or failure of any officer, agent, or other person acting for or employed by any 
common carrier, acting within the scope of his employment, shall, in every case, 
be also deemed to be the act, omission, or failure of such carrier, as well as that 
of the person. 
 
The court held that companies ought to be criminally liable for acts of their agents 
that are in violation of the Elkins Act.83 The court cited The Queen v. The Great 
North of England Railway Co.,84 discussed above. It specified that, for the purposes 
of public policy, the tort principle of respondeat superior should extend to criminal 
law. If officers and agents of companies conduct decisions in accordance with the 
companies' purposes, motivations, and goals, they can be seen to have intended to 
complete the acts and should be praised and/or held accountable for such acts.85 In 
particular, agents could assume to have had the power to perform acts within the 
scope of their employment for the benefit of the principal, without the principal 
having necessarily participated in or expressly authorised the conduct.86 It follows 
that companies accept the benefits of the agents’ conducts through profits. Therefore, 
it is not against public policy to hold the company accountable for any unauthorised 
acts by its agents if they have accepted the benefits of such acts. The court further 
explained that since the company itself cannot be arrested or imprisoned, its property 
could be taken for the purposes of punishment or compensation.87  
 
                                                           
82 32 Stat. at L 847, 708, U.S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1907. 
83 ibid. 
84 Great North of England Railway Company (n 67). 
85  New York Central (n 18) 495. 
86  ibid. 
87  ibid. 
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Following the English experience, the recognition of corporate criminal liability in 
the United States is justified in early cases due to ‘shifting trends in legal 
formalisms’, rather than through theoretical concepts. It was practically expedient 
and effective to respond to the growing power and size of companies and changing 
attitudes towards compliance through recognising corporate criminal liability.88  
 
As explored in the next section, the respondeat superior standard still applies in 
England and Wales and the United States.89 Yet, the development of the 
identification doctrine standard in England and Wales narrowed the applicability of 
respondeat superior as a prominent company criminal liability standard.90  
 
2.1.4 The Identification Doctrine  
 
In England and Wales, the prominence of the respondeat superior standard was 
narrowed by the ‘identification doctrine’ standard. Like respondeat superior, the 
identification doctrine originates in civil law, as set out in the case of Lennard’s 
Carrying Co. Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd.91 In the case, the court held that, for the 
purposes of tort law, the act of the managing director or controlling officer, not any 
member within the company, equated to an act of the company.92 Viscount Haldane 
L.C. stated,  
 
[A] company is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it has a 
body of its own; its active and directing will must consequently be sought in the 
person of somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, but who is 
really the directing mind and will of the company, the very ego and centre of the 
personality of the company … somebody who is not merely a servant or agent 
for whom the company is liable upon the footing respondent superior, but 
somebody for whom the company is liable because his action is the very action 
of the company itself.93 
 
                                                           
88  A. Weissmann and D. Newman, ‘Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability’ (2007) 82 Indiana Law 
Journal 411, 418; W.R. Thomas (n 56) 9; Baer (n 81) 2-3. See the discussion on deterrence in Chapter 
1, sections 2.1.3 and 3.1.3.  
89 See Chapter 1, section 3.1. 
90 Mays (n 38) 38. 
91 (1915) AC 705. 
92 ibid 712-4. 
93 ibid 713-4. 
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The criminal acts of individuals who are the ‘directing mind and will of the company' 
equate to the actions of the company. Corporate criminal liability would apply even 
if the agent acted against the set procedures because they ‘[directed] the mind of the 
company towards the commission of an offence.'94  
 
Defining the scope of individuals whose acts or omissions would be imputed to the 
company for a particular state of mind or behavioural standards was developed from 
the 1940s.95 In DPP v. Kent and Sussex Contractors, Ltd,96 it was held that the 
knowledge and intention of the ‘responsible agent of the company’ should be 
attributed to the company.97 In Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd v T.J. Graham & Sons 
Ltd,98 Denning L.J stated, 
 
[A] company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and 
nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools 
and act in accordance with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the 
company are mere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to do 
the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors 
and managers who represent the directing mind and will of the company, and 
control what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of 
the company and is treated by the law as such. So you will find that in cases 
where the law requires personal fault as a condition of liability in tort, the fault 
of the manager will be the personal fault of the company.99 
 
Agents are defined as individuals who hold high positions within a company, 
particularly being capable of making decisions on behalf of the company and/or play 
a key function within the company's decisional structure. Finding a company liable 
requires identifying individuals within the company who hold high positions and can 
represent the company, and proving that such individuals committed the actus reus 
and mens rea of the offence. Their criminal acts are implicated to the company 
because a company, an artificial body, cannot act without its agents.  
 
                                                           
94 ibid 714. 
95 See for e.g., R. v. I.C.R. Haulage, Ltd (1944) K.B. 551; Moore v. Bresler (1944) 2 All E.R. 515; DPP 
v. Kent and Sussex Contractors, Ltd. (1944) 1 All K.B. 146. 
96 (1944) 1 All K.B. 146. 
97 ibid 156. 
98 (1957) 1 Q.B. 159. 
99 ibid 172. 
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In Tesco Supermarkets v Nattrass,100 the company in the case was charged with an 
offence under the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 when a cashier employee sold a 
product above the advertised price, which was contrary to the company’s policies 
and employee training. The Trade Descriptions Act 1968 has three defences: 
mistake, reliance on information supplied to the trader, and/or an accident beyond 
the control of a person, and the person took all reasonable precautions and exercised 
due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.101 The company raised the last 
defence.102 Lord Diplock provided guidance on the ‘identification doctrine’, stating,  
 
What natural persons are to be treated in law as being the company for the 
purpose of acts done in the course of its business, including the taking of 
precautions and the exercise of due diligence to avoid the commission of a 
criminal offence, is to be found by identifying those natural persons who by the 
memorandum and articles of association or as a result of action taken by the 
directors, or by the company in general meeting pursuant to the articles, are 
entrusted with the exercise of the powers of the company.103   
 
Agents of the company can be identified through the memorandum or articles of 
association, or through powers granted by the board of directors. Additionally, a 
company would not be held liable unless the agents are identified, and there is 
evidence that the agents had the requisite actus rues and mens rea for the offence.104 
Thus,  applying the identification doctrine, the criminal acts of an individual holding 
the position of a ‘cashier’ cannot be imputed to the company. 
 
A number of issues arise from the Tesco Supermarkets v Nattrass105 decision. Lord 
Reid notes,  
 
Parliament has chosen to deal with the problem piecemeal… the main object of 
these provisions must have been to distinguish between those who are in some 
degree blameworthy and those who are not, and to enable the latter to escape 
from conviction if they can show that they were in no way to blame.106  
                                                           
100 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v Nattrass (1972) A.C. 153. 
101 ibid 168.  
102 ibid 153, 167. 
103 Nattrass (n 100) 200. 
104 Celia Wells, ‘Corporate Liability for Crime: The Neglected Question’ (1995) International Banking 
and Financial Law 42, 43. 
105 Nattrass (n 100) 200. 
106 ibid 169-70. 
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The court did not specifically define the scope of liability for different types of 
crimes beyond stating that the respondeat superior standard would only apply if the 
employee committed a criminal act without violating the company’s procedures.107 
Moreover, the court did not take into account that companies come in different sizes 
and have different management structures. Defining the exact parameters of 
individuals who represent the ‘alter ego of the company’ can be challenging.  
 
These issues were apparent in later decisions. Tesco Supermarkets v Nattrass108 was 
distinguished from Tesco Stores Ltd v Brent London Borough Council.109 In the case, 
a store manager sold a video work with an age classification certificate to a person 
below the specified age. Section 11 of the Video Recordings Act 1984 regulates the 
selling and supplying of video work with age classification certificates. It is a 
criminal act to sell or supply a video work for someone under the age listed in the 
classification certificate.110 Defences include lack of knowledge or reasonable 
grounds to believe that the classification certificate contained the age statement or 
lack of knowledge or reasonable grounds that the person did not attain the required 
age.111 The court held that the regulatory route to the offence would be followed, or 
in other words, that the respondeat superior standard would apply in the case. The 
company could not rely on the defence of ‘lack of knowledge’ under the 
identification principle.  
 
Distinctively, the criminal act in Tesco Stores Ltd v Brent London Borough 
Council112 did not have a ‘due diligence’ defence like Tesco Supermarkets v 
Nattrass,113 and the act was committed by a senior manager rather than an employee 
not following the orders of the company. In a large company like Tesco, the senior 
manager would not fall under the category of a person who ‘would have directed the 
company towards the commission of the offence.’ Lord Buckley stated in Tesco 
Stores Ltd v Brent London Borough Council,114 ‘can a company which contracted to 
supply a video rely on a defence …on the basis that its employee’s state of mind 
                                                           
107 ibid 173. 
108 Nattrass (n 100). 
109 Brent London Borough Council (n 112). 
110 Video Recordings Act 1984, s. 11(1). 
111 ibid s 11(2). 
112 Tesco Stores Ltd v Brent London Borough Council (1993) 2 All ER 718; 1 W.L.R. 1037. 
113 Nattrass (n 100). 
114 Brent London Borough Council (n 112). 
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cannot be imputed to itself? …No.’115 The court reasoned that if the directing mind 
and will approach was followed and the defence was to be applied, no large company 
could ever be held liable.116  
 
Thus, Tesco Stores Ltd v Brent London Borough Council117 and Tesco Supermarkets 
v Nattrass118 illustrate difficulties in determining the applicable rule of attribution if 
statutory or common law offences fail to provide clear and straightforward 
guidance.119  
 
Lord Hoffmann in the Privy Council decision, Meridian Global Funds Management 
Asia Ltd v Securities,120 sought to clarify when corporate criminal liability would be 
imposed through ‘the rules of attribution.’121 He acknowledges that the states of 
minds and behavioural standards by certain members within the company can be 
attributed to the company through statutory provisions; the company’s constitution; 
and common law principles. However, in some circumstances, the law excludes the 
rules of agency or vicarious liability by stating that the defendant is required to fulfil 
the actus reus and mens rea of the offence.122 He states,  
 
[I]n such a case, the court must fashion a special rule Hoffman clarified that in 
such circumstances, it is important of interpretation: given that it was intended 
to apply to a company, how was it intended to apply? Whose act (or knowledge, 
or state of mind) was for this purpose intended to count as the act etc of the 
company? One finds the answer to this question by applying the usual canons of 
interpretation, taking into account the language of the rule (if it is a statute) and 
its content and policy.123 
 
Importantly, determining whether a company is criminally liable is context 
dependent; it requires looking at the specific offence or case to determine the rule of 
attribution that will apply.124 Ormerod and Laird state, ‘it remains to be seen how far 
in practice the [Meridian] approach displaces [Nattrass] by allowing corporate 
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liability when the acts are those of individuals who would not be seen as a 
controller.’125 The impact and contextualisation of the case remain unclear. 
 
Dignam and Lowry imply that the case displaced the narrow application of the 
identification doctrine in Tesco Supermarkets v Nattrass,126 stating that ‘[Nattrass] 
provided a misleading analysis. The real issue was who were the controllers of the 
company for the purposes of attribution…Despite this the idea of an alter ego or 
directing mind and will of a company still appear in the law from time to time.'127 
They argue that the case is compatible with the rule in Salomon,128 which emphasises 
that a company is separate from its members.129 Loveless et al. further states, ‘Lord 
Hoffman stated that the identification model of liability was not always appropriate 
and was one subcategory of a broader rule of attribution.’130 The courts do not view 
the identification doctrine as the default rule but rather look at the objective of the 
statute to determine whether liability would be attributed to the company.131 
 
On the other hand, Ormerod and Laird interpret Meridian Global Funds 
Management Asia Ltd v Securities132 as a restatement of the law rather than a 
departure from the law.133 In R v St Regis Paper Company Ltd,134 Moses LJ, citing 
Ormerod and Laird, recognise that the case reemphasises looking back at the statute 
and sources of the law to determine the correct rule of attribution.135 The case has 
also approved the narrow approach in Moore v. Bresler,136 which was parallel to the 
approach in Tesco Supermarkets v Nattrass.137  
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Nevertheless, recent cases have viewed the identification doctrine as the default rule 
of attribution.138 The Supreme Court in Jetivia SA and another v Bilta (UK) Ltd (in 
liquidation) and others139 held that the acts of the directors could not be attributed to 
the company. In R v A Ltd,140 Brian Leveson P stated that ‘save in those cases where 
consideration of the legislation creating the offence in question leads to a different 
and perhaps broader approach, as discussed in Meridian Global Funds Management 
Asia Ltd v Securities Commission, the test for determining those individuals whose 
actions and state of mind are to be attributed to a corporate body remains that 
established in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass.’141 The approach of the courts on 
contextualising the identification doctrine as the default rule or as a subset of many 
attribution rules is inconsistent, contributing to the perception that corporate criminal 
liability as a theoretically incoherent concept.142  
 
From here, it may be worth going back to the question asked at the beginning of the 
section: What is the theoretical justification for extending respondeat superior and 
the identification doctrine, both civil law principles, to the criminal law?   
 
One may argue that ‘deterrence’ was the objective of recognising corporate criminal 
liability. Corporate criminal liability was seen as a necessary response to increasing 
social and economic harms by companies. The growing size and power of companies 
and eagerness for profit maximisation shifted attitudes of complying with the law. 
Moreover, holding members of companies liable under civil law and/or criminal law 
was not sufficient to deter companies from violating the law, hence focusing on 
punishing the corporate entity was seen as a better mechanism in deterring the 
specific company and other companies from committing violations of the law.143  
 
Yet, as Chapter 3 explores, different approaches to deterrence adopt distinctive 
approaches to attributing fault to the company. Some approaches to deterrence focus 
on holding individuals within the company reliable and reject corporate criminal 
liability to achieve specific deterrence; whilst other approaches see value in applying 
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corporate criminal liability only when deterrence is not achieved through holding the 
members personally accountable.   
 
Early cases did not adequately identify the aims of punishing companies nor how 
corporate bodies, artificial entities, could be deemed to have ‘intended’ a criminal 
act or were ‘negligent.’ Even if ‘deterrence theory’ is linked to the basis of corporate 
criminal liability, it is still not clear which approach to deterrence is being followed, 
resulting in difficulties in defining the rules of attribution.   Accordingly, in search 
for an ‘intellectual foundation of corporate criminal liability,’144  section 2.2. will 
consider a select of theoretical justifications to corporate criminal liability that has 
been considered in legal literature. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Justifications to Corporate Criminal Liability 
 
2.2.1 Justifying Corporate Criminal Liability as Moral Responsibility  
 
One justification to corporate criminal liability relates to the moral blameworthiness 
of the company, i.e. viewing the company as an ‘autonomous moral [agent]’.145 
Many theoretical approaches to ‘corporate criminal liability as group moral agency’ 
have emerged, which can be grouped as the ‘group moral agency’ approach.146  The 
subsection focuses on the theoretical views of Peter French and Philip Pettit on 
companies as moral individuals. French states,    
 
[My] interest is to argue for a theory that accepts companies as members of the 
moral community, of equal standing with the traditionally acknowledged 
biological human beings…hence that they can have whatever privileges, rights, 
and duties as are, in the normal course of affairs, accorded to moral persons.147 
 
Companies are collectives that are equal to individuals and should have the same 
rights and owe the same moral obligations.148 French argues that a moral person is a 
‘subject of a right’ and does not require ‘biological existence.’149 They are collectives 
or ‘conglomerates' not an aggregate of individuals because they have decision-
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making processes.150 Being subject to a right incurs responsibility in certain 
circumstances: when the subject’s actions cause an event, and/or when ‘the event 
was the direct result of an intentional act of the subject’.151 Given that companies are 
collectives with decision-making processes, they have a corporate personality that 
can intend. Intent can be established from the company’s internal decision structure 
(Hereinafter ‘CID’), which reflects the policies of the company and the power 
structure within the company.152 The CID is driven by the decisions of personnel 
who are acting for the benefit of the company.153  
 
Additionally, Pettit also argues that companies are moral agents. He recognises 
corporate criminal liability on the basis of ‘a regime of moral responsibility 
[dictating] when people are blameworthy.'154 He argues, 
 
‘[A] group of people will constitute a corporate agent…[which is] an individual 
human person, being capable of advancing considered goals in light of 
considered representations and, in particular, being capable of registering and 
responding to desiderata of rationality as well as to the values that members of 
the group personally countenance’155  
 
Agreeing with French’s assertion that companies are conglomerates, Pettit states that 
companies are group agents.156 Group agents can be held responsible if three 
conditions are satisfied. First, ‘value relevance’, where the company has the choice 
to make a ‘good or bad or right or wrong decision.’157 Second, ‘value judgement’, 
where the company has the ability through knowledge or evidence to make 
judgements about the relative value of options.158 Third, ‘value sensitivity’, where 
the company can make decisions after considering the value relevance and 
judgement.159 Accordingly, companies are capable of intentionality through the 
recurrent decisions taken by its members to advance their goals and are morally 
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responsible for decisions that result in violations of the law.160 A company can 
‘intend’ if four conditions are met: the company’s members have a shared goal, 
members within the company individually contribute to advance the goal, the 
company makes decisions to advance that goal, and members within the company 
have a common awareness of that goal.161 
 
From here, the corporate entity is capable of being held responsible in the same way 
individuals are, including criminal liability. Both French and Pettit argue that if 
companies are proven to be morally blameworthy, they should not be precluded from 
criminal liability and punishment.162 French explains that a company can have moral 
responsibility even if one or more of its members are not responsible.163 Pettit states 
that the mens rea, or guilty mind, includes ‘intentional malice, malice with foresight, 
negligence, or recklessness.’164  
 
Many issues arise from ‘the group moral agency’ approach. First, French and Pettit 
argue that companies owe moral duties to individuals, therefore can be morally 
blameworthy. Yet, they fail or do not sufficiently explain the reasons behind 
companies owing moral duties to individuals and how they are part of the moral 
community.165 Pettit derives his arguments on attracting moral blameworthiness 
from Christian catechisms on ‘conditions necessary and sufficient for a deed to 
constitute a serious sin….[There] must have been a grave matter…full knowledge of 
the guilt, and full consent of the will.’166 Pettit argues that a company can make value 
judgements hence attracts blame, yet it is very difficult to draw the line between a 
good and bad value judgement, especially when making short and long-term 
decisions to maximise the success of the company. This relates to the broader 
argument that there are flaws in establishing a civil and/or criminal liability system 
based on a ‘morally good citizen or company.' Individuals have different perceptions 
as to what ‘morality' is, and it is unlikely that a state has one moral standard.167 
Making decisions based on ‘moral rules’, which are constantly subject to change and 
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vary amongst different consumer markets, is difficult. The possible coherency of this 
argument is diminished in the context of a company. 
 
Furthermore, it is not clear which and how different types of mens rea are recognised 
by Pettit and French. Mellema recognises, ‘how far French is willing to go in 
granting collectives the capability of bearing moral responsibility is not clear.’168 Lee 
further states, ‘what distinguishes a defect [by a company] from an innocent 
causative act is not explained by French.’169 French explains how a company can 
‘intend’ but does not explain whether criminal responsibility can be established 
through other ways, i.e. whether a company can be reckless, have malice with 
foresight and/or be negligent. Additionally, Pettit lists the different types of mens rea 
that could be attributed to a company without explaining the particular differences 
between them. He does not, for instance, provide examples of circumstances where 
a company can be said to have met ‘malice with foresight’ rather than ‘recklessness’. 
The foundations of his arguments based on ‘reliance on grave matter…full 
knowledge of the guilt following, and full consent of the will,’ reflecting Christian 
catechisms, do not reflect culpability standards like negligence and recklessness.  
 
Overall, one theoretical justification to corporate criminal liability is that companies, 
like individuals, owe moral responsibilities. This account faces many difficulties, 
including sufficiently justifying how the company would be part of the moral 
community, defining the moral community, drawing the line between civil and 
criminal liability, and explaining the differences between the types of mens rea and 
culpability standards that are accepted. Therefore, it is more coherent to explore 
theoretical approaches that draw the line between moral blameworthiness and 
criminal liability.170 
 
2.2.2 Justifying Corporate Criminal Liability as Team Member Responsibility   
 
One influential theoretical view of corporate criminal liability is Lee’s ‘corporate 
criminal liability as team member responsibility’.171 Corporate criminal liability is 
‘[the] shared responsibility of the members of the incorporated enterprise for 
wrongdoing by one or more of the other members.’172  
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Under this view, companies are defined as ‘a set of legal consequences produced by 
corporate law and the company’s constitutive documents.’173 A company is created 
by a set of contracts, resulting in legal relationships between all bodies working on 
behalf of the company. 174 The company is a separate legal personality because it 
undergoes a process of incorporation; it is not an association of shareholders but is a 
‘separate legal entity from its shareholders.’175 
 
Given that the company is a separate legal personality following incorporation, it 
will adopt a persona.176 The company will develop monitoring and bonding policies 
to promote mutual loyalty between members of the company and the corporate body, 
and to maximise efforts to reach the objectives of members of the companies 
working as one unit or one team.177  Mutual exchanges of value between the company 
and the market help in defining the corporate personality or character and the 
company are also likely to develop policies and implement measures to establish its 
personality to its clients and the community.178 Resultantly, companies have a set of 
collective action principles that are well-founded regardless of whether there are 
changes to the team members. 179 
 
Attitudes towards compliance by members of the company are influenced by the 
contract they have with the company, monitoring and bonding policies, and the 
benefits received. Members of the team judge their conduct not individually, but 
relative to whether they completed their tasks and the company’s objectives as a 
result of their collective actions.180 Corporate success is the result of contributions 
by any person within the team.181 Any achievement committed by one or more 
members should be taken as credit for collective achievement of the whole team, and 
any failure committed by one or more members should be a discredit to the whole 
team.  Members of the team, motivated by the team’s norms and behaviour, may 
contribute to positive achievements in compliance with the law, or negative 
achievements that incur benefits to the company but are in violation of the law.182 
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For companies, crimes are defined as acts or omissions that are the responsibility of 
the team. Lee states,  
 
[Condemnation] of the whole company draws attention to the contributory role 
that the team’s norms played in producing the wrongdoing and to the 
responsibility of the members in relation to the content of those norms… and for 
the state to condemn the direct wrongdoer alone is to implicitly and mistakenly 
absolve the team.183  
 
When the negative achievements fall under criminal liability laws, criminal liability 
should be imposed on both the member of the team and the organisation, to influence 
the behaviour of team members who may have contributed to the generation of 
conduct leading to the wrongdoing, and to allow team members to evaluate whether 
they should continue to be part of the corporate entity.184  
 
Lee argues that criminal liability should be imposed under two circumstances. First, 
it should arise when the commission of the wrongdoing is partially or completely 
motivated by the team’s norms. Second, it should arise when team members 
contribute to or commit the unlawful act or omission in pursuit of the team’s goals.185 
The team members under the latter circumstance could also incur personal liability. 
When liability is imposed in accordance with these principles, companies would be 
alerted that legal violations could create a setback to achieving long term corporate 
goals.186  
 
2.2.3 The Coherence of Corporate Criminal Liability as Team Member 
Responsibility  
 
From here, it is crucial to consider the theoretical and practical coherency of 
corporate criminal liability as team member responsibility. The view compellingly 
overcomes difficulties posed by the Group Moral Agency Theory, and successfully 
counterargues many views in legal literature that oppose corporate criminal liability 
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as a principle. The subsection will defend Lee’s team member responsibility basis to 
corporate criminal liability in light of these views.  
 
Corporate criminal liability as team member responsibility advantageously provides 
a ‘non-moral' view of corporate criminal liability. Liability is imposed when a team 
member contributes to or commits an unlawful act in pursuit of the team's goals and 
by the motivation of the team's norms. The view does not set immorality as a 
standard for imposing liability. This is advantageous for three reasons. 
 
First, the theory is in line with the concepts of separate legal personality and 
corporate personhood following Salomon.187 According to a modern view of the 
concession theory, the corporate legal personality is acquired following 
incorporation as allowed by statute; ‘a persona dicta that owed its existence to the 
state.’188 The impact of this is as follows – the corporate exists as separate from its 
shareholders and is not merely an aggregate group. Accordingly, it has 
representatives like the board of directors and acquires a persona through its internal 
processes and decision-making processes.189  
 
Second, it clearly draws the line between criminal and civil liability and justifies the 
necessity for criminal liability in addition to civil liability. From here, one should 
evaluate the necessity of criminal liability in addition to civil liability. One view that 
rejects criminal liability is the neoclassical view. The neoclassical view distinguishes 
civil from criminal liability methods of punishment and compensation. Civil liability 
imposes fines, whereas criminal liability imposes sanctions beyond fines, notably 
imprisonment. Since corporate bodies are fictional entities, they cannot be 
imprisoned, hence criminal liability is not necessary. If the primary method for 
sentencing is fines, then civil liability is a more economically feasible way of dealing 
with wrongdoings. Criminal prosecutions often incur high costs associated with 
substantive procedural and substantive safeguards.190  
 
Having considered Lee’s views on criminal liability, it is clear that views rejecting 
liability on the basis of methods of sentencing and compensation fail to distinguish 
between the aims of sentencing and methods of punishment. It is not viable to reject 
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criminal liability for cost-internalisation purposes. Neither is it viable to reject 
criminal liability due to the fact that the predominant method of punishment is the 
payment of fines, which is similar to civil law cases. History evidences the failure of 
civil liability to influence the behaviour of companies. Imposing a criminal fine 
carries a different weight from imposing a civil fine. Criminal fines attach the label 
‘criminal' to the conduct and eliminate the option of factoring in the costs of civil 
fines as a part of their business (possibly through insurance).191 Parallel to Lee’s 
views, this is more likely to influence members of companies to adjust their 
preferences and understand that such conduct would result in punishment and that 
the prosecution of one company is likely to influence the behaviour of other 
companies to avoid future criminal liability.192 As will be investigated in the next 
section and later chapters, the payment of fines is not the only way to punish 
companies. 
 
Third, it clarifies the role of members in a corporate entity and identifies situations 
where personal liability and corporate liability would be imposed.193 This 
advantageously overcomes difficulties of justifying the extension of respondeat 
superior and the identification doctrine to criminal law, which early cases have failed 
to do.  
 
Legal literature opposing corporate criminal liability often cite the theoretical 
incoherence of extending vicarious liability, a tort principle, to criminal law. One 
view that rejects corporate criminal liability on theoretical grounds is worth 
considering. Hasnas states, ‘New York Central was a mistake when it was decided, 
remains a mistake today, and should be explicitly overruled.’194 Hasnas sees a clear 
distinction between criminal and civil laws:  Criminal laws aim to punish, whereas 
civil laws aim to achieve ‘corrective justice’, which would require an individual, 
even without personal fault, to pay compensation to restore an injured party for an 
act that they have caused or benefited from. Corporate criminal liability thereby 
authorises a form of collective punishment that directly contradicts fundamental 
principles of a liberal society, which are advocated by Anglo-American criminal 
law.195 
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Particularly, as the court in New York Central196 considered, Hasnas contends that 
imposing corporate criminal liability would incriminate shareholders for acts that 
they did not commit without affording them due process of the law.197 Moreover, 
management within companies cannot authorise illegal activities. Both situations 
evidence that a corporate entity cannot commit the actus reus and mens rea of a 
crime. Actus reus involves the performance of a legally prohibited act, and mens rea 
requires the actor to have a particular state of mind when committing the act. 198 
When a sentence is imposed, the property of shareholders would be used to pay for 
the fine, even though shareholders do not have the actus reus and mens rea for the 
commission of the offence.199 
 
Having considered Lee’s views on the roles of members within a company, it is clear 
that personal criminal liability would not be imposed on shareholders of a company 
if they were not directly involved with the operations of the company. A study that 
examined American public companies convicted of federal crimes in 1984-1990 has 
concluded that the impact of corporate crime on shareholder wealth is not apparent 
and that corporate crime occurs less frequently in companies where top management 
have a larger ownership stake.200  
 
In companies where ownership and management are separate, shareholders have the 
opportunity to learn about the company’s ethos, operations, policies, and 
management structure policies before investing in the company. Directors and 
employees perform tasks and make decisions based on achieving the identified 
corporate purposes, which include maximising shareholder profits. The personal 
interests of shareholders who are not involved in the operations of the company are 
not impacted by corporate criminal liability; criminal liability is not imposed on a 
shareholder not involved in the management of the company.201 Companies have 
assets that shareholders benefit from, and liabilities that shareholders are impacted 
by. Punishment is imposed on the company’s assets, including money shareholders 
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invested into the company, rather than the shareholders’ personal assets.202 The court 
in New York Central203 rightly justified its decision by looking at the negative impact 
of immunising companies by taking away ‘the only means of effectually controlling 
the subject matter and correcting the abuses.’204 It would be against public policy to 
immunise shareholders who benefit from decisions performed by its agents in 
accordance with the goals and purposes of the company.205  
 
If shareholders are involved in the operation of the company, Lee’s views clarify that 
corporate criminal liability would only be imposed if it falls under one of the 
specified circumstances. A shareholder would only incur personal liability if they 
were directly involved in the commission of the offence.206  
 
Furthermore, Lee’s team member responsibility view to corporate criminal liability 
is parallel to legible views on how corporate bodies can commit the actus reus and 
mens rea of a crime. At first sight, it seems unreasonable to hold a company 
criminally liable for the acts of the employees or agents, especially if committed 
contrary to their authority.  
 
Nevertheless, criminal liability is only imposed to enforce a ‘maximum degree of 
care’ against the person in authority to prevent harm to others, rather than moral 
guilt.207 According to Lee, companies can be held liable for a criminal act if their 
agents have acted for the purpose of benefitting the company (actus reus), and the 
agents or employees had the actual or apparent authority to act on behalf of the 
company or believed that their conduct would benefit the company (mens rea).208 
Mens rea has often been defined as a ‘wicked mind, thus implying that the law is … 
concerned with the moral guilt of the wrongdoer.’209 Nevertheless, mens rea means 
that the person has met a specific culpable standard, which the law regards as 
criminal, such as gross negligence, intention, or recklessness.210 The law has adopted 
these standards to effectively prevent harm to third parties and does not assess the 
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degree of moral guilt of the defender.211 Accordingly, corporate decisions that result 
in a violation of the law should be imputed to the company. Since the company is 
likely to acquire benefits from the violation, the punishment would include imposing 
a fine to be paid from the company’s assets and properties. Based on these views, 
the extension of respondeat superior and the identification doctrine to criminal law 
can be justified through a non-moral basis of corporate criminal liability. 
 
A non-moral view of corporate criminal liability is in line with the development of 
the corporate form and separate legal personality in England and Wales and the 
United States. Despite their flaws, the respondeat superior and identification 
standards do not refer to the moral responsibility of the company, but rather define 
the legal responsibility of the company as a result of violations of law by certain 
employees within the company.212 Fisse argues that companies cannot be immoral, 
‘if one believes that offences are ‘sins with legal definitions’…then one cannot 
believe in corporate criminal liability; companies lack a conscience.’213 Corporate 
responsibility cannot be articulated in moral terms, and culpability does not have to 
be tied to morality.214 A non-moral view is also practically in line with criminal laws 
as applied to individuals because moral obligations are not always legal obligations 
under the law.215 Moreover, corporate criminal liability as team member 
responsibility is inclusive of different forms of mens rea, thereby accounting for 
different risk factors and causes that may lead to a violation of the law.  
 
Overall, understanding corporate criminal liability as team member responsibility is 
theoretically and practically coherent: the view appropriately bridges the gap 
between the theoretical foundations of criminal law and addresses arguments against 
the historical recognition of corporate criminal liability. Any reforms to the law 
should seek to modernise corporate criminal laws rather than abolish them.  The next 
step is to explore current corporate criminal laws in England and Wales and the 
United States, including liability standards and sentencing practices. 
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3 The Current Scope of Corporate Criminal Liability and Sentencing 
 
Having assessed the historical development of corporate criminal liability and 
sentencing, the next step is to explore the current scope of the law, particularly 
liability standards and sentencing practices. As discussed above, although the first 
American decision establishing corporate criminal liability referenced English law, 
each jurisdiction adopts distinctive liability standards and sentencing practices today. 
Recent proposals in England and Wales have considered the advantages of 
implementing reforms in line with the laws in the United States.216  
 
3.1 Liability Standards 
 
3.1.1 England and Wales  
 
In England and Wales, the standard of liability is set in accordance with the type of 
crime.217 First, the respondeat superior theory applies to strict liability offences, 
where no mens rea is needed to prove that the offence occurred.218 For instance, 
traffic offences under the Road Traffic Act 1988 are strict liability offences unless 
they expressly require proving fault. Section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 states 
that a person who causes the death of another person by driving a vehicle 
dangerously will be guilty of an offence. Accordingly, if an employee violates the 
law while in the course employment, the company may be held liable. Second, the 
‘alter ego principle’, otherwise known as the ‘directing mind’ or identification 
doctrine, applies to ‘all types of offences, including those which require mens rea’.219  
 
Second, the court determines whether to apply the respondeat superior standard or 
identification doctrine standard for intermediary cases that could, at first instance, be 
categorised as either strict liability offences or non-strict liability offences. For 
example, the hybrid regulatory offences may have a due diligence defence, a lack of 
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knowledge defence, or a constructive knowledge element.220 Courts have been 
classifying these offences as either strict liability offences or non-strict liability 
offences by considering the specific circumstances of each case.221  
 
Third, distinct standards of liability have been created by statute to punish certain 
types of crimes, which have displaced the common law. They were passed ‘to 
overcome the historical difficulty in establishing corporate criminal liability.’222 
These include money laundering (Money Laundering Regulations 2007), bribery 
(Bribery Act 2010), fraud (Fraud Act 2006), and manslaughter (Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007). 
 
Under the Bribery Act 2010, an organisation could be held liable if a person 
associated with the organisation bribed a person with the intention of  
 
‘[obtaining or retaining] business for the organisation, or [obtaining or retaining] 
an advantage in the conduct of business for the organisation…[unless the 
organisation proves they had] adequate procedures designed to prevent persons 
associated with the organisation from undertaking such conduct.’223  
 
A person is considered to be associated with the organisation if they perform services 
for or on behalf of the organisation, regardless of their capacity (including 
employees, agents or subsidiaries). Additionally, employees are assumed to perform 
services for or on behalf of the organisation unless it could be proven otherwise. The 
Bribery Act 2010 takes a broader approach than common law because the criminal 
act committed by an employee, agent or subsidiary could be imputed to the company. 
The mens rea of intent by the employee, agent or subsidiary is imputed to the 
company unless a defence of having adequate procedures to safeguard against the 
bribery exists.  
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The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 altered the common 
law standard.224 An organisation can be found criminally liable ‘if the way its 
activities are managed or organised- (a) causes a person’s death, and (b) amounts to 
a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased.’225 
The company would only be found liable if the activities were managed or organised 
by one or more members of ‘senior management’, which are defined as those who 
have ‘significant roles in (i) the making of decisions about how the whole or 
substantial part of its activities are to be managed or organised or (ii) the actual 
managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those roles.’226 
Therefore, the act takes a broader approach than the common law approach because 
it does not require identification of the culpable act and mind of a specific individual 
within the company, but prosecution would still have to prove that the criminal act 
is associated with the way senior management has conducted its activities before 
liability can be established. 
 
Overall, the standards of liability under England and Wales have originated from 
respondeat superior in early cases recognising a corporate criminal liability, to a 
framework adopting different liability standards to tackle different types of crime. 
Determining intermediary cases on a case by case basis may be detrimental to 
holding companies liable, as they may adopt management structures to safeguard 
against prosecution. Moreover, passing laws to overcome difficulties of the 
identification doctrine in bringing companies to justice may be advantageous, yet 
should be approached carefully to ensure that liability standards are consistent for 
similar corporate crimes or for crimes that carry the same levels of seriousness.  
 
3.1.2 The United States  
 
To gain a full understanding of corporate criminal liability standards, it is noted that 
American criminal law derives from common law (English criminal law and state 
common law), and statutory law at state and federal levels.227 There are no common 
law crimes in the federal system because the federal government derives as delegated 
by the Constitution, but common law definitions are used in federal case law.228 
States define crimes and set their own criminal procedural rules, as long as they 
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comply with the state Constitution and the federal Constitution.229 State crimes are 
recognised through common law and statutes established by the state legislature.230 
Many states have adopted the same principles and replicated the liability standards 
adopted by federal law and the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code 
(Hereinafter ‘MPC’).231 Robinson and Dubber state, ‘if there can be said to be an 
‘American criminal code,’ the Model Penal Code is it…even within the minority of 
states without a modern code, the Model Penal Code has great influence, as courts 
regularly rely upon it to fashion the law that the state’s criminal code fails to 
provide.’232 The MPC has codified substantive criminal laws and is often relied upon 
by courts to interpret and apply the law.233   
 
Federal courts deal with offences that have a federal interest, as expressly and 
impliedly provided by the Constitution.234 Title 18 of the United States Code is the 
main criminal code of the federal government and overlays the codes of all states 
and the District of Columbia. Title 1 of The United States Code states, ‘unless the 
context indicates otherwise… the words ‘person' and ‘whoever' include companies, 
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies as well as 
individuals.’235 Accordingly, federal criminal laws apply to companies.  
 
As to the standards of liability, American law at state and federal levels ‘choose the 
most encompassing model among the existing models – respondeat superior- to cope 
with corporate criminal liability.’236 The respondeat superior doctrine, following 
New York Central237 is used for non-strict liability offences. A company can be 
prosecuted for intent, recklessness or knowledge if an employee committed a crime. 
Under the respondeat superior doctrine, the criminal act of an employee acting 
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within the scope of his or her employment and on behalf of the company, regardless 
of his hierarchy within the company and his or her capability to represent the 
company, could be implicated to the company.238  
 
Additionally, the standard under the MPC is narrower than the common law 
standard. Similar to the English approach, standards of liability are determined by 
the type of criminal activity. Strict liability offences apply to companies unless 
legislation specifies otherwise, or a contrary legislative purpose appears.239 As to 
non-strict liability offences, Section 2.07(1) states that liability could apply in three 
situations. First, when an agent acting on behalf of the company within the scope of 
their employment, commits an offence that meets the standard set in a statute, and 
there is a legislative purpose for the imposition of the liability on the company. An 
agent is defined as a ‘director, officer, servant, employee or another person 
[authorised] to act on behalf of the company or association.’240 Importantly, s 207(5) 
specifies that unless contrary to the legislative purpose of a specific statute, the 
defendants have a defence, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
high managerial agent, having supervisory responsibility for the subject matter of 
the offence, employed due diligence to prevent its commission. Second, when a 
company fails to meet a duty of affirmative performance imposed by law.241 Third, 
where the board of directors or a high managerial agent acting on behalf of the 
company within the scope of their employment ‘authorised, requested, commanded, 
performed or recklessly tolerated' an offence.242 A high managerial agent is defined 
as an officer of a company that has ‘duties of such responsibility that his conduct 
may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the company or association.’243  
 
The MPC framework adopts a similar yet more structured approach than the English 
framework. The MPC clearly specifies the basis of liability, and clearly identifies a 
common ‘due diligence' defence for all non-strict liability statutory offences, unless 
the defence goes against the legislative purpose of the statute.   
 
3.1.3 Reconsidering Current Standards of Liability 
 
                                                           
238 Pop (n 66) 4. 
239 American Law Institute (n 231) s 2.07 (2). 
240 ibid s 2.07(4)(b). 
241 ibid s 2.07 (1) (a)-(b). 
242 ibid s 2.07 (1) (c). 
243 ibid s 2.07 (1) (a)-(b). 
  
42 
From here, it is important to discuss possible issues with current standards of liability 
as set under the law in England and Wales and the United States.  
 
The respondeat superior standard provides that the acts of low-level employees in 
an organisation can be imputed to the company, even if committed is against 
corporate authority, as long as the employee had the express or apparent authority to 
make the decision or commit the act. The historical recognition of respondeat 
superior could be justified as a way of achieving deterrence. Targeting the company 
rather than individuals associated with it was seen as a way of reducing future 
harmful behaviour by the company (specific deterrence) and other companies 
(general deterrence).244 Companies will enforce better procedures to select their 
employees.245  
 
Yet, early cases have evidenced their inability to deal with different corporate 
structures and sizes. Companies should not be held responsible for unauthorised 
decisions made by employees.246 
 
Having considered Lee’s corporate criminal liability as team member responsibility, 
the respondeat superior standard would unlikely impact the behaviour of team 
members within the company, because it implies that liability could be imposed 
regardless of the team’s norm-compliant behaviour. Companies would not invest in 
implementing compliance programmes if they could still be held liable. Although 
prosecution does take into account whether the specific employee made an effort to 
hide his unauthorised conduct when determining the sentence, the company will still 
be held liable.247   
 
One contrary compelling argument is the existence of defences like ‘due diligence' 
or ‘lack of knowledge' under common law in England and Wales and the United 
States, and the MPC, for a select of non-strict liability offences. Yet, it is not 
justifiable for an employee's criminal act, that is not justified by the team's norms, to 
be imputed to a company in non-strict liability cases where such defences do not 
exist.  
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In England and Wales, difficulties also arise in classifying hybrid cases that have 
due diligence or lack of knowledge defences, or where the definition of the offence 
requires constructive knowledge.  
 
Additionally, the identification doctrine standard, adopted by English law and the 
MPC, is a deficient tool for effective enforcement of criminal law against large 
modern companies. It fails to address the complexity of current corporate structures. 
It is often difficult to identify the specific senior officer(s) responsible for a violation 
of a certain criminal law. Tariq states, ‘critically, the larger the company is, the 
harder the prosecutor’s task is to locate first, the culpable alter ego of that 
company.’248 The issue is emphasised in the context of international companies with 
managers in various jurisdictions, and sharing economy companies, where 
management structures could be implemented to safeguard against liability. 
 
The identification doctrine is ‘superfluous for deterrent purposes.’249 Gobert argues 
that the standard works ‘best in cases where it is needed least and works least in 
cases where it is needed most.’250 The larger the company, the more likely it is able 
to avoid liability. Large companies can decentralise responsibilities to avoid liability, 
by making it difficult to identify anyone senior individual in charge of a particular 
operation. In practice, senior officers can delegate their tasks to low-level employees 
to avoid criminal liability, thus making it difficult to identify the specific agents that 
fulfil the actus reus and mens rea components of many criminal offences. In Tesco 
v Nattrass,251 the court held that when an agent delegates managerial functions 
within a company with the result that the commission of a criminal act occurs, this 
comes within the directing mind and will principle and the company should 
accordingly be held liable.252 It is often still difficult, however, to prove whether the 
delegation actually took place at all, as the company can always argue that the lower 
level employee committed the act without any authority from the company itself. As 
Celia Wells rightly argues, traditional theories of corporate liability fail to ‘[tackle] 
the question of corporate risk-taking.'253 
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Additionally, the UK Ministry of Justice has stated that the identification doctrine 
may encourage bad corporate culture and practices, such as manipulating meeting 
minutes by not recording those present in order to conceal the presence of board 
members, or creating and using zero-asset companies to handle negotiations with 
third party agents.254 The UK Parliament has attempted to overcome such difficulties 
by codifying new standards of liability for different types of corporate wrongs. The 
Bribery Act 2010 carves out a due diligence defence and the Corporate Manslaughter 
and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 introduces a holistic approach to identifying 
whether management has failed to meet the standard required under the law. Their 
recent call to change the standard of liability is limited targeted at economic crimes 
(defined as money laundering, fraud, and false accounting).255 The report recognises 
the failure of the identification model in combatting corporate crime due to the 
inherent difficulties of finding companies liable as described above.  
 
It is doubtful whether implementing piecemeal reforms, rather than a reassessment 
of the law as a whole, is a step in the right direction. Economic crimes could, for 
instance, encompass wrongs well beyond that specified in the call for evidence; 
companies can always be said to be committing criminal wrongs for economic 
benefit. Reforming the law narrowly would likely lead to different standards of 
liability for comparable wrongs, leading to a fragmented system. From here, it is 
worth considering an alternative model that overcomes difficulties found in current 
liability standards.  
 
3.1.3.1 An Alternative Standard of Liability 
 
The Canadian corporate criminal liability model compellingly provides an 
alternative framework that is aligned with corporate criminal liability as team 
member responsibility. House Government Bill C- 45 was passed in 2003 to amend 
the Criminal Code256 and ‘modernise the law with respect to the criminal liability of 
companies and sentencing of companies.’257 
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Companies are covered under the Criminal Code. Section 2(1) states that ‘everyone’, 
‘person’, or ‘owner’ includes ‘public bodies, bodies corporate, societies, 
companies.’258 Section 22(1) governs offences where negligence must be proven for 
an organisation to be prosecuted for a criminal offence. It states,  
 
In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove negligence, an 
[organisation] is a party to the offence if: 
  (a) acting within the scope of their authority  
(i) one of its representatives is a party to the offence, or(ii) two or more of 
its representatives engage in conduct, whether by an act or omission, such 
that, if it had been the conduct of only one representative, that representative 
would have been a party to the offence; and 
(b) the senior officer who is responsible for the aspect of the organisation’s 
activities that is relevant to the offence departs – or the senior officers, 
collectively, depart- markedly from the standard of care that, in the 
circumstances, could reasonably be expected to prevent a representative of 
the organisation from being a party to the offence.259 
 
In R v Metron Construction Company,260 an Ontario company was convicted of 
criminal negligence when an independent contractor hired by the company as a site 
supervisor departed from the standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent 
person. He was hired to work as a site supervisor to manage a project restoring 
concrete balconies in Toronto. The way the operations were conducted resulted in 
the death of four workers on the site.261 He failed to ensure that the workers received 
written instructions in their respective languages for the use of fall protection 
systems and did not instruct the workers to use the swing stage in accordance with 
safety practices, nor did he prevent bodily harm and death through ensuring that 
lifelines were used during work hours. The court held that the independent contractor 
came within the definition of a senior officer as defined by section 2 of the Criminal 
Code.  
 
Section 22(2) further governs conduct that is based on a mens rea standard, 
excluding negligence. It states,  
                                                           
258 ibid. 
259 The Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985 (Canada), s 22(1). 
260 2013 ONCA 541, OJ No 3909 (QL).  
261 ibid 
  
46 
 
In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove fault – other than 
negligence- an organisation is a party to the offence if, with the intent at least in 
part to benefit the organisation, one of its senior officers  
(a)  acting within the scope of their authority is party to the offence; 
(b)  having the mental state required to be party to the offence and acting 
within the scope of their authority directs the work of other representatives 
of the organisation so that they do the act or make the omission specified in 
the offence; or  
(c)  knowing that a representative of the organisation is or is about to be 
party to the offence, does not take all reasonable measures to stop them from 
being a party to the offence. 
 
Importantly, section 217(1) concerning the Duties Tending to Preservation of Life 
states,  
 
[Everyone] who undertakes, or had the authority, to direct how another person 
does work or performs a task is under a legal duty to take reasonable steps to 
prevent bodily harm to that person, or any other person, arising from that work 
or task.  
 
Section 21(1) states that parties to offences include those who ‘actually commit the 
crime, does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit 
it; or abets any person in committing it.’ Section 2 defines a senior officer as, 
 
[A] representative who plays an important role in the establishment of an 
[organisation’s] policies or is responsible for managing an important aspect of 
the [organisation’s] activities and, in the case of a body corporate, includes a 
director, its chief executive officer and its chief financial officer.  
 
In R c Pétroles Global Inc,262 a company was found liable when a regional manager 
illegally participated in price fixing and, with his knowledge, allowed his six territory 
managers to engage in price fixing. The case affirmed that a middle manager is 
included in the definition of ‘senior officer' under section 2 of the Criminal Cod, and 
that their criminal conduct can indeed be attributed to the company.  
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The Canadian approach advantageously considers the variety of corporate structures. 
Through this approach, companies are unable to evade liability simply by delegating 
duties to lower level managers. They will not be held responsible when low-level 
employees commit criminal acts that the company did not authorise and took 
reasonable steps to avoid. This comes in line with proposals by Lee on corporate 
criminal liability as a team member responsibility. Importantly, the framework 
overcomes difficulties of prosecution found under the MPC and the identification 
doctrine standard applied in England and Wales.  
 
Canada’s framework offers a comprehensive approach to corporate criminal 
liability. Reforms to current liability frameworks in line with the Canadian 
framework are a welcomed step. The UK Ministry of Justice's recent proposals for 
further piecemeal codifications of certain types of corporate misconduct run the risk 
of miscategorising and setting different standards of liability for criminal acts that 
be construed as carrying the same level of seriousness. In practice, moving towards 
codification of liability standards may be interpreted as a practical impossibility as 
it would involve the abolishment of a number of recent laws. The benefits of 
adopting two standards of liability that categorise misconduct according to the type 
of mens rea outweighs these concerns, provided careful consideration is given to 
align liability standards with sentencing practices. 
 
3.2 Sentencing  
 
3.2.1 England and Wales  
 
The aims of punishing individuals are different from the aims of punishing 
companies. The Sentencing Council specifies that the aims of sentencing are to 
punish the offender (‘going to prison, doing unpaid work in the community, obeying 
a curfew or paying a fine’), make the offender give something back (‘payment of 
compensation or through restorative justice’), rehabilitate and reform the offender 
(‘changing an offender’s behaviour to prevent future crime’), reduce crime 
(‘preventing the offender from committing more crime and putting others from 
committing similar offences’), and protect the public (‘from the offender and from 
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the risk of more crimes being committed by them’.263 Thus, the aims include 
retribution, deterrence, restoration, and rehabilitation.  
 
The Sentencing Council’s definitive guidelines (Hereinafter ‘Definitive 
Guidelines’), the goals of punishment are limited to ‘deterrence and removal of gain 
derived through the commission of the offence,’264 hence are limited to deterrence 
and retribution. It is unclear why the goals of punishment are different for individuals 
and companies, and why there is no clarity on whether one goal would preside over 
another in deciding sentences.  
 
The main method of punishing companies is the payment of fines.265 Section 164 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 requires setting a fine that reflects the seriousness of 
the offence, taking in mind the financial circumstances of the offender.266 Through 
section 120 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the Sentencing Council issues 
guidelines to enforce appropriate sentencing structures for companies sentenced on 
or after October 2014, unless the court chooses otherwise or the interests of justice 
are harmed by following the guidelines.267 These include the Environmental Offence 
Definitive Guideline; The Health and Safety Offences, Corporate Manslaughter and 
Food Safety and Hygiene Offences Definitive Guideline; and the Fraud, Bribery and 
Money Laundering Offences Definitive Guideline.268  
 
In England and Wales, courts must follow sentencing guidelines.269 Section 125(3)-
(4) of the Corners and Justice Act 2009 has offence ranges for each type of offence. 
There are starting points to each category and aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances are considered to impose the appropriate sentence.270  
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For example, the process is followed to sentence companies for violations under 
fraud, money laundering and bribery:  
  
(a)  Compensation: the court determines whether the company is required to 
compensate for any ‘personal injury, loss or damage resulting from the 
offence’ as appropriate, taking into consideration the ‘evidence and means 
of the offender.’271 
(b) Confiscation: the court considers confiscation if it is appropriate or the 
Crown requests for an order of compensation.272   
(c) Determining the offence category: the court defines the category in line with 
culpability and harm. Culpability is divided into high, medium and low 
culpability, and in circumstances where characteristics are present from one 
or more of the categories, the court ‘[balances] these characteristics to reach 
a fair assessment of the offender’s culpability.’273 Harm is determined on a 
case by case basis and a financial sum is calculated. For instance, in fraud 
cases, harm is defined as the ‘actual or intended gross gain to the 
offender.’274 If the financial sum cannot be calculated, the court decides the 
appropriate amount in accordance with what could be achieved in all the 
circumstances, which may be 10-20 percent of revenue.275  
(d)  Starting point and category range: harm is multiplied by a relevant 
percentage figure representing culpability, and adjustment of the fine is 
completed according to factors relating to the seriousness of the crime.276 
(e) Adjustment of the fine: the court considers whether the fine amount is 
reflective of ‘the removal of all gain; appropriate additional punishment, and 
deterrence.’277 
(f) Consider factors to reduce the sentence: the court considers whether the 
company assisted the prosecution or investigation.  
(g) Reduction for the  guilty plea: the court considers whether to reduce the fine 
based on a company pleading guilty.  
(h) Ancillary orders: the court considers any ancillary orders that should be 
applied.  
                                                           
271 ibid. 
272 ibid. 
273 ibid. 
274 ibid. 
275 ibid. 
276 ibid. 
277 ibid. 
  
50 
(i) Totality principle: the court considers whether the total sentence, if a 
company is sentenced for more than one offence, is ‘just and proportionate 
to the offending behaviour.’278 
(j) Reasons: the court needs to give reasons and explain the impact of the 
sentence.279 
 
Additionally, The Environmental Offences Definitive Guideline applies to 
organisations that violate the Environmental Protection Act 1990, the Environmental 
Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010, and other relevant offences.280 
The guideline follows a process to determine the fine (£100 fine to an unlimited 
fine). The process of determining the appropriate fine is as follows: The court 
determines the offence category using culpability and harm factors, defines a 
category range based on the annual accounts of the company, considers the 
mitigating and aggravating factors to decide on a fine within the category, reviews 
whether the sentence ‘as a whole meets, in a fair way, the objectives of punishment, 
deterrence and removal of gains derived through the commission of the offence;’281 
takes into account factors like the  assistance of prosecution and a guilty plea; sets 
ancillary orders; considers whether the sentence is just and proportionate to the 
offending behaviour, and is required to provide reasons and explain the effect of the 
sentence.282   
 
Furthermore, the Government introduced DPAs in 2014 through Schedule 17 of the 
Crime and Courts Act 2013. It is a process that allows companies to avoid criminal 
prosecutions and a criminal trial through an agreement with a prosecutor to pay a 
sanction.283 The goals of DPAs are to achieve ‘uniformity, proportionality, 
deterrence and punishment in corporate sentencing and… provide a clear and 
consistent framework for the assessment of financial penalties … to avoid the 
collateral consequences of a conviction.’284 Upon awareness of possible misconduct 
(through self-reporting; investigation; or whistleblowers), the prosecution would 
invite the company, through a letter, to enter into negotiations. If the company 
agrees, a further letter setting the terms and conditions is sent. Following that, the 
company and prosecution would engage in negotiations, including reaching an 
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agreement to pay a sanction and possibility of undergoing monitoring and reporting 
requirement, and reporting details of financial gains or losses and details relating to 
each offence. If the company does not comply with the terms of the DPA, this can 
be used as evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings. Lastly, the prosecution 
would apply to the court for final approval, and must show that the terms of the DPA 
are fair, reasonable, and proportionate, and in the interests of justice.285 
 
3.2.2 The United States  
 
The United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual 2016 (Hereinafter 
‘Sentencing Commission Guidelines’) states that the basic objective of the 
Sentencing Reform Act 1984 is as follows:  
 
[To] enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime through 
an effective, fair sentencing system … reasonable uniformity in sentencing by 
narrowing the disparity in sentencing imposed for similar criminal offences 
committed by similar offenders…[and] proportionality in sentencing through a 
system that imposes appropriately different sentences for the criminal conduct 
of differing severity.286  
 
It specifies that ‘the basic purposes of criminal punishment are: deterrence, 
incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation.’287 Moreover, an overview 
document of the sentencing guideline for organisations states,  
 
[These] guidelines are designed to further two key purposes of sentencing: ‘just 
punishment’ and ‘deterrence.’ Under the ‘just punishment’ model, the 
punishment corresponds to the degree of blameworthiness of the offender, while 
under the ‘deterrence’ model, incentives are offered for [organisations] to detect 
and prevent crime.288 
 
The Sentencing Reform Act 1984, creating the Sentencing Commission, was based 
on the recommendations of the MPC.  Section 1.02(2) of MPC advocates that 
sentencing guidelines address the following goals,  
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The general purposes of the provisions governing the sentencing and 
treatment of offenders are:  
 
(a) to prevent the commission of offences; 
(b) to promote the correction and rehabilitation of offenders; 
(c) to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary 
punishment; 
(d) to give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may be imposed 
on conviction of an offence; 
(e) to differentiate among offenders with a view to a just [individualization] 
in their treatment.289 
 
The Sentencing Commission goals thus reflect approaches to deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and retribution. Similar to England and Wales, the guidelines do not 
clarify how these penal aims to work under one framework. In the guidelines, the 
offences are categorised in accordance with the offence behaviour and 
characteristics, and offence ranges are arranged to stipulate the appropriate sentence 
under each class.290  
 
Sentencing is determined through Section 8 of the Sentencing Commission 
Guidelines Manual 2016. For crimes including environmental crimes, the Guidelines 
state that judges should apply sentences following 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553 and 3572.291 
The sentences are fines, probation for up to five years, restitution orders, issuance of 
public notices of conviction, and exposure to forfeiture statutes.292  
 
The Guidelines detail the sentencing process and the level of punishment. The 
following principles reflect the sentencing approach: The company is required to 
remedy any harms caused by the offence by making victims whole for the harm 
caused. This does not form part of the punishment.293 If the company is funded by 
criminal means or the company is set primarily for a criminal purpose, the fine is set 
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high to divest the company of all of its assets. In other circumstances, the fine range 
is determined based on the  culpability of the companies and the  seriousness of the 
offence. Specifically, seriousness is determined by the greatest of ‘pecuniary gain, 
pecuniary loss, or the amount in the guideline offence level fine table.'294 Culpability 
is determined by two mitigating and four aggravating factors. The aggravating 
factors are ‘(i) the involvement in or tolerance of criminal activity; (ii) the prior 
history of the [organisation]; (iii) the violation of an order; and (iv) the obstruction 
of justice.’295 The mitigating factors are: ‘(i) the existence of effective compliance 
and ethics [programme]; and (ii) self-reporting, cooperation, or acceptance of 
responsibility.’296  
 
Furthermore, probations are enforced in certain circumstances to ensure that other 
sanctions are implemented or that steps will be taken by the organisation to reduce 
the likelihood of future criminal conduct.297 These include, (a) remedial orders, 
which would require ‘community service…to reduce or eliminate the harm 
threatened, or to repair the harm caused by the offense, when that harm or threatened 
harm would otherwise not be remedied’; (b) orders of notice, which could be used 
to ‘notify unidentified victims of the offense’; (c) restitution orders, which would 
‘require restitution …to compensate identifiable victims of the offense.’298  
 
Additionally, the United States has introduced DPAs in the 1990s, that allow ‘a 
prosecutor of an [organisation] to enter into an agreement whereby prosecution is 
deferred pending successful compliance with certain conditions that may include 
payment of a substantial financial penalty; an overhaul of corporate governance 
structures; and compliance, with the appointment of compliance monitors.’299 DPAs 
require companies to alter their ‘compliance [programmes], governance structures, 
or scope of operations.’300 Particularly, prosecutors have responded to corporate 
criminal misconduct through pretrial diversion agreements.301 Prosecutors can 
decide not to pursue criminal charges against a company if they agree to cooperate 
in the investigation, pay a fine, and make internal changes. Such internal changes 
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would include requiring the company to modify certain business practices, hire a 
prosecutor-approved corporate monitor, or alter its internal reporting structure.302 
 
3.2.3 Reconsidering Sentencing Aims and Methods  
 
Having briefly considered the aims of punishment and methods of punishment, it is 
important to discuss possible flaws in the current sentencing processes.  
 
First, it is clear that the aims of punishing individuals are different from the aims of 
punishing companies. As seen above, sentencing objectives for individuals in 
England and Wales are deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, rehabilitation, and 
restoration. In federal American law and the MPC, sentencing objectives for 
individuals follow the English example except for restoration. However, sentencing 
objectives for companies are limited to deterrence and retribution in both 
jurisdictions. The recognition of corporate legal personality and the recognition of 
rights for companies as separate legal entities should warrant the same sentencing 
objectives for companies and individuals.  
 
Second, the theoretical approaches to sentencing objectives are not clear. The most 
commonly cited sentencing objectives are deterrence (specific and general), 
rehabilitation, restoration, and retribution or just deserts.303 There is no single 
approach to any of the sentencing aims; each theory has many schools of thought on 
when punishment should be imposed and how punishment should be distributed. For 
example, retribution states that ‘punishment is justified when it is deserved and no 
more than deserved.’304 Particularly, the  punishment should not be imposed on 
innocent individuals because they ‘do not deserve it', and that the more severe the 
crime, the more severe the punishment should be.305 Retributivists centralise their 
arguments upon desert and proportionality, but adopt distinctive interpretations of 
desert and proportionality.306  
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As seen above, sentencing practices have incorporated retribution and deterrence 
into one system, to target different categories of offenders and offences.307 This 
means that a sentence could be intended to serve any or all of the objectives.308 
However, ‘the relative strength of the various competing goals in affecting 
perceptions of the appropriateness of penalties [needs to be considered].’309 There is 
no philosophical framework that reconciles the differing perceptions of criminal 
punishment.310 There are based on different theories that reflect how liability is to be 
established and how the sentences are to be set. Thom Brooks states that one major 
problem of the MPC ‘is not that it seeks to address multiple goals in sentencing but 
its lack of a more robust and attractive theoretical framework that brings unity to its 
goals and illuminates punishment’s primary goal of restoring rights within the 
context of a stakeholder society.’311  
 
The Sentencing Commission rejects the implementation of a system that sets 
primacy of one goal over another and alternatively employs an empirical approach 
to conclude that regardless of the distinctions between retribution and deterrence, 
both approaches will achieve similar results in terms of how the sentences are to be 
structured.312 This reflects an attempt to ‘[justify] a legal practice without sufficient 
consideration of how the individual parts coherently work together in support of the 
practice aims.’313 Leaving the decision for judges to weigh the primacy of the penal 
aims is disadvantageous  because there are various interpretation of the theories and 
how they may apply in the context of companies.  
 
Third, it is not clear how sentences would be imposed to advance one aim in a way 
that would not contradict another aim. In England and Wales and the United States, 
the main method of punishment is paying fines. This has not been evidenced to 
achieve the goals of creating norm compliant behaviour and reducing the levels of 
offending in the long term.314 Fines are not effective in cases where the violations 
include harm to the community, and the community is not able to have a say in how 
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the funds are going to be allocated, nor are they likely to change the behaviour of 
companies with wide access to resources.315  
 
Overall, a wide disparity exists between the goals of punishment in theory and how 
they have been translated to practice. The following chapters will be dedicated to 
exploring the identified issues in greater detail, particularly the theoretical 
approaches to the penal aims and how they have been applied and/or could apply in 
the context of companies. 
 
4 Conclusion  
 
The chapter served as a starting point to understanding corporate criminal laws in 
the United States and England and Wales.  Section 2 studied the basis of corporate 
criminal liability from a historical and theoretical view. The first cases recognising 
corporate criminal liability reflect its necessity and are a welcomed development, 
given the failure of administrative and civil liability to change the behaviour of 
companies, and the high impact of corporate misconducts on individuals. However, 
early cases failed to adequately explain the theoretical basis of corporate criminal 
liability. The second part of Section 2 accordingly investigated theoretical 
explanations of corporate criminal liability. ‘Companies as morally blameworthy 
entities’ is not a theoretically coherent approach. Alternatively, ‘corporate criminal 
liability as team member responsibility’ is aligned with the historical development 
of the law, and thus theoretically and practically coherent. 
 
Section 3 explored current liability standards and sentencing processes. The section 
discussed issues with current liability frameworks in England and Wales and the 
United States. The standard of liability model in Canada is advantageously aligned 
with corporate criminal liability as team member responsibility, provides a more 
consolidated and less fragmented framework, and compellingly takes account of 
different types of corporate management structures. Additionally, companies are 
punished to achieve deterrence and retribution. The goals of punishment are different 
for companies and individuals, and there is no guidance on how the goals would 
work together under one single framework. Payment of fines is the dominant method 
of sentencing. In the United States, companies could be subject to probation, 
restitution orders, issuance of public notices, and exposure to forfeiture statutes. 
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These methods are only imposed when necessary and are not mandatory. DPAs are 
processes that can help companies avoid criminal prosecution if they agree to 
complete certain remedial steps, including the payment of fines. It is not clear how 
sentences would be imposed to advance one aim in a way that would not contradict 
another aim. 
 
The two proposals relating to recognising corporate criminal liability as team 
member responsibility and adopting the Canadian standard of liability framework 
sets the scene for arguments in the following chapters. A wide disparity exists 
between the goals of punishment in theory and practice. The next chapters will 
explore prominent theories (retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and restoration) 
to advance proposals for a compelling theory of punishment for companies. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Retribution 
 
 
1 Introduction  
 
Retribution still ‘merits recognition as the criminal law’s central objective.’316 
Retribution and deterrence are recognised as the main aims of punishing companies 
in England and Wales and the United States. The United States Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines state that ‘just punishment', defined as punishment 
corresponding to the degree of blameworthiness of the offender, is the main purpose 
of criminalising companies.317 Similarly, the Definitive Guidelines in England and 
Wales identify ‘removal of gain derived through the commission of the offence' as 
the main purpose of punishment for various criminal offences applying to 
companies.318 
 
John Cottingham contends that using the term ‘retributive’ does not serve a useful 
purpose; the term is imprecise and multivocal.319 Sentencing guidelines should 
clarify which approach to retribution is being followed. This issue becomes even 
more fundamental because retribution and deterrence could be perceived as 
conflicting goals of punishment: the classical view of retribution justifies 
punishment when it is deserved, and deterrence is a consequentialist theory that 
justifies punishment for its effects.320  As briefly discussed in Chapter 1, sentencing 
policies fail to explain the theoretical approaches undertaken, and whether 
retribution and deterrence could work together under one single framework. The 
Commission in the USA attempts to address these concerns by stating that the aim 
of the law itself is to control crime, but there is no consensus on how such would be 
achieved, nor is there a consensus on whether retribution or deterrence take primacy 
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over one another as crime objectives. They state that empirical results show that 
regardless of the distinctions between approaches to retribution and deterrence, both 
approaches will achieve similar results in terms of how the sentences are to be 
structured.321  
 
As explored in Chapter 1, corporate criminal laws in England and Wales and the 
United States owe their development to borrowings from individual criminal and tort 
laws, rather than a thorough assessment of the objectives of corporate criminal 
liability and how it could be achieved.322 This poses difficulties because some 
methods of punishment cannot apply to companies.323 The chapter stresses the 
importance of understanding what the foundational concepts of the law are. It takes 
a step back to explore retribution theories and their application to punish companies.   
 
The chapter primarily aims to explore the suitability of retribution as a penal aim of 
punishment for companies. Section 2 investigates various interpretations of 
retribution and assesses the advantages and disadvantages of these various 
interpretations. Section 3 critiques the compatibility of retribution views with 
modern corporate criminal laws and evaluates the viability of retribution as a pure 
theory to punish companies. Section 4 advances an alternative view to retribution 
that works as part of a mixed theory of punishment that adopts multiple aims. 
 
2 Defining Retribution  
 
There is no single theory of retribution; there are varying interpretations to the 
definition, scope, limitations, and justifications of retribution. Yet, ‘retribution’ is a 
staple term used in sentencing policies in England and Wales and the United 
States.324 Generally, a retributive theory of punishment includes, at a minimum, three 
principles: responsibility, proportionality, and just requital. 325 Retribution is known 
to be the ‘just desert’ theory of punishment, where punishment is only imposed when 
it is ‘just’ to do so, and the criminal ‘deserves’ to be punished.326  
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The section will theoretically explore the origins of retribution and how it has 
diverged into numerous approaches in legal literature. Approaches to retribution are 
analysed by considering the circumstances in which punishment is deserved, and 
how punishment is distributed. 
 
2.1 Classical Retribution  
 
Classical retribution, with some modifications, still holds recognition as the 
foundational basis for ‘how justice should be dispensed in democratic societies.’327 
Retribution was arguably embedded in the Judeo-Christian tradition, creating what 
is now known as one of the basic justifications for punishment. According to 
classical retributivists, punishment is justified on its own ground rather than to serve 
any other purpose. Classical retributivism, rooted in a view of religion, advocates 
that those who commit wrongful acts that break the moral code of the society or 
cause harm to others deserve punishment because they disobeyed ‘God's laws.' 
Wrongful acts often result in a break of the moral code of the society, and punishment 
should be imposed to restore that order.328 The assumptions of classical retribution 
are (a) punishment is repayment of debt by the criminal to society; (b) punishment 
is justified on its own ground; (c) punishment needs to fit the crime, and (d) questions 
of culpability and ways of preventing future crime are not relevant.329 
 
Immanuel Kant, a key figure of classical retribution, advocates the Placation theory, 
which has connections with notions of sacrifice and placation of the Old 
Testament.330 As referred to in Maslen, Kant states,  
 
[Punishment] can never be administered merely as a means for promoting 
another good, either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but 
must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted 
has committed a crime; for a human being may never be manipulated merely as 
a means to the purposes of someone else … He must first be found to be 
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deserving of punishment before any consideration is given to the utility of his 
punishment for himself or for his fellow citizens.331 
 
Kant invokes a backwards-looking approach to punishment by focusing on the crime 
committed rather than imposing punishment in view of restraining similar future 
conduct.332 The enforcement of punishment should be done without considering how 
it may impact other individuals in society.333  
 
Furthermore, classical retribution distributes punishment based on desert, or 
‘treating people as they deserve’.334 Punishment is morally permissible and 
obligatory to repay the debt to society, and it needs to fit the crime.335 Kant argues 
that punishment is guided by moral standards and the ‘an eye for an eye’ principle.336 
The principles could be traced back to the Mosiac laws of the Old Testament and the 
Quraan, where punishment is imposed in proportion to the gravity of the offence.337 
The Old Testament states that both ‘the criminal shall repay an eye for an eye and a 
tooth for a tooth and that the sins of the father shall be visited upon the sons.’338 This 
was later found in the lex talionis of early Roman law.339 Kant states,  
 
What kind and what degree of punishment does legal justice adopt as its principle 
and standard? None other than the principle of equality… the principle of not 
treating one side more favourably than the other. Accordingly, any underserved 
evil that you inflict on someone else among the people is one that you do to 
yourself. If you vilify, you vilify yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from 
yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself. Only the law of retribution (jus 
talionis) can determine exactly the kind and degree of punishment.340 
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Classical retribution views punishment as a repayment of debt to society. Debt is 
accrued when a criminal inflicts suffering to another person that causes an imbalance 
of justice to society. Furthermore, the distribution of punishment is based on what 
the state distributes to individuals within a society. The state has the duty to impose 
punishment to restore the moral order in the society that occurs as a result of the 
wrongdoing.341 Punishment, hence, restores the moral balance that the crime caused.  
 
Looking at the forms of punishment that could be inflicted on individuals, lex talionis 
indicates that punishment needs to ‘duplicate the exact manner and degree of the 
crime.’342 Since legal punishment is justifiable vengeance, corporal and capital 
punishment are seen as appropriate in some cases.343 Kant states that punishment is 
physical harm necessary for the allocation of justice, even if not connected to the 
moral wickedness of the criminal.344 
 
Classical retribution has many flaws because it does not provide a measure for moral 
desert and does not clarify the criteria for determining the levels of punishment.345 
Classical retribution states that morality, guided by a view of religion, determines 
when punishment should be imposed. However, individuals within one society have 
different opinions on what is deserving of punishment. Morality has a subjective 
standard and societies may follow no or more than one religion.346 When considering 
how punishment is distributed, the ‘eye for an eye’ principle is difficult to apply in 
cases where harm is not inflicted on other individuals. This may include prostituting, 
driving under the influence, or using drugs.347 Similarly, punishment is difficult to 
apply in cases where it is morally unacceptable. If classical retributivism is applied 
strictly, it would involve methods like torturing torturers and raping rapists.348 One 
may conversely argue that classical retribution does not require imposing a 
punishment that is identical to the crime committed. Rather, a punishment that 
produces an equal level of harm suffered by the victim or by the society could be 
imposed. Nevertheless, the level of ‘equal harm’ is difficult to quantify in cases 
where no direct harm has been suffered by another individual. Moreover, classical 
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retribution incorrectly assumes that individuals have the same level of sensitivity to 
harm.349   
 
Furthermore, classical retributivism does not consider the circumstances of the 
offence and culpability factors, or how future similar conduct could be refrained by 
other individuals in society. Failure to take account of culpability and mitigating 
factors is problematic in the context of individuals who are seen to be disadvantaged 
by social institutions. It is unclear whether Kant views individuals disadvantaged by 
social institutions as criminals because they willfully committed a crime, or as non-
criminals because they do not deserve to be punished.350 Additionally, the failure of 
classical retribution to factor in the specific circumstances of the offender may result 
in punishing innocent individuals.351 
 
It is also questionable whether classical retribution can exist in a framework that 
includes multiple penal aims. Current laws in England and Wales and the United 
States apply multiple aims of punishment.352  Classical retribution rejects the impact 
of punishment on future crimes. This implies that retribution cannot exist alongside 
deterrence, which is a consequentialist view of punishment. Many deterrence 
approaches impose punishment based on creating fear within the general society on 
the consequences of committing similar wrongful conduct.353  
 
Nevertheless, one interpretation of Kant’s retribution theory suggests that retribution 
could work alongside other goals of punishment. Brooks contends that Kant 
considers retribution for moral law violations and consequentialism for positive law 
violations.354 The distinction between moral laws and positive laws is as follows: 
Moral laws are universal laws that stem from how individuals act and become ‘the 
standard by which [individuals] judge the moral correctness of every particular 
action.’355 Moral laws require individuals to act according to the universal laws 
created by individual actions. Positive laws are rules written in legislation that may 
be rational or irrational, and not necessarily measurable by morality standards.   
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Thom Brooks also points to Kant’s arguments on governments imposing deterrent 
punishments when pragmatic matters outweigh the achievement of justice.  In his 
‘Doctrine of Right’, Kant argues that protection of the community outweighs 
retributive concerns. If all murders were executed, and the number of criminals is so 
great, necessity would require the state to enforce a judgement other than capital 
punishment.356  
 
On a broader level, this interpretation of Kant’s retribution theory encouragingly 
suggests that classical retribution could work alongside other penal aims, in line with 
current prominent penal aims in England and Wales and the United States. However, 
having advanced a non-moral basis to corporate criminal liability in Chapter 1, 
classical retribution would not be an appropriate framework for punishing 
companies. The next step is to evaluate the development of classical retribution into 
many modern approaches in legal literature.   
 
2.2 Modern Varieties to Retribution 
 
The understanding of ‘retribution’ diverged from its original classical variant in 
religious scripts and classical interpretations, including Immanuel Kant’s retribution 
theory, to various interpretations amongst academics. Particularly, many 
interpretations of proportionality and desert emerged.357 Cottingham defines nine 
approaches to punishment labelled as ‘retributive.’358 Twenty years later, Walker 
stated that the versions of retribution have multiplied since Cottingham’s article.359  
 
Two interlinking remarks could be pointed out when assessing modern approaches 
to retribution. First, there are many interpretations of what conducts should be 
criminal, and how a crime should be punished. Second, some modern varieties of 
retribution are not ‘pure'. They use other penal aims to justify either the aim of 
punishment and/or distribution of punishment.360  
 
2.2.1 New Interpretations to What Counts as a Crime and How Criminals Ought to 
be Punished 
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First, many modern approaches to retribution have altered the conditions of what 
counts as criminal conduct and how punishment is distributed. Expressivist theories 
are variants of retributivism, advocated by philosophers like Joel Feinberg and 
Antony Duff.361 Brooks synthesises the ideas of retributivist expressivism as follows,  
 
[Punishment] is justified as the communication of retributivist expressivism. 
Punishment is (a) an activity communicated by the state to offenders (b) 
pertaining to their retributivist desert for moral wrongdoing (c) that is best 
communicated through the expression of legal punishment.362   
 
Punishment is justified when it causes immoral harm and is distributed in proportion 
to immorality.363 It ‘has an expressivist function of [communicating] public 
disapproval to criminal offenders for their moral wrongdoing where punishment is 
proportionate to immorality.’364 Punishment aims to communicate that the public 
disapproves the criminal’s immoral conduct and distributes punishment in 
proportion to the immorality of the conduct. 
 
Expressivist theories have different positions on whether punishment requires 
further justifications beyond that ‘it is deserved’, whether it needs to be 
communicated and expressed, the reasons for punishing moral wrongs, which moral 
wrongs are to be punished, and the methods of punishing criminals.365 For example, 
regarding the distribution of punishment, Feinberg distinguishes between 
punishment and penalties. Punishment, limited to imprisonment, requires public 
condemnation as a justification, and penalties include community sentencing, verbal 
warnings, and monetary fines. Duff also requires offenders to express their remorse 
to the public as part of the punishment, to fulfil the ‘punishment as communication 
of public disapproval' justification of sentencing.366  
 
Furthermore, the Fair Play theory, advocated by philosophers like John Rawls and 
HLA Hart, adopts different interpretations to the justification and distribution of 
punishment. Fair play connects punishments with society's political order. Notably, 
John Rawls states that individuals have political obligations, defined as moral 
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obligations or duties to obey the law and support the state’s political institutions.367 
Punishment is justified when individuals choose not to meet their obligations to the 
cooperating members of society.368 This is based on fairness and considering the 
value of law-abiding citizens in society. Non-criminal individuals exercise self-
restraint by respecting the rights of others in society, whilst criminals gain fulfilment 
from committing crimes.369 Similar to Kant’s retribution theory, the state should play 
a role in impeding criminals from gaining an unfair advantage over citizens who 
abide by the law.370 However, the focus should be placed on protecting law-abiding 
individuals rather than the offender. Distribution of punishment is aimed at ‘restoring 
the equilibrium of benefits and burdens by taking from the individual what he owes, 
that is, exacting the debt.’371 Thus, punishment is interpreted as a repayment of debt 
in proportion to the unfair advantage obtained a criminal accrues as a result of 
committing the crime. 372  
 
2.2.2 Hybrid Theories: Retribution and Other Penal Aims   
 
Second, several modern retribution theories do not completely reject utilitarian 
views.373 Even Kant’s classical retribution theory of punishment considers 
deterrence principles for the distribution of punishment.374  
 
One modern approach to retribution that considers other penal aims is ‘negative 
retribution.’375 Notably, Rawls and Hart’s approaches to retribution are classified 
under negative retribution. Rawls argues utilitarianism addresses questions about 
specific cases, and retribution addresses ‘the application of particular rules to 
particular cases.’376 Retribution provides the justification for punishing a particular 
criminal, and utilitarianism justifies why institutional practices punish any 
criminal.377 Rawls focuses on restoring the rights of law-abiding citizens rather than 
just punishing the criminal. Hart similarly agrees that different penal aims could be 
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used to justify punishment.378 Particularly, negative retributivism states that 
individuals who deserve punishment should be prosecuted, but the application of 
punishment should be in accordance with consequentialist considerations.379  
 
As discussed above, classical retribution, otherwise identified as positive retribution, 
links desert to the justification of punishment and its distribution. Conversely, 
negative retribution contends that desert is necessary but not sufficient for 
distributing punishment to those who deserve it and that the system is guided by 
other considerations to understand whether one should apply punishment. For 
example, the punishment of a deserving criminal should not apply if it would lead to 
war or political instability.380 
 
At first instance, negative retribution is more aligned with the laws in England and 
Wales and the United States than classical retribution, because it adopts deterrence 
and retribution as penal aims of punishment. However, negative retributivism 
contradictorily argues that punishing offenders does not contribute to crime 
reduction but justifies a criminal justice system that accepts these effects.381  
Overall, the section explored various theoretical approaches to retribution, ranging 
from classical retribution to various modern interpretations of retribution. The 
purpose of exploring the approaches is to note their unique interpretations with 
regards to when punishment is deserved and the methods of punishment. Several 
issues are pointed out: First, negative retribution inconsistently justifies punishment 
in accordance with retribution principles but agrees with distributing punishment in 
accordance with deterrence principles. This crucially highlights the importance of 
agreeing on the theoretical foundations of current sentencing practices to avoid any 
inconsistencies. Second, retribution approaches that advance morality as a basis for 
setting laws are incompatible with current criminal laws in the United States and 
England and Wales. Third, approaches to retribution that limit punishment to 
‘imprisonment’ are incompatible with current criminal laws applying to companies. 
Therefore, retribution cannot exist as a sole primary objective for punishing 
companies as some theories contend. These issues will be explored in the context of 
corporate crime below.  
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3 Retribution and Corporate Crime 
 
3.1 Which Approach to Retribution is Being Followed by Sentencing Practices? 
 
There are many theoretical approaches to retribution. This could be an advantage 
and a disadvantage. As Chapter one briefly discussed, the Definitive Guidelines 
(England and Wales) and the Sentencing Commission Guidelines (United States) list 
retribution as a penal aim.382 They do not, however, detail the theoretical approach 
to retribution that is being followed.   
 
Different approaches to retribution adopt unique interpretations to what ‘deserves to 
be punished.’ Stone argues that some forms of culpability like vicarious liability and 
negligence may be unjust to impose on companies. He states,  
 
[To] move the law in this direction is, at least by degrees, to loosen the criminal 
law’s moral tethers. Negligence is shadowy. Vicarious is plastic (who, after all, 
will appear, after the fact, to have been in ‘a responsible position?’). Neither 
squares well with fair notice, intent, or real blameworthiness.383  
 
In his view of retribution, crimes that require the mens rea of negligence would be 
unjust to impose on companies because it is ‘immoral’. The line between what is 
negligent and not negligent is difficult to draw, and it is unfair to impute corporate 
criminal liability for the criminal acts of any employee within the company. 
Nevertheless, Thompson states that negligence-based liability is justified because of 
the potential gross harm resulting from organisational negligence. This view is 
parallel to the negative retribution approach discussed above. Academics that limit 
‘just punishment’ to certain types of mens rea (e.g. solely to intent-based crimes) 
could lead one to believe that the retributive principle of desert is incompatible with 
current corporate criminal laws that punish companies under various men rea 
standards.384 
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Nevertheless, the existence of various approaches to retribution and ‘what deserves 
punishment’ could be advantageous. The law could adopt one approach to retribution 
that is theoretically, and practically coherent, and current laws could be reformed to 
clarify which approach to retribution needs to be taken. Section 4 will consider a 
viable approach to retribution. 
 
3.2 ‘Moral Retribution’ and Corporate Crime 
 
The majority of retribution approaches, as evidenced in Section 2, are based on 
morality. This generally means that criminals are punished to the degree they 
deserve, and this degree is measured in accordance with the crime's ‘wickedness'.385 
Having considered moral based justifications of corporate criminal liability in 
Chapter 1, it is reiterated that distinguishing punishable evils and punishable non-
evils is difficult. Moreover, criminal laws in England and Wales and the United 
States still punish acts that are not necessarily ‘immoral’. It is also often difficult to 
ascertain the actual intentions of the defendants and whether they were morally 
responsible to a certain extent.386 These arguments are discussed in greater detail 
below in the context of expressivist theories, given their popularity in the literature 
on retribution.387 The critique may also be applicable to other approaches to 
retribution.  
 
As explored in the previous section, expressivist theories define criminality in 
relation to immorality. Yet, not all crimes by companies are harms to morals. In other 
words, there is a wide spectrum of crimes that are not clearly linked to morality, and 
criminal laws in England and Wales and the United States enforce punishments on 
conducts that are not necessarily immoral.388  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the thesis takes the view that morality is an illegitimate 
basis for the imposition of criminal laws on companies; corporate responsibility is 
justified based on ‘team member responsibility.’389 For example, The Bribery Act 
2010 criminalises a company for failing to take adequate procedures to prevent 
individuals associated with the company from bribing a person, with the intention of 
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benefiting the company.390 Opinions may diverge on whether the act of bribing an 
individual is immoral, and whether a company’s failure to set procedures that prevent 
its representatives from bribing other individuals is immoral.  
 
Expressivist theories also emphasise communicating public disapproval of the 
criminal's act to achieve retribution. In practice, however, society is likely to have a 
divergence of moral and political values. Individuals may agree on the criminality 
of murder and theft but may disagree on the justifications of punishment and degree 
of punishment.391 Duff conversely argues that a criterion for criminalisation does not 
need to be set for the public to communicate its disapproval when a crime occurs.392 
This argument fails on many grounds. Not setting a criterion for what ought to be 
criminalised would prevent the collection of information on the common values in 
society, how the common values collide, how to overcome the collision of values, 
and determining the values that need to be communicated to reflect public 
condemnation.393  
 
Expressive theorists do not explain how ‘justice’ is achieved when harm is caused to 
various parties, including ‘direct, indirect and remote victims.’394 They also fail to 
explain whether punishment should be set proportionally to the harm caused to all 
the victims or just the direct victims. It is difficult to consistently set a degree of 
public condemnation that is proportionate to the moral wrongfulness of a criminal 
offence.395 It is crucial to apply these issues in the context of corporate crime. In a 
corporate manslaughter case, for instance, the direct victim could be the person who 
has been killed as a result of the company’s deviation from the relevant standard of 
liability. The indirect victims may be family members and dependents who have 
suffered financial and/or emotional distress. The remote victims are members of the 
community who have been affected by the crime (for e.g. incurred costs as a result 
of modifying their routines to avoid being victims of a crime).396 BP Exploration and 
Production Inc. was convicted on counts of manslaughter and violations of 
environmental laws that resulted in the death of eleven individuals and one of the 
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largest oil spills in the history of the petroleum industry.397 The victims are the eleven 
individuals who have lost their lives; their families, spouses and defendants; and 
communities impacted by exposure to organic solvents.398 From here, should 
punishment only be set in proportion to the death of eleven individuals? Should the 
negative impacts on the health of individuals in contaminated communities be 
accounted for? The long-term impact on the remote victims is unlikely to be taken 
into consideration under expressive theorists. 
 
3.3.  Limiting Punishment to ‘Imprisonment’ and Retribution as a ‘Pure’ Theory of 
Punishment for Companies 
 
Even though retribution is a dominant penal aim, a ‘pure’ theory of retribution would 
be difficult to apply to modern criminal law.399  
 
First, classical retribution distributes punishment in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality, expressed as the ‘eye for an eye' principle. Under this principle, 
punishment focuses on the crime committed and not the offender, regardless of the 
potential for re-offending.400 Current sentencing policies, which list retribution as a 
penal aim, do not enforce these principles. Alternatively, they enforce minimum 
mandatory sentences or a sentence range for each type of offence, which is increased 
and/or decreased in accordance with the specific circumstances of the criminal act 
and the offender. 
 
One may conversely argue that current sentencing policies apply a modern approach 
to retribution. The ‘eye for an eye' principle has been modified to ‘applying the 
punishment that fits the crime' by many modern approaches to retribution. Modern 
approaches to retribution also accept considering mitigating circumstances like 
diminished capacity and mental incapacity. As discussed above, these modern 
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approaches to retribution, like expressivist theories, are not ‘pure’ and adopt 
principles accepted by other penal aims. A modified version of morality that is not 
retroactive, and considers the variety of corporate structures, types of companies, 
financial resources of companies, and other circumstances when enforcing 
punishment, may be a feasible way to distribute punishment.  
 
Second, a number of modern approaches to retribution limit punishment to 
‘imprisonment.’401 These approaches to retribution are incompatible with the basis 
of corporate criminal liability. Moreover, mixed theories of punishment, like 
expressivist theories, which justify punishment on retributivist grounds and 
distribute punishment based on deterrence grounds, are theoretically and practically 
incoherent, as discussed above.  
 
Overall, many approaches to retribution fail to justify why companies should be 
punished and how they should be punished. Nevertheless, an interpretation of the 
principle of proportionality, not in its traditional form, could contribute to a viable 
theory of punishment for companies. From here, a viable theory of punishment for 
companies should overcome the flaws identified with many retribution approaches, 
to particularly combat various corporate crimes, and target various types of 
companies.402 An alternative view that could fit in within a mixed theory of 
punishment is explored next. 
 
4 An Alternative View to Retribution: Legal Retribution  
 
4.1 The Theoretical Basis of Legal Retribution 
 
‘Legal retribution’ is a non-moral approach to retribution developed by Brudner 
based on Hegel’s philosophy and other scholars who follow his theories, including 
Green and Seth. Brooks takes into account of all these views and develops a modified 
and more compelling theory of legal retributivism.403  
 
Brudner, as referred to in Brooks’ article, states, 
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The best theory of the penal law’s general part … is not a theory about how 
the moral good of punishing evil is best served; nor is it a theory about when 
it is appropriate to express moral condemnation of blameworthy conduct or 
character through the penal power of the state; nor is it an account of what 
it takes for punishment to be a form of moral pedagogy addressed to a 
socially responsible agent rather than a tool for manipulating the behaviour 
of a rational hedonist. To put the point succinctly: the best theory of the 
penal law is a theory of penal right rather than one of penal morality.404  
 
In interpreting Brudner’s theory, Ramsay states,  
 
[The] most persuasive feature of Brudner's theory is that… [it is] able to explain 
features of the criminal law that moral theory is unable to explain. Moral theories 
of criminalisation either rely on the harm principle and are unable to explain 
those criminal wrongs (such as battery) that can be committed without proof of 
any harm, or they rely on moral retributivism that is unable to explain the entirely 
harm-oriented public welfare offences, where there may be no moral 
wrongdoing. These two perspectives similarly struggle to explain why 
negligence is common in the public welfare offences but traditionally absent 
from what judges sometimes refer to as ‘true crimes'.405 
 
Legal retribution convincingly punishes companies for breaking the law regardless 
of whether the law is immoral or moral. For Brudner, punishment is connected to a 
violation of ‘liberty’ rather than harm. Desert is understood as the defendant’s 
wrong; or actions and inactions that cause interference with the choice of others, and 
the ‘connection between the recipient’s wrong and the wrong he suffers.’406 In 
practice, however, some crimes may not interfere with the free choice of others. 
Brudner excludes these crimes from legal retributivism but includes them under 
other categories in his full instrumentalist theory of penal laws.407 For example, he 
states ‘public welfare offences' would fall outside legal retributivism but would be 
included under a ‘full theory of justified penal force.'408 He argues that only public 
welfare offences that involve ‘knowing', hence ‘contravening a statute protecting 
                                                           
404 Alan Brudner, Punishment and Freedom in Brooks, ‘Punishment: Political, not Moral’ (n 402). 
405 Peter Ramsay, ‘The Dialogic Community at Dusk’ (2014) Critical Analysis of Law 316, 317. 
406 Brooks, ‘Punishment: Political, not Moral’ (n 402) 430. 
407 Alan Brudner, ‘A Reply to Critics of Punishment and Freedom’ (2011) 14 New Criminal Law 
Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal 495, 495-6. 
408 ibid 495. 
  
74 
greenery cannot be criminal, in my view, for this action falls into the subcategory of 
breaches of welfare laws that serve a social preference.'409 However, in England and 
Wales and the United States, prosecution of environmental crimes is ‘an established 
part of [the] criminal justice system.’410 Hence, an interpretation of legal retribution 
that includes strict and non-strict liability offences is more aligned with current 
criminal laws.  
The modified theory proposed by Brooks states that conducts that violate the rights 
of others should be criminal. Importantly, he states, ‘we may violate rights in 
preventing others from free choice, but it is not clear that all rights violations entail 
the prevention of free choice to each other.’411 The interpretation of ‘conducts that 
violate the rights of other people’ is subject to constant change given changing 
perspectives and values of individuals in the community.412 The types of services 
and products offered by companies, attitudes towards compliance, and the types of 
companies, are subject to constant change. Moreover, attitudes toward compliance 
are impacted by the aforementioned factors. Legal retribution advantageously 
considers these factors to justify punishment. 
 
Additionally, legal retribution states that punishment is justified for strict liability 
offences and non-strict liability offences (including intent and negligence). Brooks 
states, ‘punishment is often justified through its justifying aim or purpose, such as 
retribution, deterrence or rehabilitation.’413 Additionally, Brudner states, ‘there is 
plenty of discretionary room in sentencing for fixing the exact measure of 
punishment with a view to deterrence and rehabilitation.’414 Legal retribution accepts 
that sentences may be distributed in accordance with rehabilitation and deterrence 
where appropriate, and distribution of punishment includes methods beyond 
imprisonment.415 Applying these concepts to corporate crime, the punishment of 
companies is justified when they have defective compliance systems and internal 
procedures that lead to interference with the rights of others. Legal retribution 
accepts that crime can result from other reasons, and punishment is justified in other 
circumstances beyond just deserts.  
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Legal retribution distinctively overcomes the three main issues identified in the 
previous section. First, it adopts a broader view of punishment that justifies its 
imposition in accordance with different penal aims, including just deserts. Second, 
it provides a non-moral basis of punishment, making it theoretically and practically 
coherent with current criminal laws in the United States and England and Wales. 
Third, it states that punishment could be distributed through imprisonment and other 
methods.  
 
4.2 Legal Retribution for Corporate Crime 
 
Having explored the theoretical foundations of legal retribution and how different 
approaches to retribution may apply in the context of companies, it is important to 
defend its viability in the context of corporate crime in further detail. It has been 
argued that legal retribution could form part of a broader theory of punishment for 
companies (given that accepts other penal aims for the justification and distribution 
of punishment). The section defends legal retribution and illustrates its alignment 
proposals set in Chapter 1. 
 
The section also defends legal retribution by considering the views of Wong. Wong 
rejects retribution as a theory of punishment for companies. Wong argues that ‘the 
basic assumptions and fundamental postulates of retribution cannot satisfactorily 
assess blame, impose liability, and exact restitution on companies.’416 Wong raises 
three questions when discussing retribution in the context of corporate crime: ‘(1) 
What corporate conducts should be punished?; (2) who should be held responsible 
for corporate conduct?; and (3) How should corporate criminals be punished?’417 
Each of the questions is explored in greater detail below.  
 
4.2.1 Which Corporate Wrongs Should be Punished?   
 
Many approaches to retribution punish conduct that is ‘immoral' and use 
‘immorality' as a scale for drawing the line between legal and illegal conduct. Wong 
rightly argues that retributivists adopt different interpretations to ‘immoral conduct’, 
yet do not provide guidance on determining the difference between morality and 
immorality. Moral-based retribution approaches are not practically coherent because 
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it is difficult to define ‘morally correct’ decisions that companies have to make to 
avoid breaking the law.418  
 
Nevertheless, legal retribution overcomes difficulties found in moral-based 
approaches to retribution. Legal retribution contends that not all moral wrongs are 
illegal and not all laws are based on morality. It is just to punish companies when 
they violate the rights of individuals, regardless of whether the violation is moral or 
immoral.  
 
This view comes in line with Lee’s ‘team member responsibility’ view. It stipulates 
that corporate misconducts should be criminalised if they are motivated by the 
team’s norms and/or pursued by the team’s members in pursuit of their goals; and 
punishes strict liability offences and non-strict liability offences that may have been 
caused by negligence, intent, or recklessness.419  
 
4.2.2 Who Should be Held Responsible for Corporate Wrongs? 
 
The proposals of legal retribution reflect that both individual responsibility and 
corporate responsibility would be imposed when it is just to do so (when the rights 
of individuals are violated). As Chapter 1 advanced, corporate criminal liability is 
justified when the actions or inactions of certain representatives within the company 
are viewed as ‘team member responsibility.' For non-strict liability offences, team 
member responsibility is defined in accordance to the ‘broad identification principle', 
where the actions and omissions of senior management, even when they delegate 
their tasks to low-level employees, should be representative of the company’s 
actions.420 Consistent with legal retribution, it is also just to punish misconducts that 
are the responsibility of the team when they violate the rights of other individuals, 
including strict liability offences. Individuals within the company who are 
pinpointed to have committed a criminal offence could also incur personal liability. 
 
It is crucial to assess opposing views to defend legal retribution. Wong argues that 
the main retribution debate lies in ‘whether moral culpability can be imposed on an 
impersonal entity.'421 Since a company is not an individual, how could moral fault 
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be attributed to it?422 This view is parallel to arguments rejecting corporate criminal 
liability as explored in Chapter 1. Wong concludes that moral culpability requires ‘a 
capacity to conduct moral reasoning and an ability to make responsible choices.’423 
‘Causing harm' is not sufficient to attribute moral culpability. Furthermore, he argues 
that it is difficult to pinpoint the responsibility of wrongdoing within a corporate 
entity. Decisions may be carried by more than one individual, often as part of a 
group, with or without supervision. Members of companies may also change over 
time.424 
 
Brent and Fisse alternatively argue that many retributive approaches incorrectly 
reinforce ‘individualism’. Particularly, they lie on three assumptions: First, they 
‘pre-suppose individual as opposed to corporate responsibility.’425 Second, they are 
‘pre-conditioned on fault,’ which is not workable or defensible in the context of 
companies.426 Third, they argue that punishing companies goes against desert.427 
Similar to arguments of the ‘group moral agency’ theory advanced in Chapter 1, 
Brent and Fisse find companies as responsible moral agents, because they have a 
wealth of resources and can acquire superior knowledge over individuals.428 From 
there, they advance a ‘concept of reactive fault', which attributes corporate criminal 
liability based on ‘unreasonable corporate failure to devise and undertake 
satisfactory preventative or corrective measures in response to the commission of the 
actus reus of an offence by personnel acting on behalf of the company.'429 A company 
can be morally responsible because of intending to enforce policies and complete 
projects, and accordingly for failing to achieve compliance with the law.430 Third, 
they argue that as blameworthy moral agents, companies incur punishment that may 
impact innocent shareholders. This is similar to the impact of a crime on the families 
of the victims and defendants. In the case of companies, innocent associates and 
shareholders do not serve punishment or experience the stigma of punishment. 
Moreover, they partake in a distributional scheme of profits and losses from the 
company’s activities, have accepted corporate benefits flowing from profits of the 
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company or on the basis of their position within the company, and hence should look 
at their involvement as an investment rather than ‘praise of blame.’431  
 
Although it is agreed that a clear distinction between individual and corporate 
liability needs to be made, Brent and Fisse incorrectly base liability on moral 
grounds. Difficulties with moral retributive approaches have been discussed 
extensively in the previous sections. Companies can always safeguard against the 
‘reactive fault’ standard of liability by enforcing ‘corrective measures’ following the 
commission of the offence. In some circumstances, the costs of implementing 
corrective measures are lesser than the short-term profits made out of the 
commission of the offence.432  
 
Legal retribution clearly distinguishes between individual criminal liability and 
corporate criminal liability. Innocent individuals who work for the company are not 
subject to the stigma of conviction and criminal punishment, and those who have 
participated or were responsible are estopped from earning illegally, and the 
company is estopped from allocating illegal resources at the society’s expense.433 
This would influence the behaviour of team members and allow them to evaluate 
whether they should continue to be part of the company.434  Therefore, it is just to 
punish individuals within the company that have committed an offence for the 
benefit of the company, and they can be held individually responsible for the crime 
they committed.  
 
4.2.3 How Should Corporate Crimes be Punished? 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, punishment is distributed in accordance with retribution 
and deterrence principles. For example, in the United States, the principle of 
proportionality applies, and the seriousness of the crime determines the sentence 
severity.435 Moreover, one of the requirements for sanctions imposed on companies 
and their agents is that they provide ‘just punishment’.436 Nevertheless, it is unclear 
what approach to retribution is being followed to determine ‘fair and just 
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punishment’ and to define the parameters of ‘seriousness’ in relation to 
proportionality.  
Wong argues that distributing punishment in accordance with retribution is 
problematic. He states, 
 
[W]hen only the group is being harmed as a collective, and not that of the 
members individually, whose moral judgement should be taken into 
account?... When the harm is done to a group…it elicits distinct and different 
emotion and/or cognitive response than when an individual is personally 
injured.'437  
 
The criminal conduct is committed by a group entity and it is difficult to ascertain 
the moral judgement of the group. Moreover, different levels of harm are suffered 
by various groups of people as a result of the crime.  
 
Legal retribution, on the other hand, does not concentrate on the moral judgement of 
these groups. Legal retribution provides that it is just to punish companies that 
violate the rights of other people, even for crimes that do not require proof of mens 
rea. For example, the punishment would be distributed in accordance with retribution 
principles in strict liability offences, because it is just to punish a company when 
they conduct an act that violates the rights of others. Methods of punishment clearly 
go beyond imprisonment. Punishment is distributed in proportion to the gravity of 
the rights violated. A process could be implemented to identify the individuals whose 
rights have been affected by the criminal act or omission.  
 
4.2.4 The Advantages of Legal Retribution 
 
Legal retributivism's distinctive view of law and culpability accounts for different 
offences and offenders, which other retribution approaches fail to do. Section 2 
theoretically analysed various interpretations to retribution, ranging from its classical 
variant to modern interpretations like the Fair Play theory; expressivist retributivism, 
and negative retributivism. Classical retribution stands on an extreme and negatively 
defends strict views on punishment guided by religious views, which are difficult to 
apply in the context of companies. It is problematic to provide a set objective 
standard of morality, a criterion for determining the levels of punishment, and to 
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apply modes of punishment based on the ‘eye for an eye' principle. Expressivist 
retributivism also considers morality as a standard for punishment and do not provide 
a clear criterion as to how punishment should be distributed in proportion to 
morality. It is unclear whether punishment could go beyond imprisonment, and 
whether communication of public disapproval is linked to the standards of liability. 
This would be problematic in the case of companies, given the practical impossibility 
of imprisoning companies, and the existence of various standards of liability. The 
Fair Play theory and negative retributivism positively attempt to collate different 
retribution and other theories to gain a better understanding of the justifying aims of 
punishment and its distribution. Nevertheless, the theories fail to clarify how 
retribution and utilitarianism could function coherently under one theory.   
 
Thus, legal retribution advantageously accepts that crime has more than one cause. 
Brooks states, ‘if our freedom and rights are better protected and preserved by the 
incorporation of non-retributivist elements in the specific circumstances under 
certain conditions, then it may be a mistake to reject such incorporation out of 
hand.’438 When the primary aim of punishment is the protection of rights, then 
punishment could be tailored to the specific circumstances of each case. 
Proportionality is accepted by different theories. Legal retribution is part of a mixed 
theory that can accommodate other goals of punishment when they best address the 
protection of rights in a specific situation.  
 
5 Conclusion  
 
The chapter explored retribution theories and defended a view of retribution that can 
effectively address corporate crime.  
 
Section 2 defined and assessed various approaches to retribution, ranging from 
classical retribution to various modern views of retribution. Section 3 identified three 
main challenges: the lack of clarity on which approach to retribution is currently 
being applied in practice; prevalent retribution approaches that define morality in 
relation to legality do not represent modern criminal laws nor provide insights on 
how laws could be improved or how justice could be achieved; and views on 
retribution pertaining to it being a ‘pure theory of punishment’ and punishment being 
                                                           
438 Brooks, ‘Punishment: Political, not Moral’ (n 402) 437. 
  
81 
limited to imprisonment create vast difficulties to the practical coherency of 
retribution to address corporate crime. 
 
Section 4 advanced ‘legal retribution’ as an alternative view that could fit within a 
mixed punishment model, through explaining its theoretical underpinnings, and 
exploring and defending its application in the context of corporate crime. This was 
addressed by explaining its advantages over other views of retribution discussed in 
Sections 2 and 3. Legal retribution is well-suited with ideas discussed in Chapter 1 
(corporate criminal liability as ‘team member responsibility’, the Canadian standard 
of liability model, and justifying the punishment of non-strict liability offences). 
 
Overall, legal retribution can work as part of a theory of punishment for companies 
that consider other penal aims. It overcomes disadvantages of the lack of clarity of 
current sentencing policies that do not define the approach of retribution to be 
followed and how retribution could fit with other penal aims and addresses 
discrepancies between the theory and practice of retribution, which is crucial when 
applied to address corporate crime.  The next chapters will also consider the 
compatibility of retribution with deterrence, rehabilitation, and/or restoration.
  
82 
Chapter Three 
 
Deterrence 
 
 
1 Introduction  
 
Deterrence is an essential postulate of criminal liability and sentencing practices. 
Deterrence encompasses a family of theories that justify crime to deter future 
criminal acts and the frequency of future crimes.439 In comparison to approaches to 
retribution focusing on just deserts, deterrence theories broadly fall under 
consequentialist justifications to punishment.440 Consequentialism could be 
generally defined as justifying punishment because the perceived positive 
consequences exceed the negative consequences.441 In the context of companies, 
deterrence theories claim that companies obey the law because the threat of detection 
and punishment through criminal sanctions is important to companies and their 
managers.442  
 
As Chapter 2 explained, the two central objectives of imposing criminal law on 
companies in England and Wales and the United States are retribution and 
deterrence.443 Having discussed how retribution could contribute to a broader theory 
of punishment, the next step is to examine the fitness of deterrence to contribute to 
a theory of punishment for companies. This requires examining the coherence of 
deterrence as a theory of punishment, and how it has been applied in practice to 
regulate corporate misconduct.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 1 examines various theoretical 
approaches to deterrence, ranging from classical deterrence to modern deterrence 
approaches. Section 2 analyses the application of deterrence in England and Wales 
and the United States to address corporate crime. Section 2.1 particularly addresses 
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how sentencing policies have applied deterrence theories in combination to 
retribution to punish corporations; and how DPAs provide a supplementary, yet 
important, contribution to controlling corporate crime. Section 2.2 discusses 
challenges to adopt a liability and sentencing model based solely on deterrence. 
Taking in mind the advantages and pitfalls of retribution, Section 3 discusses how 
deterrence could play a part in a theory of punishment for companies.  
 
2 Deterrence Theory  
 
Like retribution, there is no single theory of deterrence.444  The section will 
theoretically explore the foundational concepts of deterrence, from its classical 
views laid down by utilitarian philosophers to its various modern approaches. The 
views of deterrence are analysed by considering the circumstances in which 
punishment should be imposed and allocated.   
 
2.1 The Origins of Deterrence 
 
The word deterrence originates from the Latin word deterre – ‘to frighten from or 
away.’445 Deterrence could be defined as the manipulation of individual behaviour 
through threats. Like retribution, Freedman arguably states that deterrence is rooted 
in a view of many religious books, asserting that individuals should conduct their 
earthly lives in accordance to how they may be rewarded or punished for eternity in 
the next life. He explains that in the Bible, God's first words contained a deterrent 
effect. God permitted Adam to eat any fruit in the garden except for the fruit of the 
Tree of Conscience; eating the forbidden fruit means that Adam was ‘doomed to die.' 
Adam and Eve failed to follow these rules, resulting in their banishment from Eden 
and delayed death. The story of Adam and Eve is also present in many religions that 
promise ‘heaven’ and threaten ‘hell’, including Islam.446 
 
The concept of ‘threat with a purpose’ and the ability to manipulate individual 
calculations to prevent them from committing harm emerged in the thinking of 
utilitarian philosophers.447 Deterrence developed from universalistic assumptions on 
human nature and law obedience, advocated by utilitarian philosophers. They 
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protested retributivist theories dominating criminal laws and policies in Europe.448 
Three prominent classical deterrence proponents include Thomas Hobbes 
(Leviathan), Cesare Beccaria (Dei Delitti e delle Pene), and Jeremy Bentham (An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation).449 According to Bentham, 
  
In so far as by the act of punishment exercised on the delinquent, other persons 
at large are considered as deterred from the commission of acts of the like 
obnoxious description, and the act of punishment is in consequence considered 
as endued with the quality of determent. It is by the impression made on the will 
of those persons, an impression made in this case not by the act itself, but by the 
idea of it, accompanied with the eventual expectation of a similar evil, as about 
to be eventually produced in their own instances, that the ultimately intentional 
result is considered as produced: and in this case, it is also said to be produced 
by the example, or by the force of example.450  
 
This view reflects the three main components to deterrence theories, ‘severity, 
certainty, and celerity.’451 First, the higher the severity of punishment, the more 
likely that individuals will abide by the law.  Second, laws should be certain to ensure 
individuals understand the consequences of committing crimes and refrain from 
violating the law. Third, punishments should be imposed swiftly for the offender and 
other individuals to understand the negative impacts of violating the law. 452 These 
ideas are explored in greater detail below. 
 
Classical deterrence assumes that criminals, like other individuals, are rational 
actors.453 Crime is committed by individuals following a pain-pleasure analysis, 
where individuals conclude that the benefits of committing a crime exceed its 
costs.454 Hobbes states that individuals are ‘creatures of their own volition who want 
certain things and who fight when their desires are in conflict.’455 Individuals pursue 
their self-interests, including social reputation and material gain, and these self-
interests can create conflict with other individuals’ interests. The conflict of interests 
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could lead to exclusion by some members of the society, and in some cases, lead to 
law violation. Classical deterrence claims that individuals agree to enter a ‘social 
contract’, enforced by the government, to regulate their conflict of interests.456 
 
Distribution of punishment is based on the pain-pleasure principle. Bentham states 
that criminals would be prevented from engaging in punishment if the apparent or 
actual value of pain is higher than pleasure.457 He also asserts that states have an 
obligation to ‘promote the happiness of the society, by punishing and rewarding.’458 
Similarly, Beccaria states,  
 
What are the true and most effective laws? They are those pacts and conventions 
that everyone would observe and propose while the voice of private interest, 
which one always hears, is silent or in agreement with the voice of the public 
interest.459 
 
Deterrence is achieved when the laws define crimes and specify the amounts and 
types of punishment for different types of crimes, applied proportionally to the 
amount of harm inflicted on society.460 Punishment should not be imposed in excess 
of what is necessary to prevent individuals from violating the law and controlling 
the actions of offenders.461 Deterrence focuses on manipulating individual behaviour 
through the threat of punishment and enforcing prosecution. Beccaria asserts that 
manipulating individual behaviour requires influencing their minds and inflicting 
low damages on the criminal.462 Bentham states that certainty, rather than severity, 
is a more efficient way of controlling crime.463 The combination of the threat of 
punishment and actual punishment can deter future crime.464 
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Overall, traditional deterrence is based on three concepts: severity, certainty, and 
celerity.  Today, these concepts reflect the framework for testing deterrence.465 
Classical deterrence was developed as a universalistic idea of how individuals act 
and how society should respond to individuals who did not follow the law. This can 
be perceived as an advantage and a disadvantage. The pain-pleasure and free will 
concepts do not consider other possible preventative effects of punishment beyond 
its frightening impacts. It simplistic views also fail to consider the differences 
between various types of offenders and how their decisions may be influenced by 
personal experiences and demographics.466  
 
On the other hand, classical deterrence positively contributes to understanding the 
cause of committing certain crimes and how punishment should be enforced. For 
instance, classical deterrence contends that individuals always seek to achieve their 
self-interests, and crime stems from a conflict of interests between the specific 
offender and others in the society, and offenders feeling excluded from the society.467  
 
Hence, deterrence in its traditional form contributes to knowledge on individual 
behaviour and factors that contribute to criminality. Many modern deterrence 
approaches adopt modified versions of these principles, as will be explored in the 
next section.468  
  
2.2 Modern Deterrence 
 
Classical deterrence has a number of flaws: the pain-pleasure principle is simplistic 
and not practically coherent, uniform punishments are insufficient, and the need to 
develop concrete and diversified ways to respond to crime. Consequently, modern 
deterrence theories tested the assumptions of classical philosophers and developed a 
set of theories, which have three common assumptions. 
 
Under modern deterrence approaches, individuals are inhibited from committing 
crimes for a number of reasons: ‘(1) they fear the consequences of punishment, (2) 
laws have an educative influence on citizens, and (3) a person's prosocial habits are 
reinforced.'469 Punishment is based on enforcing a ‘preventative force against crime’ 
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to control or change the present and future behaviours of individuals in a way that 
makes them fearful of the consequences of offending.470 It may also have an 
educative influence on them and personal circumstances are taken into account in 
sentencing. The rest of Section 2.2 will discuss notable elements of modern 
deterrence. 
 
 
 
2.2.1 General Deterrence and Specific Deterrence  
 
Modern deterrence theories introduced two methods of controlling crime. Crime can 
be controlled at an individual and a broader level, the former known as ‘specific 
deterrence’ and the latter known as ‘general deterrence’. The greater the certainty 
and severity of punishment, the greater the deterrent impact on other offenders 
(specific deterrence) and the public (general deterrence).471 The two concepts work 
together to control crime from a different angle.472 General deterrence aims to inhibit 
the general society from committing crimes when they witness criminals inflicting 
pain. Specific deterrence focuses on deterring the specific offender from committing 
further crime through imposing proportional ‘pain' to offset the benefits of 
committing the crime.473 
 
A closer look at general and specific deterrence reveals its similarities to 
rehabilitation. The problem to be addressed is ‘[whether] rehabilitation is deterrence 
by another name.’474 Somer argues that rehabilitation can be ‘a principal objective 
of correctional [programmes] but should not be considered as a ‘penal aim’.475 This 
implies that rehabilitation is a sub-set of deterrence. This view is incorrect on a 
number of grounds. 
 
Rehabilitation and deterrence fall under consequentialist approaches to punishment, 
which justify punishment because of the positive consequences of obeying the law 
over its negative consequences.476 Brooks states that although deterrence and 
rehabilitation both aim at the reduction of crime, the results are achieved through 
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two distinctive ways. Specific deterrence asserts that an offender has experienced 
punishment and is fearful of further punishment if they choose to commit another 
crime. General deterrence is achieved when members of society fear the punishment 
that other offenders have endured. This does not mean that all offenders and 
members of the society who do not engage in further crime do not have the desire to 
do so.  On the other hand, rehabilitation affirms that members of the society, 
including offenders, would not commit crime because they have no desire to engage 
in crime.477 Therefore, the aims of crime reduction are achieved in two different 
ways, making rehabilitation and deterrence separate penal aims. 
2.2.2 Deterrence and Incapacitation 
 
Specific and general deterrence have different perspectives on the construction of 
punishment that go beyond conveying fear in the consequences of punishment as 
stated above. Brooks states that punishment under deterrence could take several 
forms: fear, incapacitation, and reform. Fear of the threatened punishments may 
deter individuals from criminality. Moreover, criminals may not engage in more 
crime because they have been reformed.478 With regards to incapacitation, many 
academics interpret it as a distinct penal aim.479 Spelman states, 
 
The criminal justice system controls crime in several ways. By maintaining a 
threat of punishment for those who commit crimes, it may deter potential 
offenders from committing criminal acts in the first place. Alternatively, 
offenders who have been punished may be deterred by the threat of being 
punished again. If deterrence is unsuccessful, the system may rehabilitate 
offenders once they have been caught. And if rehabilitation is unsuccessful, the 
system can put convicted offenders in jails and prisons where they are unable to 
harm the rest of us. That is, incarcerated offenders are incapacitated.480 
 
Incapacitation is interpreted as a way of dealing with criminals who cannot be 
rehabilitated or deterred. Deterrence also accepts imprisoning criminals in certain 
circumstances. From here, incapacitation should be interpreted as a form of 
deterrence rather than a separate theory of punishment.481 Somer defines 
incapacitation as ‘the state of being held in or contained, … [which may involve] the 
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physical removal of the offender from society, …[or] the chemical and surgical 
means of restraint.’482 Incapacitation could be explained as physically restraining an 
individual from committing crimes, often through imprisonment. It could also 
include loss of vocational licenses and deportation.   
 
One of the reasons why incapacitation fails the ‘theory’ test is its failure to explain 
the particular circumstances and lengths of incapacitation, the impact of 
incapacitation, and the influence of the wrong of confinement and the expense.483 
Specifically, incapacitation unrealistically embraces imprisoning ‘everyone’, 
including innocent people, to prevent future crime.484 Brooks notably states that 
incapacitation makes ‘a mistake about the geography of crime.’485 Incapacitation 
fails to recognise that offending does not stop when offenders are imprisoned, 
because individuals may commit crimes in prison. 486 Somer recognises that the rate 
of crime in American prisons has increased.487  
 
Therefore, incapacitation fails to meet the definition of punishment as a response to 
crime.488 Section 2.1 will further explore how corporations could be incapacitated. 
 
2.2.3 The Rational Actor Model and the Economic Theory of Deterrence  
   
The traditional pain-pleasure and free will principles have been further examined by 
modern deterrence approaches.  Modern deterrence elaborates that human rationality 
is partially determined and partially bounded. Decisions are limited by the amount, 
quality, and type of knowledge a person acquires. Decisions are made based on the 
information available, and individual demographic, environmental and situational 
experiences.489 
 
Some modern deterrence theorists, notably Becker, advance an economic theory of 
punishment.490 Inspired by Beccaria and Bentham's economic calculus, he developed 
a theory to answer normative questions on the number of resources and punishment 
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that should be used to enforce criminal laws. He measures the ‘social loss' from 
offences; including vengeance, deterrence, compensation, and rehabilitation; and 
finds the expenditure of resources that minimise the losses; including costs of 
prosecuting offenders, the nature of punishments, and responses of offenders to 
changes in enforcement.491 In his study, he states that crimes include tax evasion, 
white-collar crimes, and views punishment as including imprisonment, probations, 
and fines.492 He further contends that the change of the probability of punishment 
(certainty of punishment) has a greater impact on preventing crime than a change of 
punishment (severity of punishment).493 It follows that using fines ‘whenever 
feasible’ has a greater impact on social welfare over imprisonment.494 The use of 
imprisonment requires knowledge on the elasticities of the response of offences to 
change in punishments, which is difficult to calculate.495 In his ‘theory of collusion', 
he concludes that optimal allocation of resources complements optimal policies to 
combat illegal behaviour.496    
 
Becker’s theory inspired a series of studies that embraced an economic perspective 
of crime. Durlauf and Nagin conducted a review of various empirical studies on 
deterrence, particularly aggregate regression studies that examine (i) the relationship 
between crime rates and aggregate measures of police levels, and (ii) the relationship 
between imprisonment rates and aggregate crime rates. In relation to (i), they critique 
a study by Donohue (2009) that identifies six major published journal articles and 
find a negative association between imprisonment rates and crime rates. They state 
that these studies do not evaluate how alternative policies jointly affect crime and 
imprisonment, do not explain the use of certain control variables, and negatively use 
functional forms that do not represent aggregations of individual decisions.497 In 
relation to (ii), they evaluate studies that positively find an inverse relationship 
between large resource commitments to policing and lower crime rates, stating that 
the validity of these results is diminished by inadequate attention to model 
uncertainty. Based on these findings, Durlauf and Nagin find that the studies on rates 
of imprisonment and crime rates are theoretically and statistically flawed and that 
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the studies on resource commitments and crime rates are useful but only to a limited 
extent.498 
  
Furthermore, Durlauf and Nagin examine studies that focus on the deterrent effect 
of specific policies or interventions, including (i) severity-based policies and (ii) 
certainty-based policies.  In relation to (i) severity-based policies, they examine 
studies on the deterrent effect of ‘California's Three Strikes and You're Out' law, 
which orders a 25-year minimum sentence after a criminal is convicted of ‘three 
strike-eligible offences.' For instance, Zimring, Hawkings, and Kamin (2001) 
conclude that the three-strike law resulted in a 2% decrease in felony rates. They 
observe that these studies do not conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the trade-off 
between attendant increases and crime reduction, which in hand diminishes the 
policy impacts of their findings. Additionally, Durlauf and Nagin assess a study by 
Helland and Tabarrok (2007) on the effects of the law on crime and its cost-
effectiveness. It focuses on whether the law deterred offending among individuals 
previously convicted of strike-eligible offences. They compared the future offending 
of two-strike and one-strike convicted criminals. They found that the arrest rates 
were 20% lower for the two strike-eligible offences, hence reflecting that the risk of 
a 25 minimum sentence contributed to decisions on whether to re-offend. Durlauf 
and Nagin observe that the studies did not consider the differences in legal 
representation between the two groups, the differing incentives for additional crime 
commission, and whether some criminals committed non-strike eligible offences.499  
 
With regards to (ii) certainty-based policies, Durlauf and Nagin analyse studies on 
the relationship between marginal changes in police presence or different approaches 
to mobilising police and crime rates. This includes empirical studies on the effects 
of abrupt changes in police presence and crime-prevention effectiveness of different 
strategies for deploying police. They review various studies on how police resources 
are used and conclude that the impact of police activity is heterogeneous and depends 
on the circumstances.500 Additionally, they examine Cincinnati Police Department 
(Shi, 2009), the New Jersey State Police (Heaton, in press), and the Oregon State 
Police (DeAngelo and Hansen, 2008),501 which have concluded that there is an 
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inverse relationship between police presence and crime rates. They point out that 
there was no examination of police behaviour beyond making arrests.502  
 
They conclude, in agreement with Becker, on the following: increasing lengthy 
sentences has a marginal deterrent effect; increasing the visibility of police in ways 
to heighten the perceived risk of apprehension has a substantial deterrent effect, and 
experiencing imprisonment compared with non-custodial sanctions like probation –
referred to as specific deterrence- does not prevent reoffending and may have a 
criminogenic effect.503 
 
One advancement of modern theories of punishment is the importance of severity, 
celerity, and certainty. As seen in Becker’s economic theory and in a number of other 
deterrence studies, empirical evidence points towards certainty and severity over 
celerity with regards to the rate of commission of a particular offence.504 A number 
of studies hold inverse relationships between the rate of crime and the severity of 
punishment and certainty of the law.505 It follows that certainty of the law is regarded 
as a more important variable than the severity of punishment.506 For example, 
Williams and Hawkins state that formal sanction threats deter crime by triggering 
informal sanction threats. Informal sanction threats include internal emotions of guilt 
and shame.507 Williams and Hawkins interpret certainty as a combination of the 
actual certain or uncertain status of the law and the perception of that certainty and 
conclude that effective communication about the rational basis of punishment and 
threats of punishment play a positive factor in effective deterrence.508 Additionally, 
Andenaes states that the influence of deterrence varies by the crime type.509 Some 
determinant factors for setting punishment are detection and publicity. First, crimes 
that are unlikely to be detected require more severe penalties to maintain the same 
value of punishment. Second, when a criminal is prosecuted, it is desirable to 
communicate the prosecution to individuals in society.510 The greatest deterrence 
impact occurs when criminal acts are calculative in nature. Simpson argues that 
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accordingly, many types of corporate crimes are more deterrable than violent 
crimes.511 
 
Overall, it is important to recognise that many deterrence studies interpret terms like 
‘severity’ and ‘celerity’ differently and use different control variables, which may 
diminish the impact of the studies and their practical coherence.  Nevertheless, 
modern deterrence theories contribute to understanding the causes of crime and how 
punishment should be distributed. Through testing the assumptions of celerity, 
severity, and certainty, modern theories of deterrence find that punishment should 
not be uniform. There are different forms of deterrence influencing the rate of 
compliance to laws, including fear, incapacitation, and reform. Additionally, 
although the modern rational actor model simplifies how individuals could comply 
with the law by assuming that they are all deterrable, modern deterrence approaches 
positively expand on the idea by recognising that individual decisions are partially 
determined and bounded.512 Deterrence and rehabilitation attempt to address the 
issue of reducing crime in two different ways. 
 
Having explored the theoretical underpinnings of many deterrence approaches and 
how they apply to non-corporate crime, the next section will discuss the application 
of deterrence to corporate crime. 
 
3 Deterrence and Corporate Crime 
 
Deterrence models are based on four assumptions: (a) companies are fully-informed 
utility maximisers; (2) statutes define illegal misconduct; (3) punishment provides 
the primary incentive for corporate compliance; and (4) enforcement agencies 
optimally detect and punish misbehaviour, given available resources.513 Companies 
always calculate whether the benefit of committing an offence is higher than the 
costs and risks. Laws clearly draw the line between legal and illegal behaviour, and 
enforcement agencies use their resources to detect and punish illegal behaviour by 
companies. Punishment should create an incentive for developing norm-compliant 
behaviour in the long run. 
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The section analyses the competency of applying a punishment theory based on 
deterrence. Section 3.1 studies sentencing guidelines and DPAs. Section 3.2 
discusses the sufficiency of applying deterrence to corporate crime and potential 
discrepancies between the theory and practice of a corporate crime.  
 
3.1 Deterrence Theory and Corporate Criminal Laws in England and Wales and the 
United States  
 
3.1.1 Definitive Guidelines (England and Wales) and Sentencing Commission 
Guidelines (USA)  
 
Current sentencing guidelines are based on deterrence principles, as discussed in 
Chapter 1. In England and Wales, the Definitive Guidelines state that the goals of 
punishment are ‘deterrence and removal of gain derived through the commission of 
the offence.’514 In accordance with deterrence, corporations primarily pay fines when 
they violate the law. Section 164 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 states that the fine 
is set in accordance with the seriousness of the offence, taking in mind the financial 
circumstances of the offender.515  
 
For example, The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, which 
criminalises companies for serious management failures resulting in fatalities, has 
an offence range of £180,000 to an unlimited fine. The sentencing guidelines follow 
a number of steps to determine the fine.  
 
First, the seriousness of the offence is determined based on the foreseeability of 
serious injury; how far the company fell from the standard of duty; whether the 
breach was a result of a systematic departure from good practice or is representative 
of systematic failures; the number of deaths; and risks of further serious injuries and 
deaths. Second, the court considers the company’s annual turnover and financial 
factors to determine the category range. Third, the court ensures that the fine meets 
the objectives of retribution and reduction of crime and has a substantial economic 
impact on the company to force management and shareholders to understand the 
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importance of having a safe environment for workers and how members of the public 
are affected by their activities. Fourth, the court considers the level of fines and the 
ability of the companies to improve conditions within the organisation to comply 
with the law, and the impact the fine has on other stakeholders. Where appropriate, 
the fine could be substantial to keep the company out of business. The court 
contemplates reducing the fine based on factors like guilty pleas, and whether the 
companies have assisted the prosecution. The court also evaluates the necessity of 
additional ancillary orders like compensation, remediation, and publicity orders.516  
Thus, in England and Wales, the Definitive Guidelines apply deterrence principles: 
this includes applying fines in proportion to the seriousness of the offence, judged 
by factors like the impact on members of the public, lack of safe environments for 
workers, and departure from their duty of care under the law. Fines can be lowered 
if the company assists prosecution or pleads guilty.  
 
Referring back to the assumptions of deterrence that companies are utility 
maximisers and legal punishment should inspire norm compliant behaviour, 
companies with large access to resources are less likely to adopt norm-compliant 
cultures. Distribution of punishment in accordance with these principles allow these 
companies to ‘payout' their fines and factor in the cost of crime. It is beneficial to 
consider a different structure for the distribution of punishment that would fit 
different types of companies. Sentencing policies need to be restructured in a way 
where deterrence goals are only applied when appropriate for the case at hand.  
 
The Sentencing Commission Guidelines also aim to further deterrence and 
retribution. Distribution of punishment is through paying fines, combined with, 
where appropriate, probation for up to five years, making restitution, issuing public 
notices, and exposure to forfeiture statutes. Parallel to the deterrence principle that 
companies are ‘fully informed utility maximisers,’ when an organisation primarily 
operates for a criminal purpose or by criminal means, the fine should be set high to 
divest the organisation of all its assets.517 For other crimes, the fine range is set in 
accordance with the seriousness of the offence and culpability of the organisation. 
Seriousness is reflected by the greatest pecuniary gain, pecuniary loss or the amount 
set out in the offence level fine table.518 Additionally, parallel to the assumption that 
punishment should create incentives for companies to comply, companies can self-
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police their own conduct to detect and prevent crime.519 Chapter Eight of the 
Sentencing Guidelines lists criteria for establishing an effective compliance 
programme known as a corporate ‘good citizenship’ model, which includes: 
 
[O]versight by high-level personnel; due care in delegating substantial 
discretionary authority; effective communication to all levels of employees; 
reasonable steps to achieve compliance, which include systems of monitoring, 
auditing, and reporting suspected wrongdoing without fear of reprisal; consistent 
enforcement of compliance standards including disciplinary mechanisms; 
reasonable steps to respond to and prevent further similar offenses upon 
detection of a violation.520  
 
The Sentencing Commission Guidelines list the components of a ‘good citizenship 
programme’, but do not clarify how these programs could be implemented, nor how 
companies could design their compliance programmes. Companies may not be 
encouraged to develop institutional cultures that discourage criminal conduct if they 
are subject to prosecution despite implementing compliance programmes. The 
respondeat superior standard of liability for many corporate crimes may also pose 
an issue for achieving punishment goals because companies could be held liable for 
the act of a low-level employee even if they implemented a good citizenship model. 
It is difficult to set the level of fines in cases where the main operations of the 
company are not primarily criminal sufficiently high to outweigh the risk of a 
company engaging in crime and/or investing in compliance programmes. On the 
other hand, it may be argued that the Commission can mitigate potential fines for up 
to 95 percent for having effective compliance programmes. The argument, however, 
fails to recognise the informal sanctions that result from criminal prosecution.521 
 
Overall, distribution in accordance to deterrence and retribution could successfully 
address certain types of companies and crimes where the crime is clearly a result of 
a company calculating the risks of offending to be lower than the short and long-
term benefits of violating the law. Accordingly, when companies commit a crime 
because the costs of crime are lower than the perceived benefits, fines should be 
imposed in proportion to the seriousness of the offence. Other methods of 
punishment accepted by penal aims may be used in other circumstances. The 
                                                           
519 Desio (n 247). 
520 ibid. 
521 ibid. 
  
97 
application of the proportionality principle is accepted by other punishment theories 
and may be suitable in certain types of corporate crimes. In practice, companies may 
commit a crime for more than one reason; which goes beyond the assumptions set 
by deterrence theories, and the availability of methods of distribution that can 
effectively target crime in these circumstances is pivotal.  
 
3.1.2 DPAs  
 
The recognition of DPAs in the early 1990s in the United States, and in 2014 in 
England and Wales, is a hallmark for corporate criminal law. It foreshadows that the 
role of criminal law in regulating corporate misconduct is increasingly broader. 
Companies in certain circumstances are encouraged to self-report and settle rather 
than be prosecuted through normal trial. DPAs are applied as pre-trial diversion tools 
in some circumstances. If companies comply with the conditions of the DPA, they 
avoid punishment. 
 
As explained in Section 2.2.2, there are many forms to deterrence, including fear, 
incapacitation, and reform.522 Many approaches to modern deterrence also recognise 
the impact of informal sanctions on the levels of compliance.523  DPAs could be 
interpreted as a tool for imposing fear and reforming companies. This argument is 
explored in further detail below. 
 
 
3.1.2.1 DPAs in Theory 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, DPAs are agreements between prosecutors and 
companies who have violated a criminal law to pay a sanction and follow steps to 
avoid  criminal prosecution and trial.524 When the prosecution is aware of misconduct 
by a company (through self-reporting, investigation, and whistleblowers), they invite 
the company to enter into negotiations. Upon agreement, the prosecution would 
invite the company to set the terms and conditions of the agreement.  The terms and 
conditions could include agreeing to pay a sanction; undergoing monitoring and 
reporting requirements, including reporting details pertaining to the offence; the 
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appointment of compliance officers; and/or altering their governance structures, the 
scope of operations, or compliance programmes.525  
 
Although it is acknowledged that DPAs are not a traditional method of punishment, 
the implementation of DPAs is a direct application of principles adopted by many 
deterrence theories. It forecasts different forms of punishment: fear, incapacitation, 
and reform. DPAs aim to achieve deterrence, proportionality, and uniformity in 
corporate sentencing to assess financial penalties and avoid collateral consequences 
of a conviction.526 They incapacitate the company from committing further crime, 
through monitoring and requiring them to change their governance structures in a 
way that is compliant with the law. Additionally, companies will likely fear 
prosecution and take steps to comply with the terms and conditions of the DPA.  
 
The next step is to comparatively analyse the implementation of DPAs in England 
and Wales and the USA.  
 
3.1.2.2 DPAs in Practice 
 
In the United States, DPAs have been employed in the early 1990s. They are not 
set under a statute but are rather implemented in accordance with policies set by the 
Department of Justice and the Deputy Attorney General guidelines for the 
enforcement of DPAs (Hereinafter ‘Deputy Attorney General Guidelines’), which 
are produced in the form of memorandums. Prosecutors and the general authority 
have high discretion, and judicial involvement would depend on the case. DPAs do 
not require filing formal criminal charges against the company.527 
 
In 1999, the then Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder identified eight factors to be 
considered in deciding whether to charge a company, which remain mostly 
unchanged,  
 
1. The nature and seriousness of the offence, including the risk of harm to the 
public, and applicable policies and priorities, if any, governing the 
prosecution of companies for particular categories of crime;  
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2. The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the company, including the 
complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate management;  
3. The company’s history of similar conduct, including prior criminal, civil, 
and regulatory enforcement actions against it;  
4. The company’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its 
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if 
necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work product 
privileges;  
5. The existence and adequacy of the company’s compliance programme;  
6. The company’s remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an 
effective corporate compliance programme or to improve an existing one, to 
replace responsible management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to 
pay restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant government agencies; 
7. Collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to shareholders 
and employees not proven personally culpable; and 
8. The adequacy of non-criminal remedies, such as civil or regulatory 
enforcement actions.528 
 
The Deputy Attorney General Guidelines also define ten relevant principles for using 
and monitoring DPAs once the process was initiated. A monitor is appointed to 
provide recommendations and ensure that the company adheres to reporting 
requirements. A monitor is a highly-respected person or entity that does not have 
any conflicts of interests and does not compromise public confidence. The 
Department of Justice also has the duty to determine if a company complied with the 
terms of the DPA. Furthermore, the Deputy Attorney General Guidelines define 
‘cooperation with prosecution’, which relates to the extent at which companies 
disclose relevant facts. It does not include whether the company has advanced 
attorney fees to its employees, whether the company retained or sanctioned 
employees, nor whether the company has entered into a joint defence agreement.529 
Moreover, attorney-client privileges made in furtherance of crime or fraud are 
excluded from privilege protection.530 A recent memorandum emphasised the 
obligation for companies to provide all relevant facts relating to individuals 
                                                           
528 Transparency International Canada, ‘Another Arrow in the Quiver? Consideration of a Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement Scheme in Canada’ (Transparency International Canada, July 2017) 
<http://www.transparencycanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/DPA-Report-Final.pdf> accessed 27 
September 2017) 10-11. 
529 ibid 12. 
530 ibid. 
  
100 
responsible for misconducts. It further stated that leniency regarding civil or criminal 
liability would only be given if the company discloses the responsible individuals.531   
 
The Deputy Attorney General Guidelines are parallel to the Sentencing Commission 
Guidelines. The guidelines for determining whether to charge a company include the 
nature and seriousness of the offence, the company’s remedial actions, and whether 
the company has an adequate compliance programme to lessen the chances of 
reoffending in the future. It evidences that the role of the criminal law has changed 
from simply punishing companies to enforcing measures to control the levels of 
offending and how companies could operate in a way that would not violate the law. 
The processes, however, are not codified under law. They largely operate based on 
broad guidelines with high discretion given to prosecutors. Companies who do not 
comply with the terms of the DPA may not be subject to criminal liability. Having 
considered the adequacy of Lee’s team member liability basis for corporate criminal 
liability, identifying the individuals responsible for the criminal act within the 
company is essential. The current processes would shield and protect individuals 
from potential criminal liability.  
 
In England and Wales, DPAs are governed by Schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts 
Act 2013. Contrary to the USA, section 2 prohibits prosecutors from agreeing to 
withhold charges; failure to comply with requirements of a DPA would lead to 
criminal prosecution. Section 5 sets the requirements for every DPA. This includes, 
 
(i) To pay the prosecutor a financial penalty;  
(ii) to compensate victims of the alleged offence;  
(iii) to donate money to a charity or a third party; 
(iv) to disgorge any profits made by [the accused] from the alleged offence; 
(v) to implement a compliance programme or make changes to an existing 
compliance programme relating to [the accused]’s policies or to the training of 
[the accused]’s employees or both; 
(vi) to co-operate in any investigation related to the alleged offence;  
(vii) to pay any reasonable costs of the prosecutor in relation to the alleged 
offence or the DPA.532 
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Similar to the United States, some of the requirements of DPAs reflect principles 
inherent in many deterrence theories and are similar to the sentencing guidelines. 
These include the payment of fines, compensation, disgorgement of profits; and 
restructuring compliance programmes. The financial penalty is comparable to what 
a court would impose upon conviction of a guilty plea.533  
 
Schedule 17 further specifies the roles of the prosecutors, monitors, and offenders. 
This evidences high judicial oversight on DPAs, contrary to the American process. 
Particularly, prosecutors need to obtain approval from the court to sign that entry to 
the DPA would be in the interests of justice and that the proposed terms are fair, 
reasonable, and proportionate. After approval is obtained and negotiations are 
completed, they are submitted to the court for final approval, and any positive 
approvals must be done in an open court.534  
 
There are also procedures regarding breaching DPAs, and how to modify the terms 
of a DPA. Section 11 gives prosecutors the power to discontinue proceedings 
following the expiry of a DPA. Section 13 states that the statement of the facts in a 
DPA is treated as an admission by the company and can be used in any criminal 
proceeding relating to the alleged offence. Failure to comply with these requirements 
could be used as evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings.535  
 
Section 6 of Schedule 17 requires the Serious Fraud Office and Crown Prosecution 
Service to issue a Code for prosecutors offering guidance on DPAs. Prosecutors need 
to consider the Code when exercising their responsibilities. The Code states that a 
DPA is a discretionary tool and that only the prosecutor may invite the company to 
enter into DPA negotiations as an alternative to prosecution. The company may 
refuse an invitation if it is offered. Furthermore, the prosecutor may draw the judge’s 
attention to any victims’ statements or information relating to the impact of the 
alleged offence on the victim. Any financial penalty needs to consider the financial 
resources of the company. A company is given a discount to an early guilty plea, 
equating to a one-third discount for a plea at the earliest opportunity.   
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Section 7 of Schedule 17 governs the conduct and appointment of monitors. It 
specifies that their appointment is dependent on factual circumstances of each case, 
and must be fair, reasonable, and proportionate. The offenders must afford the 
monitor access to all relevant aspects of its business during the course of the DPA, 
and any legal professional privilege is unaffected and remains intact. It also sets the 
requirements for corporate compliance programmes, including training and 
education, details on contract terms with stakeholders, and reporting requirements.536 
 
It is clear that the DPA process in England and Wales, in theory, offers more 
advantages than the DPA process in the United States. There is a clear framework 
for the implementation of DPAs: not meeting the terms of the DPA would lead to 
criminal prosecution, and prosecutors have to obtain approval from the court and 
ensure that the DPA is in the interests of justice and the proposed terms are fair. This 
advantageously limits the amount of discretion given to prosecutors, encourages 
transparency, and is in line with legal certainty. Additionally, ‘cooperation with 
prosecutors’ is interpreted differently. The reports of the monitors in the United 
States are subject to privilege rules, and certain information is not available to the 
prosecutors, whereas the information is provided to prosecutors and the company in 
England and Wales and the United States. The English framework encourages 
transparency, and all the internal issues that have led a certain company to violate 
the law are resolved to minimise the potential of reoffending.  
 
It is important to assess the operation of DPAs in practice. England and Wales 
approved its first DPA in SFO v Standard Bank Plc.537 The defendants failed to 
prevent bribery of Tanzanian officials during raising funds for the government 
through sovereign note private placement, which was in contravention of Section 7 
of the Bribery Act 2010. Standard Bank Plc was ordered to pay financial penalties 
of US$25.2 million, pay US$7 million in compensation to the Government in 
Tanzania, pay reasonable costs of the SFO, and ordered to continue to cooperate with 
the SFP subject to an independent review of its existing compliance programme, and 
implement recommendations of an independent reviewer.538 Sir Brian contended that 
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pursuing a DPA was in the interests of justice and was fair, reasonable, and 
proportionate.539  
 
It could conversely be argued that the use of DPAs and involvement of the judiciary 
is ‘an unprecedented and possibly unwelcome involvement of the judiciary in 
approving execution action.'540 Nevertheless, the case evidenced, as Padfield argues, 
that DPAs are not necessarily a process ‘[that provides] a way for companies to buy 
their way out of the criminal justice system or to brush the wrongdoing under the 
carpet.’541 The DPA was a public event rather than a private event as the DPA Code 
of Practice stated; there was a statement of facts that identified key players in the 
conduct; the DPA included a clause that prevented those charged to contract the 
narrative of the facts; the defendants were ordered to continue cooperation and 
disclose documents to any local or international agency with regards to the matters 
described in the statement of facts.542  
 
Although it is acknowledged that the decision positively requires the company to 
cooperate further with individuals impacted by the criminal misconduct and to 
implement processes to ensure that it would not be involved in future similar 
misconducts, there are still flaws in the current DPA process. In the case, the 
responsibility of the offence was imposed on the Bank's subsidiary and executives 
in Tanzania rather than any individuals being held responsible in England and Wales, 
even though the Bank has authorised a local agent to negotiate the dealings.543 This 
clearly undermines public confidence because the investigation did not yield to 
accountability to all individuals involved.544 Furthermore, the SFO relied on the 
defendant’s internal investigations to obtain evidence on the statement of facts. This 
provides a risk of not obtaining a full investigation and holding all individuals 
responsible for the conduct in England and Wales accountable and undermines 
transparency and certainty goals.545  
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Additionally, as explored in Section 2, Schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 
2013 sets requirements for the terms of every DPA, which include payment of a 
financial penalty; compensating victims; donating money to charity or a third party; 
disgorgement of profits; implementing a financial programme; cooperating with the 
investigation; and paying the costs of the prosecutors.546 The calculation of the 
punishment did not include the revenue the Bank made by trading its bonds in the 
secondary market; any financial advantages that the Bank obtained over other 
competitors; and the full harm to Tanzania.547 
 
DPAs provide an alternative way of controlling corporate misconduct and 
implementing a process that foreshadows three forms of deterrence: fear, 
incapacitation, and reform. Nevertheless, the application of DPAs in England and 
Wales and the USA, however, has been met with controversies. DPAs in their current 
state are likely to undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system, 
particularly their approach to punishing companies, and whether it adversely impacts 
their rights.  
 
3.2  Other Challenges to Deterrence in the Context of Corporate Crime 
 
Sentencing guidelines and DPAs are shaped by retribution and deterrence principles. 
The section examines the possible flaws of applying deterrence theories in practice 
and assesses their viability for a theory of punishment for companies. 
 
3.2.1 Deterrence Theories Do Not Differentiate Between Different Types of 
Corporate Offenders and Offenses   
 
Many deterrence theories assume that laws would have the same deterrent impact on 
all offenders. Deterrence policies focus on setting a suitable deterrent impact on 
members of the community.548 Deterrence fails to consider that ‘different actors have 
differing views about what constitutes rational behaviour.’549 In the non-corporate 
context, deterrence would presumptively work if all individuals act rationally, and 
the government and individuals have a common understanding of suitable 
behaviours and defined situations and can be supported by social pressures and 
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punishment.550 Deterrence wrongfully assumes that all individuals engage in a 
calculated cost-benefit analysis before committing a crime, does not consider that 
individuals may commit spontaneous crimes and that some crimes do not require 
proof of intent. Moreover, laws do not take regard to factors like unemployment, low 
income, and social condemnation.551 Looking back at Becker’s Economic Theory of 
Punishment in Section 2.2.3, empirical research has found mixed results regarding 
the impact of certainty, celerity, and severity on crime levels. They also found that 
threats and punishments have varying effects between individuals.552  
 
Examining the issue in the corporate context reveals that companies have various 
corporate management structures: companies can be local or international, public or 
private, and the board can have different numbers of shadow directors, executive and 
non-executive directors, and/or could be stakeholder-oriented rather than 
shareholder-oriented. Decision making by companies is dependent on their profit-
making margins, whether they are new entrants in the industry or have been 
established in the industry for years, and the types of goods and services offered. 
Although companies may engage in criminal activities due to the low risks of 
prosecution and high short-term material benefits, companies could be prosecuted 
for strict liability crimes where the intention is not present, but rather that the 
company failed to enact appropriate procedures that result in a violation of the law. 
In the case of federal law in the United States, companies may be found liable when 
low-level employees are proven to have engaged in criminal conduct without the 
knowledge or approval of the company.553  
 
Companies may also change their management structure over time and expand to 
other industries, and/or pull out from other industries. Thom Brooks states, ‘this is 
the problem of time and changing effect…the deterrent power of punishment 
constantly changes over time in response to social conditions. The deterrent potential 
of any punishment is always in flux and is subject to constant change.'554 In 
competitive industries, the risk of being prosecuted and having to pay a fine may be 
seen as a lower risk than violating the law and acquiring short-term benefits. Laws 
based on deterrence fail to acknowledge that different groups respond to laws 
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differently and that a company may have different responses to a law depending on 
their economic circumstances.555  
 
3.2.2 Does Deterrence Work in Practice?  
 
Some theoretical approaches to deterrence contend that applying deterrence based- 
laws and policies would reduce the levels of crime to zero. Crime exists solely due 
to a failure to communicate the threat of punishment in practice.556 Freedman rightly 
contends that ‘a reliable theory would offer confidence that if certain conditions are 
present a given outcome will follow.’557 Testing a theory requires identifying the 
dependent variables, the casual or independent variables, and the mechanisms that 
link both. Deterrence presents propositions that could be tested.558 Yet, punishment 
in practice does not have a confirmed deterrent impact.559 Although there are 
conflicting results on deterrence in practice, it continues to be used as a goal of 
punishment for individuals and companies.560  
 
Section 2.2.3 discussed a number of empirical studies that are based on modern 
theories of deterrence. They do not decisively conclude that it is effective in reducing 
crime. Kennedy states,  
 
[The] burgeoning docket of criminal cases illustrates that deterrence has not been 
effective to any substantial degree. The effectiveness of deterrence cannot be 
demonstrated conclusively because researchers employ a scientific method of 
inquiry which attempts to disprove a hypothesis rather than prove them.561  
 
There is a disagreement amongst scholars on the measures of deterrence and 
calculating success and failure, and not many statistical reports on deterrence 
explicitly address corporate crime.562 This argument is hereby explored in further 
detail. 
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First, studies assess deterrence in a variety of ways. Simpson categorises corporate 
crime studies into objective deterrence studies (which examine the impact of formal 
legal sanctions on the levels of offending), and perpetual deterrence studies (which 
consider the perception of companies of the certainty and severity of punishment 
rather than its objective level).563 It is important not to generalise the results of 
applying deterrence-based laws, policies, and processes. 
 
Particularly, the certainty of punishment could be interpreted in many ways. It could 
be understood as subjective or objective: subjective certainty relates to the perception 
of the risk, whilst objective certainty is the actual risk of being subject to 
punishment.564 A University of Cambridge survey concluded: (a) for some classes 
of potential offenders, the perception of the risks of being punished affect their 
reported choices on whether to offend; (b) the studies with the least methodological 
issues address informal sanctions; and (c) the studies with the least methodological 
issues focus on certainty rather than severity.565 Moreover, many studies examine 
the relationship between sentence severity, understood as the length of custodial 
sentences, and general deterrence. They conclude that the certainty of punishment 
rather than punishment severity is correlated with general deterrence. Threats of 
severe punishment have not been strongly linked to less crime and public benefits 
but rather contributed to higher costs.566 Freedman states that one reason why 
certainty has a higher impact on behaviour than severity is the lack of knowledge on 
actual sentencing practices and substantial public underestimation of how tough 
punishments can be.567  
 
Moreover, the success and failure of deterrent-based laws could be interpreted 
differently.568 Brooks defines three categories for measuring success: ‘(a) deterrence 
theories that aim for any deterrent effect; (b) deterrent theories that aim for any 
substantial effect; and (c) deterrent theories that aim for a complete effect.’569 
Options (a) and (c) are problematic. Option (c) implies that there will be no crime if 
deterrent laws apply. It follows that any deterrent policy will never be successful, 
hence is not a realistic measure of success. Option (a) contends that deterrence is 
achieved even when there is no known effect. Deterrence should have a clear impact 
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on crime rather than a tangible role to be called a deterrent policy.570 Brooks 
compellingly argues that option (b) presents the best way to measure the success of 
deterrence theory. It is still difficult to define the exact parameters of achieving a 
substantial effect.571  
 
Given the lack of knowledge on how to measure the success of deterrent laws, laws 
based solely on deterrence are more likely to be subject to abuse by governments 
than those based on other theories. Governments may enforce laws that do not have 
a negative impact on the level of crime. This may result in punishments that are not 
proportional, and companies being subject to high fines without justification. Since 
deterrence focuses on the effects of punishment through influencing individual 
behaviour, there would be a desire to implement a strategy to mislead the public 
about the threat of punishment. Nevertheless, the risk of the public gaining 
knowledge of manipulation makes these strategies problematic.572 
 
Empirical studies reveal that the basic assumptions of many modern deterrence 
theories, as explained in the context of companies, fail to take account of important 
factors. As discussed in the previous section, Scholz identifies four assumptions that 
basic deterrence models are based on: companies are utility maximisers, statutes 
define misbehaviour, punishment encourages corporate compliance, and 
enforcement agencies use available resources to optimally detect and punish 
misbehaviour.573 Scholz states that studies on deterrence for two decades reveal that 
these four assumptions do not reflect the reality of corporate behaviour. Based on 
four empirical tests, he finds that enforcing penalties on corporate bodies that have 
failed to comply with workplace safety improved their conditions, but the number of 
penalties had a little impact on safety improvements. He also finds that cooperative 
strategies that use punishments more intensely than frequently are more effective in 
reducing workplace injuries than deterrence-oriented strategies. Additionally, the 
intensity of enforcement activities varies across jurisdictions, and are impacted by 
different national and political demands. Lastly, taxpayers’ trust in the government 
and duty to pay taxes has more impact on compliance rates than fear of being 
prosecuted for failure to comply.574 The basic assumptions of deterrence simply 
categorise corporate misconduct into right and wrong and fail to take into 
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consideration corporate error correction, voluntary compliance, agency 
accountability and cooperative enforcement. The empirical studies evidence that 
many factors can impact norm-compliant behaviour.   
 
At a broader level, many deterrence proponents claim that punishment has a deterrent 
effect, even if evidence cannot conclusively determine that such a relationship exists. 
There are many assumptions to deterrence that are not necessarily reflective of the 
behaviour of individuals and companies: that society understands all the laws they 
are governed by, that the burdens of punishment outweigh the benefits of committing 
a criminal act, and/or that individuals engage in a cost-benefit analysis and choose 
to either commit or avoid crime. Proponents of deterrence theories claim that 
evidence to the contrary assumptions defies basic intuitions about criminal justice.  
575 However, many individuals lack knowledge of various crimes and are not deterred 
by that threat of punishment since they do not have sufficient knowledge on the 
likelihood of prosecution. Intuitive deterrence is only applicable to individuals who 
have acquired knowledge about all crimes.576 Moreover, threats of severe 
punishment have not been strongly linked to a reduction in the levels of crime.577 
Punishment should be designed to achieve a broader goal of directing corporate 
behaviour in ways that improve the general welfare.578 The basic assumptions of 
deterrence do not account for controlling corporate misconducts in a way that 
minimises the impact on general welfare. 
 
In sum, these discussion points lead to one conclusion: punishment models based 
solely on deterrence assumptions fail to respond to changing corporate attitudes and 
varying behaviours by companies. Having considered how legal retribution could 
contribute to a theory of punishment for companies, the next section accordingly 
explores how an approach to deterrence could contribute to a theory of punishment 
for companies. 
 
4 Deterrence for Corporate Crime: An Alternative View  
 
4.1 Purpose of Punishment 
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Many approaches to deterrence positively add knowledge to understanding why 
companies violate the law and why they ought to be punished.  
 
A compelling view that is parallel to classical deterrence and some modern 
approaches to deterrence is that companies may violate the law because there is a 
conflict of interest between them and society. Companies make decisions to achieve 
their identified goals, including maximising profits. Companies may make decisions 
that conflict with the rights of others if their perceived benefits are higher than their 
perceived costs. Conflicts of interest that result in a violation of the law should be 
punished.  
 
Another justifying aim of punishment is reducing the levels of crime, which includes 
encouraging companies to develop norm-compliant behaviour. This view is adopted 
by many modern deterrence approaches arguing that future crime can be prevented 
by influencing the present and future behaviour of companies.579 
 
These justifying aims of punishment should consider and recurrently identify various 
factors that drive and impact corporate decisions. Some modern deterrence theories 
further expand this idea by correctly contending that decisions are bounded by 
limited resources and knowledge, and the specific circumstances of each company, 
like the industry it operates in. Particularly, the rational actor model argues that 
corporate decisions are partially determined and partially bounded by the amount, 
quality, and type of knowledge held. Decisions are made based on the information 
available, and the specific experiences of companies.580 Moreover, Becker’s focus 
on the economic arguments about decision choices contributes to understanding the 
variety of companies’ decision-making processes.  
 
These approaches to deterrence can work together with legal retribution. A first-hand 
look at deterrence may reveal its stark contrast to retribution. Deterrence and 
retribution have different justifications to punishment: deterrence is a 
consequentialist theory that justifies punishment for its deterrent effects, whereas 
retribution justifies punishment when deserved.581 In practice, current the Sentencing 
Commission Guidelines (USA) and the Definitive Guidelines (England and Wales) 
and punishment aims have not specified the theoretical approaches to  deterrence and 
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retribution that are being followed; whether one goal of punishment could take 
primacy over the other; and how they could work together under one single 
framework. Chapter 2 explored how legal retribution could work with other penal 
aims under one model. Unlike other prominent approaches to retribution, legal 
retribution does not focus on the moral gravity of the act. Instead, legal retribution 
argues that states issue threats of punishment to those who break the law. The law 
only punishes individuals that fail to adhere to the threats of punishments for 
committing crimes.582  
 
Therefore, the justifying aims of punishment adopted by legal retribution and 
deterrence, as explained previously, are not contradictory and could work under one 
model to provide a more coherent understanding of crime by companies and why 
they should be punished. Overall, the two justifying aims of punishment provide an 
important contribution to understanding punishment.   
 
4.2 The Distribution of Punishment 
 
Corporate criminal laws are based on deterrence and retribution. In both 
jurisdictions, the level of fines is set in proportion to the seriousness of the offence, 
considering the circumstances of the company. Fines are the main method of 
punishment, and ancillary orders are implemented in certain circumstances.  
 
Proportionality is the main principle of deterrence theories. Classical deterrence 
applies the pain-pleasure principle and punishment is imposed in proportion to the 
harm inflicted to the society.583 Bentham offers compelling ideas about punishing 
and rewarding to promote the happiness of society.584 The pain-pleasure principle 
also considers severity, certainty, and celerity. The more severe the punishment, the 
more likely that individuals will abide by the law. The more certain laws are, the 
more likely individuals understand the consequences of crime and refrain from 
committing offences. The more swiftly punishment is imposed, the less likely 
individuals would commit crimes.585  
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Nevertheless, proportionality under classical deterrence does not consider factors 
beyond the frightening impact of punishment, neither does it place public interests 
as central to its aims, despite Bentham’s assertions that the public interest would be 
in mind. It also does not clarify the relative importance of severity, celerity and 
certainty. It is contestable whether public confidence is central to the theory of 
punishment if it does not account for the various types of offenders and how their 
decisions may be influenced by personal experiences, demographics, and 
environmental influences.586 This is remedied by approaches to modern deterrence 
that do take individual prosocial habits into account, and that understand that laws 
should have an educative impact on citizens. For instance, the rational actor model 
understands human rationality as partially determined and partially bounded. They 
are bounded by the amount of knowledge a person has and are partially determined 
by demographic and environmental factors.587 Becker’s economic theory of 
punishment also considers the social loss of crime, including the costs of prosecuting 
offenders, the nature of punishments, and responses of offenders to changes in 
enforcement. This also suggests that the certainty of punishment has a greater impact 
than the severity of punishment in reducing crime.588  
 
A broader view of proportionality that considers many factors, including 
demographic and environmental factors, and personal experiences, could contribute 
to a theory of punishment for companies. Punishment would be imposed in 
proportion to the impact on the community, taking in mind the circumstances of the 
company. It would also be enforced in a way that would impact the individual 
offender (specific deterrence) and other companies (general deterrence). This view 
advantageously does not contradict with legal retribution's view of imposing 
punishment in proportion to the gravity of the offence, defined by the impact on 
individuals in the community and the gains derived through the commission of the 
offence. It would not be based on moral grounds and is subject to change over 
time.589 The varying interpretations of proportionality by retribution and deterrence 
would add value to a broader theory of punishment for companies. 
 
5 Conclusion  
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The chapter examined the viability of deterrence theories to punish companies. 
Although a sentencing model based solely on deterrence is not practically coherent, 
some concepts of deterrence could contribute to understanding the punishment of 
companies and how they should be punished. Current sentencing guidelines and 
policies, and penal aims to advance retribution and deterrence.590 Nevertheless, the 
theoretical approaches to deterrence and retribution are not defined. Section 2 
thereby explored various theoretical approaches to deterrence, ranging from classical 
deterrence to modern views of deterrence. Section 3 discussed how sentencing 
policies and DPAs apply deterrence principles. It defined the premises and pitfalls 
of applying deterrence in these contexts. Section 4 discussed how deterrence could 
work as part of a theory of punishment for companies. 
 
Overall, classical deterrence contributes to understanding that some companies may 
commit crime after conducting a pain-pleasure calculation. Modern varieties of 
deterrence advantageously show that other factors should be considered to 
understand what drives companies to violate the law and how they should be 
punished. Punishment should be imposed to deter specific company and other 
companies. Rehabilitation is also distinguished from deterrence; each aims to reduce 
the levels of crime by using different mechanisms. Incapacitation, on the other hand, 
is considered to be a form of deterrence rather than a separate penal aim because it 
does not meet the definition of punishment as a response to crime. The rational actor 
model and economic theory of deterrence present partial understandings of 
punishment and how it should be distributed, and show the relative importance of 
celerity, certainty, and severity of punishment. They also show that there are various 
interpretations and theoretical approaches to deterrence. 
 
In practice, deterrence is a central aim of punishment, and distribution of punishment 
applies deterrence principles. It could successfully address certain types of offenders 
and offences that are parallel to deterrence's justified aim of punishment. The 
application of the proportionality principle is also inherent in other theories of 
punishment. Nevertheless, there are many theoretical challenges to deterrence 
principles in the Sentencing Commission Guidelines and the Definitive Guidelines, 
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including the structure of the ‘good citizenship’ compliance model and fine payment 
by offenders, which do not encourage norm-compliant behaviour by companies. 
DPAs fundamentally provide alternative ways of controlling corporate misconduct 
but are currently structured in a way that is likely to allow companies to avoid 
liability and/or shield responsible individuals from criminal responsibility. 
Additionally, deterrence doesn't differentiate between different types of corporate 
offenders and offences, and there is skepticism on its capability to work in practice 
given mixed results from empirical studies in the context of individual and corporate 
crime.   
 
A defined approach to deterrence could contribute to a broader theory of punishment 
for companies. Parallel to specific and general deterrence, companies ought to be 
punished when they violate the law to maximise their interests at the expense of other 
individuals’ rights. Companies should also be punished to reduce the levels of crime 
in the short and long term. Punishment in these circumstances is imposed taking into 
account the specific factors that led to the crime, and the specific circumstances of 
the company, and in proportion to the seriousness of the offence. These views 
compellingly do not contradict and could work under a single framework alongside 
legal retribution. The next chapter with test the suitability of including rehabilitation 
within a theory of punishment for companies.
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Chapter Four 
 
Rehabilitation 
 
 
1 Introduction  
 
Rehabilitation theories are offender-centric: they aim to rehabilitate offenders by 
transforming them from criminals to law-abiding individuals by choice.591 This may 
include efforts by states to reduce the offenders’ propensity to commit illegal acts.592 
As addressed in Chapters 2 and 3, there is a tension between retribution and 
consequentialist theories of punishment (deterrence and rehabilitation) because they 
‘[use] different currencies and think different things to be important.’593 Moreover, 
the significance and effectiveness of rehabilitation are uncertain.594 Unlike 
retribution and deterrence, rehabilitation is not a main penal aim and is often used to 
supplement deterrence and retribution.  
 
The chapter aims to explore rehabilitation as a potential component of a theory of 
punishment for companies. Section 2 examines the historical and theoretical 
development of rehabilitation in England and Wales and the United States and 
evaluates modern approaches to rehabilitation.   
 
Section 3 identifies issues arising from the findings of Section 2 by studying whether 
rehabilitation is a complete theory of punishment for companies and whether it could 
work alongside other penal aims. Section 4 discusses rehabilitation in the context of 
corporate crime. Particularly, it examines Henning’s theory of punishment based 
solely on rehabilitation; and the advantages and disadvantages of including 
rehabilitative regulatory tools and punishment methods, including DPAs, restitution 
orders, and compliance programmes.  
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2 Defining Rehabilitation  
 
Like other theories of punishment, there is no single theory of rehabilitation.595 
Hudson defines rehabilitation as follows, 
 
Taking away the desire to offend, is the aim of reformist or rehabilitative 
punishment. The objective of reform or rehabilitation is to reintegrate the 
offender into society after a period of punishment and to design the content of 
the punishment so as to achieve this.596 
 
Many rehabilitation theories of punishment aim to address moral failings by 
offenders and risk factors that lead to crime. This widens the causes of crimes beyond 
the responsibility of the individual as many retributivists contend; the conditions of 
the offender like income levels and environmental factors may lead to crime and the 
criminal justice system should consider the consequences of a crime. The 
interpretations of the factors that lead to crime and the consequences of crime vary 
between different approaches to rehabilitation. Robinson and Raynor state, ‘we thus 
have a whole new vocabulary around rehabilitation, but we are arguably no closer to 
a common understanding of just what the rehabilitation of offenders entails.’597 Some 
rehabilitation theories aim to remove the desire by offenders to offend and/or to 
reintegrate offenders to society. Reform or rehabilitation may be used 
interchangeably or have a different meaning under different approaches to 
rehabilitation.598 Accordingly, to build a contemporary theory that may include 
rehabilitation, the section aims to historically evaluate rehabilitation in theory and 
practice. 
 
2.1 The Origins of Rehabilitation 
 
2.1.1 England and Wales  
 
2.1.1.1 Rehabilitation in Prison 
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Prisons were temporary facilities that held offenders whilst they awaited public 
punishment. Offenders were punished in public. Sentences included whipping, 
branding, stocks, ducking stool, the pillory, and executions.599 The idea of ‘restraint 
to reform’ emerged in Western European countries and British colonies in the 
Sixteenth century. Prisons were used to deter individuals from committing crimes. 
Solitary confinement was also used to rehabilitate the offenders through ‘moral and 
spiritual enlightenment’.600  Particularly, solitary confinement aimed to ‘reduce 
moral contagion, but also with the intention of curing the offender’s physical and 
spiritual defects. Such prisoners were kept in silence, subjected to a special diet, and 
allowed only the distraction of approved books.’601 Notably, Henry VIII turned his 
palace to a ‘house of correction’ for London’s undeserving poor and individuals that 
lived in environments most prone to crime. In contrast to monastic prisons, these 
houses provided opportunities for enforced labour.602  
 
In the Eighteenth century, John Howard, a notable figure in the rehabilitation 
movement, published The State of Prisons, a draft bill detailing a plan to reform 
prisons and offenders. Inspired by his Christian beliefs, Howard advocated for 
‘penitentiary discipline’, which aimed to morally correct prisoners through Bible 
readings and labour. This, in his view, would ‘correct the faults of prisons, and make 
them for the future more useful to society.’603 These proposals were sustained by the 
Government's commitment to developing a national system of penitentiaries. This 
resulted in the Penitentiary Act 1779, passed with the consultation of Howard. The 
Penitentiary Act marks the use of prisons as a central form of punishment in the 
British criminal justice system.604 Nevertheless, the Penitentiary Act 1779 was never 
implemented due to ministerial reluctance to a prison system that would return 
prisoners to their own communities.  
 
Another notable rehabilitation initiative in the Eighteenth century is the creation of 
a prison system that aimed to advance rehabilitation and deterrence. The Holford 
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Committee called Bentham, a utilitarian philosopher, Sir George (a manager of a 
penitentiary prison), and John Becher (a reverend of a house of correction), to build 
a prison system that ‘works.’ The Holford Committee rejected a number of 
Bentham’s proposals because it diminished the importance of religious instruction 
and moral improvement. The Holford Committee initiative resulted in a new national 
penitentiary for young and first-time offenders. The system prioritised labour, 
religion, and solitary confinement. In theory, a prison system that combined two 
penal aims is promising. This, however, was not effective in practice. There were 
issues with recruiting staff that could implement and advance rehabilitation, and 
there was a prisoner rebellion against the system, which eventually led to riots in 
1818. Prisons that were later built on this system did not survive the 1840’s.605  
 
From the 1850s, rehabilitation lost its prominence as a penal aim. Particularly, the 
Carnarvon Committee comparatively assessed deterrence and rehabilitation and 
concluded that rehabilitation harms deterrence, and the imposition of deterrent 
punishments was more effective. Additionally, Edmund De Cane, a chairman of the 
Prison Commission from 1877 to 1895, proposed the following: (a) general 
deterrence should be prioritised over individual deterrence and reform. Reform 
should not be objective and may be achieved within a deterrent system of 
punishment; (b) punishments should be uniform and should not vary according to 
the offenders’ circumstances or characteristics, and (c) breaches of prison rules were 
followed by severe disciplinary actions.606 This marked a move away from 
rehabilitation ideals in prisons.607 This system was later criticised due to the high 
rates of recidivism following the release of prisoners and discourse in public 
confidence. This led to the appointment of the Department Committee of Inquiry, 
chaired by Herbert Gladstone, to respond to the criticisms and review the principles 
of the penal system.608  
 
The Gladstone Committee Report, produced by the Departmental Committee on 
Prisons in 1895, is a report supporting rehabilitation as a prominent penal aim 
alongside deterrence.609  It emphasised the importance of utilising prisons to inform 
the moral instincts of prisoners, and to eventually transform them into physically and 
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morally stronger individuals by the end of their prison term.610 It also optimistically 
envisioned that all prisoners are open to reform, including habitual offenders.611 The 
Prison Act 1898 reasserted rehabilitation as integral to prisons, through ‘productive’ 
rather than merely ‘hard’ labour, hence enabling prisoners to reintegrate back to 
society following release.612 
 
Subsequently, a number of laws based on rehabilitation were passed, despite a 
political turn in favour of ‘getting tough on crime’ and privatising prisons.613 Three 
notable examples are worthy of mentioning: First, The Prevention of Crime Act 1908 
created separate establishments for juvenile offenders and implemented a system of 
‘physical work, technical and education instruction’ within a moral environment. 
Second, The Criminal Act of 1948 also created new forms of ‘prison’ through 
‘remand centres, detention centres and borstal institutions.’614 Third, The 
Rehabilitation Act 1974 provided offenders protections the following release, 
through mandating labelling offenders as ‘rehabilitated’ after a period of completing 
custodial sentences, community orders, or youth rehabilitation orders.615 The 
controversy of considering criminals to have ‘spent’ their convictions based on the 
length of the sentence rather than its nature, and providing protections solely to 
convicted offenders rather than victims, may reflect a misunderstanding of how 
rehabilitation principles should translate to practice.616  
 
Overall, rehabilitation theories were largely influenced by religious beliefs, resulting 
in the creation of prison facilities that aimed to reform the offenders' morals through 
mandating labour, religious readings, and solitary confinement to enlighten the 
offenders into correcting their morals that led them to offenders. Initiatives 
combining deterrence and rehabilitation were not consistently effective in reducing 
the levels of recidivism, resulting in a rise and fall of rehabilitation as a penal aim. 
The resulting laws providing protections to offenders the following release and 
ensuring their reintegration back to the community are promising yet need to be 
targeted to specific types of offenders and crimes. 
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2.1.1.2 Rehabilitation Outside Prison 
 
Rehabilitation theories were also articulated in practice through resettlement 
programmes following release from prison, probation, and sentencing processes for 
juvenile offenders.  
 
First, resettlement of offenders the following release was developed through the 
‘ticket of leave' system, discharged prisoners' aid societies, surveillance following 
release, and the provision of temporary refuges. The ‘ticket of leave' system 
mandated ex-convicts to regularly report to the police, acquire employment, and to 
not associate with other offenders. The actual implementation lowered recidivism 
rates but was met with difficulties: ex-prisoners under the system had difficulties in 
acquiring employment and the public and police’s trust.617 The Discharged 
Prisoners’ Aid Society was funded by public funds and voluntary subscriptions to 
discourage recidivism. Additionally, the Penal Servitude Act implemented a system 
of surveillance through interviewing convicts following release to determine their 
intentions, providing them with clothing and money, and endeavouring to find 
employment for them. There were also temporary refuges for released prisoners to 
live and complete productive work.618 
 
Second, there were also historical attempts at separating juvenile offenders from 
adult offenders in the Nineteenth century. For instance, a system that appointed 
guardians to young offenders, and requested reports on their behaviour was 
implemented in Birmingham in 1839. In the mid-1850s, there was legal recognition 
of the reformatory school system, which mandating completing schoolwork, 
engaging labour, and engaging in religious worship as part of the punishment. The 
Youthful Offenders Act of 1854 mandated sending certain young offenders under 
the age of 16 to reformatory schools following completion of short prison 
sentences.619  
 
Third, the formal practice of probation could be traced to initiatives like diversionary 
reformative practices with juveniles and adult offenders, practices of releasing 
suitable ‘offenders of recognizance’ (Later the Summary Jurisdiction Act of 1879), 
‘rescue work’ of the Church of England Temperance Society to combat drunkenness 
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and intemperateness.620 The idea of more religious awareness and less crime led to 
an increase in the number of police court missionaries that assisted with developing 
open relationships with offenders. The Church of England Temperance Society 
supported released prisoners through providing them with accommodation, 
employment, and requiring offenders to sign pledges of abstinence of release.621 The 
Probation Order 1907 created ‘community sentences'. Community sentences 
included releasing offenders from prison and requiring them to meet guidelines set 
by missionaries and probation officers or requiring offenders to complete unpaid 
work in the community or get treated for drug use instead of being imprisoned.622 
 
Regardless of a political turn in favour of deterrence and ‘getting tough on 
criminals’, a number of statutory acts were passed to formalise probation. Howard 
Vincent introduced the Probation of First Offenders Bill, which resulted in The 
Probation of First Offenders Act 1887. The Act evidenced a willingness for adopting 
a system that advocates for reform over harsh prisons in some circumstances.623 
There were also other rehabilitation programmes, including the Transforming 
Rehabilitation programme, which was passed following The Probation Order 
1907.624  
 
Overall, there are still conflicting opinions on whether rehabilitation should be an 
alternative to deterrence, could complement deterrence, or be integral to a deterrent 
punishment model.625  
 
2.1.2 The United States   
 
In the United States, rehabilitation could be traced back to the late 1700s. There was 
a shift from relying on public punishment methods; like marking thieves with the 
letter ‘T’, branding, and the use of stocks and the pillory, to developing reformatories 
and penitentiaries.626 Like in Europe, imprisonment was only used in exceptional 
circumstances, for instance as a temporary abode for prisoners awaiting trial or when 
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offenders owe debts.627 The Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of 
Public Prisons, a group of Quakers, argued against a law passed in 1786, which 
authorised sentencing through public labour in city streets. These efforts led to the 
establishment of the first state prison in the United States in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania in 1790. The use of imprisonment gradually increased as a method of 
punishment following that.628 
 
Different states adopted distinctive interpretations of punishment. In New York, 
individuals committed crime because they ‘[did not] respect authority and lacked 
strong work habits.'629 This led to the establishment of the Auburn System in 1797, 
which required facilities to assign work to prisoners.  The system was, however, 
criticised for maximising industrialisation initiatives at the expense of prisoner rights 
(poor working conditions, low pay, and physical abuse).630 On the other hand, the 
Pennsylvania System of imprisonment was based on the belief that crime is caused 
because individuals are ‘sinners’, and the distribution of punishment should 
accordingly be based on ensuring offenders feel remorseful for their actions. 
Therefore, prisoners were isolated to reflect on their ‘deviant actions’ and repent, 
which was hoped to eventually reform their behaviour.631 The system lost its 
popularity due to the mental implications of the prisoners and a large number of 
suicides.632 Both systems failed to maintain discipline and isolation, often resulting 
in large yearly pardons, followed by high rates of reoffending upon release.633 
 
The New York Prison Association assigned Wines and Dwight to evaluate 
penitentiaries in the United States and Canada. They concluded that reforms should 
be in line with the Irish prison system. The system mandated inmates to advance 
through a series of grades, eventually leading to their release upon good conduct. 
Consequently, the National Congress of Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline 
adopted the Declaration of Principles, which established adult reformatories with 
indeterminate sentences, a classification system, academic and vocational 
instructions, constructive labour, humane disciplinary methods, and parole.634 These 
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principles were put into test through the Elmira Reformatory created in New York 
in 1877. It combined a military-style discipline with religious services, trade, 
academic education, and institutional newspapers.635 New York also passed 
legislation providing for indeterminate sentencing, which gave managers of 
reformatories discretion to set the offenders’ life sentence, as long as it is within the 
maximum statutory term of the offence, and courts were precluded from limiting the 
duration of the sentence.636 Additionally, Congress in 1910 established a federal 
parole system that authorised using indeterminate sentencing. Under the system, 
Congress, the judge, and parole board collectively played a role in determining the 
sentence length; Congress sets the maximum sentences, judges impose a sentence 
within the statutory range, and the parole board determines when the offender would 
be released. The sentencing judge could sentence offenders to no time at all or opt 
to suspend a sentence.637 
 
In the 1940s, correctional facilities were increasingly being used. In parts of the 
country, correctional systems provided living facilities to offenders the following 
release, implemented pre-release and work-release programmes, and day reporting 
programmes. Offenders were free to work and continue their livelihood in the 
community but their behaviour was monitored.638 The ‘medical model of 
corrections', where correctional officers were given wide discretion to set sentences 
specific to the offenders through assessing the causes of offending; treating the 
offender based on the diagnosis, and setting up follow up meetings to monitor the 
effects and outcomes of the treatment.639   
 
During the 1950s to 1960s, California adopted rehabilitation and affirmed that the 
purpose of imprisonment was to reform and correct.640 Remarkably, Texas 
implemented a rehabilitation programme in the 1950s that combined vocational 
training and religious programs. This was yet overturned by the following manager 
of the Texas Prison System in the 1960s, whose main objectives were cutting costs 
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including medical care, facility upkeep, and further reliance on armed inmates to 
oversee inmates.641 
 
In the 1970s, rehabilitation took a back-seat to a ‘get tough on crime approach.’642 
Rehabilitation was not seen as effective in controlling or preventing crime, possibly 
spurred by the need to advance certain political agendas. Roberts and Hough argue 
that rehabilitation was opposed by liberals because it gave extensive discretion to 
judges and correctional officials, hence indirectly victimising offenders. It was also 
opposed by conservatives because it implemented short prison sentences.643  
Although both agendas gave different reasons for the failure of rehabilitation to 
control crime, they agreed on discontinuing it as a guiding theory of punishment.644 
A study conducted in the late 1980s concluded that community correction staff 
emphasised goals of deterrence and community protection over rehabilitation.645 
Again, this was largely influenced by political ideologies: conservatives argued that 
these programmes were ‘soft on crime’ and undermined the goals of retribution and 
deterrence, whilst liberals argued that consistency was difficult to achieve in parole 
sentences.646  
 
Additionally, the Sentencing Reform Act 1984 also marked a move away from 
rehabilitation as a primary purpose of punishment: Congress reported the failure of 
the indeterminate sentencing model, which linked completion of treatment 
programmes in prison to release. The influence of parole boards is limited by lack of 
knowledge on when offenders are ‘rehabilitated’; and parole boards and judges had 
too much discretion, impacting the consistency of sentences. They maintained that 
prison programmes, fines, and/or probation may be recommended by judges in 
certain circumstances.647  
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These arguments were driven by research by publishers like Robert Martinson and 
James Wilson.648 Wilson, in his 1975 book Thinking About Crime, argued that 
‘nothing works’ and challenged rehabilitation for ‘[requiring] not merely optimistic 
but heroic assumptions about the nature of man.’649 Robert Martinson also wrote an 
article entitled ‘What Works’, where he contended that offender rehabilitation is 
‘nothing.’ He further wrote a report, known as The Martinson Report, praising 
punitive measures over rehabilitation.650 The report also reviewed 220 studies on 
correctional practice and concluded that the impact of correctional facilities on 
offender recidivism was minor.651  
 
The pessimistic approach of ‘nothing works’ is seen to have been overstated. The 
contribution of psychologists on the influence of risk factors; including early 
exposure to substance abuse, psychology, and poverty, have been overlooked.652 
This includes a study by The Stanford Prison Experiment published by 1973, proving 
that the prison environment could have a large influence on prisoners’ behaviour. 
Notably, one finding was that 23-hour continuous solitary confinements led to 
negative psychological mindsets, thus impacting the prisoners’ social and 
occupational skills.653  
 
In 2004, Frank Cullen, President of the American Society of Criminology, delivered 
a speech entitled, ‘The Twelve People Who Saved Rehabilitation: How the Science 
of Criminology Made a Difference.’654 He argued,  
 
Three decades ago, it was widely believed by criminologists and policymakers 
that ‘nothing works’ to reform offenders and that ‘rehabilitation is dead’ as a 
guiding correctional philosophy. By contrast, today there is a vibrant movement 
to reaffirm rehabilitation and to implement [programmes] based on the principles 
of effective intervention. How did this happen? I contend that the saving of 
rehabilitation was a contingent reality that emerged due to the efforts of a small 
group of loosely coupled research criminologists. These scholars rejected the 
‘nothing works’ professional ideology and instead used rigorous science to show 
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that popular punitive interventions were ineffective, that offenders were not 
beyond redemption, and that treatment [programmes] rooted in criminological 
knowledge were capable of meaningfully reducing recidivism.655 
 
Rehabilitation was seen as an important penal aim by Cullen. It distinctively rejected 
the pessimistic deterrent view of criminals as incapable of being reformed and 
focused on implementing programmes that addressed risk factors that lead 
individuals to commit crimes. David Frabee later published ‘Rethinking 
Rehabilitation: Why Can’t We Reform Our Criminals?’, where he stated that 
rehabilitation ‘has little or no lasting impact on recidivism.’656 He alternatively 
recommended a deterrence system based on investing in satellite tracking 
technologies. He stated, ‘we must return to basic principles and do a better job of 
detecting crimes and swiftly applying sanctions. Change is possible without 
workbooks, videos, and group meetings.’657 Overall, the recurrent tension between 
deterrence and rehabilitation, and failure to combine both approaches under one 
system, resulted in the fall of rehabilitation as a prominent penal aim.  
 
2.1.3 Lessons from the Historical Development of Rehabilitation   
 
The historical use of rehabilitation foreshadows its contribution to understanding 
some of the risk factors that lead to crime, and how punishment could be distributed 
to benefit offenders and the community.  
 
First, there are many interpretations and approaches to rehabilitation, evidenced in 
the variety of rehabilitative approaches used before, during, and after sentencing. 
Various rehabilitation approaches incorrectly focused on offenders ‘breaking moral 
rules.’ The Gladstone Committee report argued that criminality was a result of 
disassociation from religion and breaking from moral rules. Howard’s ‘penitentiary 
discipline’ also emphasised public worship, prayer, and solitary reflection.658 
Additionally, rehabilitation in the community also highlighted the importance of 
religion. The Youthful Offenders Act 1854 enforced religious worship for offenders 
                                                           
655 Francis T. Cullen, ‘The Twelve People Who Saved Rehabilitation: How the Science of Criminology 
Made a Difference’ (2005) 43 Criminology 1, 1. 
656 David Frabee, Rethinking Rehabilitation: Why Can’t We Reform Our Criminals? (American 
Enterprise Institution 2005) xvi. 
657 ibid 76-7. 
658 Cullen, ‘The Twelve People Who Saved Rehabilitation: How the Science of Criminology Made a 
Difference’ (n 655) 34-6. 
  
127 
under the age of 16. It was no surprise that these approaches faced difficulties in 
practice.  
 
From here, it is important to consider moral approaches to rehabilitation, to reinforce 
arguments made in support of distinguishing morality from legality, as argued in 
previous chapters. Somer identifies two moral approaches to retribution. First, 
rehabilitation is defined as returning the offender to a desirable state, particularly to 
a ‘moral individual’ state. Second, rehabilitation is defined as reshaping the offender 
into a new and improved form through curing their ‘physical and spiritual defects’.659 
These definitions align with the deontological approach to rehabilitation, which 
argues that individuals are ‘morally’ significant to society, and the state should make 
reasonable attempts to assist offenders to transform to abiding citizens. The 
definitions do not define how rehabilitation is achieved.  
 
Adopting a rehabilitation approach that (a) separates morality from legality and (b) 
broadens the risk factors of punishment beyond violating moral rules, is necessary 
to effectively respond to crime. There are benefits to adopting an approach that 
focuses on the positive impacts of rehabilitating criminals to society, through 
addressing the various risk factors (which differ in accordance to the type of offence 
and offender) and enforcing punitive measures, keeping in mind how these processes 
would help restore public confidence in the criminal justice system.   
 
Particularly, the consequentialist approach to rehabilitation overcomes difficulties of 
moral approaches to retribution. It focuses on the positive impacts of rehabilitating 
criminals to society, particularly crime reduction.660 Sentences could also 
incorporate education and training, and reintegration processes following the 
sentence could be implemented to ensure offenders have a support network.661  
Bertrand Russell states that criminals should be treated as individuals with illnesses 
that need to be cured, rather than individuals with moral failings, and prisons should 
implement strategies to cure these illnesses.662 Brooks argues for combining 
treatment and punitive measures to address the risk factors associated with criminal 
offending.663 Additionally, he clarifies that rehabilitation is achieved when criminals 
are reformed, which means that offenders have no propensity to commit further 
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crime because they understand the wrongness of their past actions. He emphasises 
that reformation requires acknowledging the guilt of the past criminal activity.664 
 
Second, rehabilitation offers novel ways of dealing with crimes beyond 
imprisonment. As discussed, the distribution of punishment goes beyond 
imprisonment and aims to tackle some of the risk factors of crime with the aim of 
reducing the levels of crime. Many rehabilitation approaches positively support 
moving away from universalistic penal treatments to individualised elastic and 
varied approaches to punishment, through creating classes of offenders and 
punishment models that are less centred on prisons.665 There may be advantages to 
adopting a more consistent and targeted system that does not give large discretion to 
judges and correctional officers to suspend sentences or provide very different 
sentences to offenders that have committed the same crime.666  
 
Third, there were historical efforts to combine rehabilitation and deterrence under 
one framework, evidencing rehabilitation’s capability to work alongside other penal 
aims. Notably, Howard’s rehabilitative approaches were distinct from Bentham’s 
deterrence approaches, yet both supported crime reduction. Fergus McNeill argues 
that Bentham’s ideologies of ‘requalifying’ prisoners are ‘a deontological 
conception of rehabilitation.’667 The Holford Committee also advocated for merging 
different penal aims. It implemented seclusion and labour in prisons in combination 
with ‘awakening the prisoners’ conscious’ through worship. Replacing rehabilitation 
and deterrence measures in prison with a sole deterrence-based approach increased 
the levels of recidivism.  
 
Although the thesis disagrees with moral approaches to retribution, this illustrates 
that responding to crimes using rehabilitation for some criminals and deterrence for 
other criminals may be more efficient than choosing between the two. 
 
Fourth, increasing public confidence in the criminal justice system is a key factor in 
the success of rehabilitation and other penal aims. It is evident that the decline of 
popularity of ‘rehabilitation' as a solution to ‘what works? 'was not mainly due to 
flaws in the theory of rehabilitation. It was rather influenced by political agendas in 
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favour of ‘getting tough on crime’ and the privatisation of prisons.668 As William 
Kelly states, ‘[policy] has been swinging back and forth for the past 60 years and, 
unfortunately, it hasn’t settled in the middle.’669 Ward and Maruna convincingly 
argue that the debate between ‘nothing works' and ‘treatment works' is misdirected. 
The right question to ask is ‘what helps people go straight?' Keeping public interest 
in mind is a key factor in the success of rehabilitation in practice. Further control 
trials, experimentations, and meta-analysis across different programmes are 
needed.670 This line of positive thinking deviates away from targeting offender 
weaknesses and moves towards targeting the offenders’ strengths. There is potential 
for rehabilitation to reduce re-offending if further research is conducted, taking in 
mind that the costs associated with implementing these programmes may reduce the 
costs associated with future crimes.671  
 
Having discussed the potential of rehabilitation to contribute to the justifications of 
punishment and how punishment should be distributed, the next section aims to 
refute and understand possible challenges to rehabilitation. 
 
 
3 Challenges to Rehabilitation 
 
3.1 Is Rehabilitation a Theory of Punishment?  
 
Unlike other theories of punishment, opponents of rehabilitation go to the extent of 
stating that rehabilitation ‘is a myth [that] undermines the legitimacy of the 
indeterminate sentence law’ and ‘[it] is either misnamed or wholly illogical.’672 
Somer argues that rehabilitation has been extended to mean ‘anything.’ A judge 
understood the effects of solitary confinement as a way to create self-reliant 
individuals, which is a function of rehabilitation.673 William Saxbe, a former 
Attorney-General, argued that imprisonment is for punishment, not reform. A former 
California Director of Corrections stated, ‘prison is for people society can't stomach. 
Can't kid yourself about rehabilitation.' A former spokesman for the Federal Bureau 
of Prison stated that requiring prisoners to engage in educational and provisional 
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programmes is ‘frank talk in a field renowned for its reliance on sugarcoating and 
obfuscation.’674 Richard McGee, former Director of the Washington and California 
Prison systems, states that rehabilitation has its benefits for some correctional 
programs but should not be an aim for imposing a sentence. In other words, he 
distinguishes between rehabilitation as an aim of punishment (should not exist) and 
rehabilitation’s benefits as a method of punishment (obligation of the state to provide 
rehabilitative opportunities).675 
 
Some of these arguments are fueled by the realisation that some individuals are 
resistant to reform. Theoretically, if rehabilitation is applied as a pure theory of 
punishment, it would only punish individuals who are responsive to reform to 
achieve its aim. It may be difficult to define the risk factors that need to be 
‘rehabilitated’.676 Nevertheless, if rehabilitation could work for some offenders, there 
should still be an effort to enforce rehabilitative measures within a theory of 
punishment.677 
 
Viewing rehabilitation as ‘informal justice’ undermines its importance as a penal 
aim. Particularly, the conception of punishment is usually associated with ‘pain’ 
rather than ‘pampering’.678 The interpretation of rehabilitation as ‘ineffective 
informal justice’ rests on a mistake. Cullen states that the movement away from the 
rehabilitation ideal was due to low public confidence.679 The ‘ticket of way system' 
that mandated criminals to report to officers the following release and acquire 
employment decreased recidivism in the short term, but was met with difficulties in 
the long term, given the lack of public trust in the possibility of change by ex-
offenders, especially since it was an informal programme.680   
 
Brooks states that applying rehabilitative theories of punishment in and after prison 
would increase the chances of social integration by offenders, hence removing their 
tendency to engage in criminal activities. He also contends that popular political 
agendas have proclaimed going ‘tough on crime' without investigating whether the 
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approaches are actually successful and cost-effective.681 Importantly, rehabilitation 
would not be viewed as a myth if punishment is understood as a response to crime. 
Although rehabilitation may challenge the understanding of punishment as 
‘imprisonment’, there is no clear evidence that restricting the freedom of movement 
and association in prisons is more effective than a rehabilitation institution. Thus, 
rehabilitation should be viewed as a viable response to some types of crimes and 
offenders.682  
 
3.2 Can Rehabilitation Work with Other Penal Aims?  
 
The history of rehabilitation evidenced efforts to incorporate it within a deterrent 
and/or retributivist criminal justice system. In England and Wales, the Government’s 
commitment to developing a national system of penitentiaries, resulting in the 
Penitentiary Act 1779, combined rehabilitation approaches (awaking of 
consciousness of sin) and deterrence approaches (socialising their instincts for 
pleasure through productive work).683 In the United States, penitentiary facilities 
based on the strict application of one theory of punishment over the other has proven 
unsuccessful in reducing reoffending. The subsection seeks to understand the tension 
between rehabilitation and other theories of punishment, and whether rehabilitation 
contributes to addressing certain or all types of offences and offenders. 
 
 
 
3.2.1 Rehabilitation and Deterrence  
 
First, the relationship between rehabilitation and deterrence is mixed: some scholarly 
articles contend that rehabilitation is contrary to deterrence and may dilute its 
positive impacts, whilst other scholarly articles argue that rehabilitation is not a real 
theory of punishment and is a category of deterrence.684  
 
Shavell states that rehabilitation may dilute deterrence. If an offender comes to 
believe that being imprisoned will assist him in gaining skills, the ‘pain’ of being in 
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prison may be lessened. The impact may be balanced by increasing the sanction’s 
length, but there are difficulties in acquiring a balance between achieving the goals 
of rehabilitation and deterrence.685 Some scholarly works have mistakenly failed to 
separate rehabilitation and deterrence. Robson states, ‘the term ‘deterrence’ 
encompasses…rehabilitation…since [the objective] ultimately focuses on deterring 
misconduct.’686 Franklin and Zawring state that rehabilitation is broader than 
theories of punishment that discourage criminal conduct by associating pain with 
criminality in the mind of the offender; it encourages criminals to reorient their 
values and be loyal to prevailing social norms.687 Walker states, ‘as soon as the aim 
of reformation is extended beyond individual deterrence, theories about the way it is 
to be attained begin to multiply.’688 Nevertheless, they go on to state that that 
distinction is incorrectly made, and talk about rehabilitation in the context of 
deterrence. They argue that studies have mixed results on whether the punishment in 
prisons leads to attitudes towards compliance with social norms; the constant 
association with individuals who have criminal skills may lead to identification with 
anti-social and criminal values.689  
 
Brooks correctly points out that defining punishment as a response to crime would 
assist in viewing deterrence and rehabilitation as two separate penal aims.690  Some 
rehabilitative theories of punishment argue that crimes result from individual and 
social problems. The response to crime is to eliminate these factors by tackling these 
risk factors. This approach is absent from prominent deterrence and retributive 
theories of punishment. Deterrence means that an offender is fearful of enduring the 
punishment of crime but does not necessarily believe being involved in criminal 
activity is incorrect. Rehabilitation means that an offender does not engage in crime 
because they do not want to.691 Although both aim to reduce crime, they achieve that 
aim using different approaches.692  
 
3.2.2 Jean Hampton: ‘Moral Education Theory of Punishment’   
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The ‘Moral Education Theory of Punishment’ advances a theory of punishment that 
includes rehabilitation. Hampton states that her theory ‘incorporates certain elements 
of deterrence, retributivist, and rehabilitation views’ and justifies punishment if it 
provides an educative benefit to the wrongdoer.693 The theory states, ‘punishment is 
intended as a way of teaching the wrongdoer that the action she did (or wants to do) 
is forbidden because it is morally wrong and should not be done for that reason.’694 
Under this approach, criminals lack moral education; punishment may educate 
criminals for their good and public good, and criminals are rehabilitated when they 
are aware that their crimes are moral wrongs.695 She discusses punishment in the 
context of families. Parents enforce harsh punishments and admonitions to 
encourage their children to not commit immoral acts and understand that their acts 
are immoral.696  
 
Additionally, Hampton argues that the law should educate individuals on how to 
make moral decisions. She states, ‘[w]rong occasions punishment not because pain 
deserves pain, but because evil deserves correction.’697 Having the requisite moral 
knowledge increases the level of responsibility of action, and makes punishment a 
proper response to a breach of one's moral duty.698 States have the duty to enforce 
the law in a way that reflects the moral consensus of the community.699 
 
With regards to the distribution of punishment, Hampton states that punishment 
should not damage a criminal's autonomy; should convey to the criminal and society 
that their acts are wrong; and requires an infliction of pain applied in proportion to 
advancing and achieving moral education. Hampton does not go beyond the above 
to clarify exactly how punishment should be distributed. She states that her theory 
will ‘unlikely [be] 100 percent successful in moral education efforts.’700 Thus, it 
remains unclear how punishment should fit the crime, and how punishment would 
effectively apply to all offenders. 
 
                                                           
693 Jean Hampton, ‘The Moral Education Theory of Punishment’ (1984) 13 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 208, 208-9. 
694 Brooks, Punishment (n 13) 56. 
695 Hampton (n 693) 210. 
696 ibid 207-18. 
697 ibid 238. 
698 Lisa A Smith, ‘The Moral Reform Theory of Punishment’ (1995) 27 Ariz L. Review 197, 199. 
699 ibid 201. 
700 Hampton (n 693) 231. 
  
134 
The next question to consider is whether Hampton’s theory is actually hybrid. Jean 
Hampton claims to advance a mixed theory of punishment. She states that contrary 
to retributivist and deterrence approaches, further punishment would be avoided 
because offenders have understood the immorality of their criminal wrongdoing, 
rather than fear punishment, and criminals are prioritised over the social good.701 
Under the theory, punishment aims to negate wrongs and reassert rights and should 
benefit the criminal.702 Contrary to many deterrence approaches, the punishment 
should not simply be imposed to condition society to do what they want them to do, 
but rather to teach them the difference between moral and immoral acts, even if the 
pain is inflicted to achieve these goals.703 The theory rejects indeterminate sentencing 
and parole boards and treating offenders for any mental illnesses.704  
 
There are various interpretations of Hampton's theory. Adams states her theory 
combines retribution and rehabilitation because her interpretation of retribution 
requires a ‘desire [by the state] to restore proper moral order.'705 Moreover, he argues 
that her theory applies a modern approach to retribution; it rejects a strict 
interpretation of retribution’s proportionality principle and the use of inhumane 
punishment (for instance, an offender throwing acid at someone’s face should be 
punished with acid thrown at his/her face).706 On the other hand, Christopher argues 
that her theory is retributivist because it does not reject the role of the pain in 
understanding the moral wrongfulness of an act, and could assist offenders in 
understanding their self-worth.707 
 
Hampton’s theory of punishment is not a hybrid theory of punishment, but rather a 
rehabilitation theory of punishment. It fails to explain how the penal aims of 
deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation collectively come under one framework, 
but rather reject many fundamental and defining features from each of the penal 
aims. Contrary to many retribution and deterrence approaches, it rejects advancing 
the social good and imposing punishment because it is just. It justifies punishment 
to help offenders understand the immorality of their conduct. It is not clear how 
                                                           
701 Smith (n 698) 198. 
702 Hampton (n 693) 215. 
703 ibid 212. 
704 ibid 233. 
705 Joseph Q. Adams, ‘Retribution Requires Rehabilitation’ (Master of Arts Thesis, Georgia State 
University 2008) 1. 
706 ibid 11. 
707 Russell Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of ‘Just Punishment’ (2002) 96 Nw. U. 
L Rev. 843, 957. 
  
135 
punishment should be distributed, whether proportionality is accepted as a principle, 
how the moral standard would be set, and clearly fails to address all types of crimes 
and offenders. As discussed in previous chapters, the problem with enforcing 
punishment based on moral grounds is that immorality does not always equate to 
illegality. Setting morality as a standard would make it difficult to rehabilitate 
offenders for illegal non-moral wrongs. Moreover, it is not compatible with current 
criminal laws in England and Wales and the United States, where corporate criminal 
liability is enforced for crimes that that are not necessarily immoral. Therefore, it has 
not been conclusively proven that punishment can an educative effect on all 
offenders in practice.708  
 
3.3 How Have Rehabilitation Measures Been Applied in Practice? 
 
Rehabilitation exists within a ‘theoretical vacuum’.709  Ward and Maruna state,  
 
[M]aybe more than any other area of criminological research, rehabilitation has 
been plagued with new discoveries, miracle cures, revolutions and silver bullets, 
all buffeted by that all-powerful justification of ‘science’.710  
 
Martinson further argues,  
 
But what specifically is the method? Probation-like placement? Small caseloads? 
Unadultered love? What is it? What is the actual process that takes place by 
which ‘recidivism' is reduced? if [one of the rehabilitation supporters] knew 
which ‘element' or ‘dimension' of the [treatment] was having whatever effect he 
thinks he has found, he surely would not keep it such a secret. He would patent 
it, sell It around the country to our administers be given the congressional medal 
of honour, and retire to the Bahamas, an [honoured] and wealthy man. [The 
academic rehabilitation proponent] can talk for twenty pages in the special 
language we all know so well, but he cannot bring himself to say in plain English 
to my [neighbours], who are waiting with bated breath, just what this process 
is.711 
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Some approaches to rehabilitation, like Hampton’s theory, do not define how 
punishment would be distributed and how recidivism would be reduced. The 
literature on rehabilitation is empirical in nature and ‘attempts to run before 
walking.’ Empirical studies on rehabilitation reveal mixed results. There are studies 
that evidence a reduction of five to ten percent through targeted ‘rehabilitative 
treatment programmes’. They consider risk factors of offending, and target these risk 
factors, finding rehabilitation as a more effective measure than deterrence.712 
Moreover, early intervention programmes have direct links to reduced recidivism.713 
Dutcher, who studied white-collar criminals, argues that rehabilitation measures can 
help offenders reflect on their poor decisions, and what changes could be done 
following release. He uses the example of Martha Stewart, who found her five-month 
sentence as ‘life-altering'; and David Novak, who stated that ‘[prison gave him] the 
opportunity to be still and reflect upon a lot of the poor judgements [he] made.'714 
Nevertheless, Harris states that interviewing past offenders in prison conveyed a 
‘distaste’ for the concept of rehabilitation and correctional treatment programmes, 
given that offenders are perceived as untrustworthy, possibly dangerous and 
misguided, which has impacted efforts to empower offenders to change through 
targeting their strengths.715 
 
One issue to be addressed is the difficulty of determining whether rehabilitation has 
been successfully achieved. The success of rehabilitation measures may result in 
‘high levels of sensitivity to threats of punishment’ or ‘reduced re-offending rates.’ 
How is sensitivity to threats of future punishment measured? Does rehabilitation 
consider that reduced recidivism may be due to other reasons than reform?716 For 
example, parole boards require in some circumstances ‘proof of rehabilitation’ to 
release offenders sentenced for an indefinite period. Rehabilitation is often 
demonstrated through enrollment in educational programmes, and/or attending 
alcohol anonymous meetings. Somer correctly argues that institutional adjustment 
in prison is very different from adjustment outside of prison. There is a possibility 
that some offenders enroll in these programmes to serve less time in prison, rather 
than for the purposes of reform.717   
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Accordingly, an approach to rehabilitation has to be defined and applied in practice. 
The right questions to ask are when to apply rehabilitation and ‘what helps people 
go straight?’718 Research has suggested that voluntary processes and applying 
personalised programmes according to a pre-defined set of principles are more 
effective. To maximise reintegration, targeting offender strengths, and intervention 
during and following the sentence, are required to address risk factors that have led 
to engaging in criminal activity.719 Thus, rehabilitation could contribute to a coherent 
theory of punishment for companies.   
 
Overall, challenges to rehabilitation include questioning whether it could be 
categorised as a separate theory of punishment; its ability to work alongside other 
penal aims; and how it could work in practice. Rehabilitation is viewed as a separate 
theory of punishment that could work alongside deterrence and legal retribution. The 
potential for retribution to be a prominent penal aim has been limited by historical 
political agendas in favour of a ‘tough on crime’ approach, thus impacting the 
development of rehabilitation programmes and resulting in inconsistent results in 
practice. There may be potential for rehabilitation to address certain types of 
corporate offenders. The next section explores how this could be achieved. 
 
4 Rehabilitation for Corporate Crime  
 
The section consolidates the findings of the previous section to illustrate how 
rehabilitation could contribute to a theory of punishment for companies.  
 
4.1 The Justifying Aim of Punishment 
 
Rehabilitation is not currently a penal aim for corporate crime in the United States 
and England and Wales. The Sentencing Commission Guidelines (USA) and 
Definitive Guidelines (England and Wales) include rehabilitation as an aim for the 
punishment of individuals, but the aim of corporate criminal punishment is limited 
to retribution and deterrence.720 The MPC, a persuasive model for American state 
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laws, includes rehabilitation as a goal of punishment.721  
 
Scholars like Henning argue that rehabilitation is more effective than other theories 
of punishment for corporate crime. He states, ‘if the only result of corporate criminal 
prosecutions were monetary penalties, then prosecuting companies just so everyone 
feels better would base the criminal law.’722 Empirical data set out in Section 3 has 
evidenced that rehabilitation could work for some types of crimes and corporate 
offenders. Nevertheless, rehabilitation cannot be effective for all companies. 
Violations of the law may occur for different reasons that do not fall under 
rehabilitation. Hence, the justification of punishment should not solely rely on a 
rehabilitative approach of ‘educating the offenders', nor is rehabilitation suitable for 
offenders that are not willing to cooperate.   
 
In Section 2, it was evidenced that the moral approaches to rehabilitation did not 
work in practice to address crime committed by individuals. As discussed in Section 
3, non-moral approaches to retribution do not agree on whether rehabilitation should 
apply to address the ‘risk factors' of offending or to reintegrate offenders to society 
or both. 
 
Accordingly, a defined approach to rehabilitation could contribute to understanding 
why some companies should be punished. Rehabilitation is a separate penal 
objective that aims to reduce the levels of crime and to target internal risk factors. 
Particularly, companies ought to be punished for violations of the law resulting from 
the following,  
 
[Defective] control systems, insufficient checks and balances within the 
organisation to ensure the law is complied with, poor communication, and 
inadequate standard operating procedures which fail to incorporate safeguards 
against reckless behaviour. Sometimes these [organisational] defects are 
intentional, manifesting a conscious decision by the corporate hierarchy to turn 
a blind eye to corner cutting in order to get results. Sometimes the defects reflect 
sloppiness or managerial negligence.723 
                                                           
Definitive Guideline’ (n 31); United States Sentencing Commission, ‘Guidelines Manual 2016’ (n 11) 
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Companies are required to adopt processes that comply with the law. Failure to do 
so as a result of negligence and/or intent should be punished. Rehabilitation in some 
circumstances could (a) help companies reform their internal processes in a way that 
is compliant with the law, and/or (b) ensure or reduce the level of desire by 
companies to engage in criminal activities in the future. Empirical studies have 
evidenced that reforming the internal processes of companies lowers the chances of 
re-offending by the company in the future.724 The aim of punishing such companies 
is to tackle the risk factors that led to the criminality, to ensure that the company 
itself complies with the law and that other companies within the industry are aware 
that similar behaviour would lead to punishment. Companies are not punished to be 
fearful of punishment but offered the incentives to comply with the law for long term 
success.  
 
This approach to rehabilitation recognises that companies have to be willing to 
cooperate and participate in the process for it to work.725 Moreover, risk factors may 
be subject to change for companies. For rehabilitation to work, legal institutions need 
to employ resources to identify new risk factors and trends to understand how 
companies make decisions. 
 
4.2 Distribution of Punishment  
 
The role of the criminal law is progressively broadening. Companies are encouraged 
to self-report and settle rather than be prosecuted through normal trial (e.g. through 
engaging in DPAs). Moreover, processes like restructuring compliance programmes 
and restitution could theoretically advance rehabilitation goals and need to be 
centralised (rather than be ancillary) to the punishment process where relevant.  
 
4.2.1 DPAs   
 
DPAs have been discussed in Chapter 3 in the context of deterrence. For instance, 
DPAs in England and Wales may create fear of criminal conviction if the terms of 
the agreement are not met by the company.726  
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In relation to rehabilitation, DPAs have historically been used to rehabilitate juvenile 
offenders and drug offenders through mandating their participation in programmes 
that address risk factors as an alternative to incarnation.727 They could be understood 
as a tool for ‘structural reform prosecution’ to ‘[leverage] the prosecutions to secure 
adoption of sweeping internal reforms.’728  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the inconsistent implementation of DPAs has lowered its 
potential benefits. For instance, a DPA with KPMG allowed the government to force 
employees to cooperate in the investigation at the expense of losing their jobs and 
payment of attorneys’ fees by the firm.729 Moreover, the interpretation of what 
‘cooperation’ entails is not clear, and there are no guidelines on when a DPA would 
be available, and how they should exactly be structured.730 The adoption of the 
‘Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-
Prosecution Agreements with Companies’ provides guidelines for selecting the 
monitors that will oversee the companies’ compliance. Moreover, the Deputy 
Attorney General has to approve the monitor selected and prosecutors should 
‘decline to accept a monitor if he or she has an interest in, or relationship with, the 
company or its employees, impartiality.’731 
 
Additionally, as explored in Section 2, Schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 
2013 sets requirements for the terms in every DPA, which include payment of a 
financial penalty; compensating victims; donating money to charity or a third party; 
disgorgement of profits; implementing a financial programme; cooperating with the 
investigation; and payment of reasonable costs to prosecutors.732 The calculation of 
the punishment did not include the revenue the defendant made by trading its bonds 
in the secondary market; any financial advantages that the defendant obtained over 
other competitors; and the full harm to Tanzania.733 The current structure of DPAs 
could allow companies to settle their way out of a crime without identifying the 
individuals responsible for the wrongdoing. This is likely to undermine the rights of 
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individuals whose rights have been violated. The goal of rehabilitation would 
unlikely to be advanced under these circumstances.  
 
 
 
4.2.2 Restitution 
 
Restitution orders are imposed as part of a criminal sentence, either primarily or as 
ancillary orders, mandating offenders to pay financial obligations to the victims for 
a range of losses, including disgorgement of profits and gains from criminality, 
and/or emotional and psychological losses by the victims.734 Restitution in criminal 
law could be viewed as an application of rehabilitation theories if it contributes to 
further the rehabilitation of the offender rather than mere compensation for the harm 
inflicted on the victim.735  
 
In England and Wales, restitution orders are ancillary orders that could be applied, 
through section 148 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, to offenders 
convicted of stealing goods. Specifically, those in possession or control of stolen 
goods should restore them to the victim; any goods directly or indirectly representing 
the stolen goods should be transferred to the victim, or a sum not exceeding the value 
of the stolen goods should be paid to the victim.736 In the context of companies, the 
Definitive Guidelines, relying primarily on fines, consider whether a fine imposed 
should be changed based on the offender's ability to make restitution to the victim.737 
This implies that restitution orders may not apply in all circumstances, or the amount 
may vary according to the circumstances. There is no guidance on how they should 
apply beyond the fact that they are supplementary and cannot contradict deterrence 
and retribution. 
 
In American federal law, The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act 1996 orders 
restitution for any offence that has an identifiable victim, or where victims have 
                                                           
734 Cortney Lollar, ‘What is Criminal Prosecution?’ (1994) 100 Iowa L. Rev. 93, 93-95. 
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suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss.738 The Sentencing Commission 
Guidelines require a court to order restitution when sentencing a company.739 
Restitution could be applied in combination with probation for up to five years, 
issuance of public notices of conviction, and/or exposure to forfeiture statutes.740 If 
victims cannot be identified, the court would take into consideration public harm 
caused by the offence and other relevant factors.741  
 
From here, questions to consider include: when should restitution orders be 
enforced? Should restitution orders aim to rehabilitate the offender or be 
supplementary to advancing the aims of deterrence and retribution? According to the 
American case of Kelly v Robinson,742  
 
Restitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty because it [forces] the 
defendant to confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have 
caused…Similarly, the direct relationship between the harm and the 
punishment gives restitution a more precise deterrent effect than a traditional 
fine.743 
 
Restitution under this definition advances an approach to deterrence; it ‘forces' the 
defendant to confront the harms they have caused. This means that an offender who 
has the financial capability or has not pleaded guilty to a crime would not necessarily 
be rehabilitated under these cases. Alternatively, in the American case of Karr v 
State,744 The Alaska Supreme Court stated,  
  
Restitution should not only compensate the victim for the harm inflicted by the 
offender but should also further the rehabilitation of the offender. If restitution 
is ordered in an amount that is clearly impossible for the offender to pay, the 
offender's rehabilitation will be inhibited and not furthered. If the offender is 
haled into court for nonpayment of restitution …, or if the offender petitions the 
court …to avoid this sanction, his reintegration into society will be disrupted. 
Also, an offender might simply give up and make no payments at all if the 
restitution ordered is clearly impossible to pay. This could result in [efforts by 
                                                           
738 United States Code, Supplement 4, Title 18, section 366A (2006) (United States). 
739 United States Sentencing Commission, ‘Guidelines Manual 2016’ (n 11) §8B1.1(a). 
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the offender] to avoid this sanction, neither of which would further the dual goals 
behind restitution.745 
 
The case explains that rehabilitation should only apply when there is ‘rehabilitative 
potential,’ specifically when companies accept the responsibility of compensating 
the victims for the losses suffered.746 Hanning states that punishments should ‘focus 
on imposing a penalty that will allow the organisation to redress its wrongdoing 
while taking steps to ensure that the misconduct is less likely to occur.’747 Corporate 
wrongdoings often involve harm and could be addressed through a form of 
remediation. Restitution in addition to fines should be central to correct the harmful 
impacts of corporate crime.   
 
Overall, the subsection has illustrated that rehabilitation mechanisms, notably, 
through restitution orders, could be combined with other methods of punishment to 
advance the goals of rehabilitation. Given that restitution may advance goals parallel 
to rehabilitation, it may be more theoretically coherent to include rehabilitation as a 
penal aim. 
 
4.2.3 Compliance Programmes 
 
Compliance programmes are ‘internal [programmes] and policy decisions made by 
a company in order to meet the standards set by government laws and regulations.’748 
Walsh and Pyrich further state that ‘criminal liability is imposed not only to deter 
wrongful behaviour but also to rehabilitate or improve corporate conduct… 
companies should be rewarded for taking proactive steps to cure internal 
dysfunctions that foster criminal behaviour.’749 Although not regarded as a 
punishment method, the implementation of legally compliant programmes may 
reduce the sentence imposed on a company when it commits a crime. In relation to 
the principles of rehabilitation, compliance programmes assist in instilling the 
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‘lawful mindset,’ through adopting processes that ensure that the company would 
not violate the law.750  
 
Chapter 8 of the Sentencing Commission Guidelines provides criteria for 
establishing effective compliance programmes,  
 
[Oversight] by high-level personnel; due care in delegating substantial 
discretionary authority; effective communication to all levels of employees; 
reasonable steps to achieve compliance, which include systems for monitoring, 
auditing, and reporting suspected wrongdoing without fear of reprisal; consistent 
enforcement of compliance standards including disciplinary mechanisms; and 
reasonable steps to respond to and prevent further offenses upon detection of a 
violation.751  
 
The criteria are designed to flexibly allow companies to construct a ‘good citizenship 
model’ that is suited for their company.752 Companies are also encouraged to adopt 
‘best practice’ models that have been developed by executive agencies like the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, 
and/or the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. The Sentencing Commission 
aims to develop a norm compliant culture that discourages criminal conduct.753 
It is important to note that the standard of corporate criminal liability in federal 
American law is respondeat superior unless a statute adopts a different standard. 
This means that the criminal acts of any employee, regardless of their position within 
the company, could be imputed to the company. Even if a company attempts to 
safeguard against these convictions through enforcing a compliance programme that 
meets the standards set by law, it may still be subject to liability. The Sentencing 
Commission argues that companies should not be discouraged from complying with 
the law through taking cost-cutting measures, because enforcing a compliance 
programme that meets the standards set by law would mitigate the potential fine for 
up to 95 percent.754  
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In England and Wales, the implementation of compliance programmes has an impact 
on the interpretation of ‘offence seriousness’ when sentencing companies. The 
implementation of a compliance programme may indicate that the breach is an 
isolated incident rather than a systematic failure of the company, which corresponds 
to a more serious offence.755 In relation to fraud, bribery, and money laundering 
offences, fines could be adjusted based on their impact on the offenders’ abilities to 
implement effective compliance programmes.756 In relation to environmental 
offences, the level of the fine could be increased if the company has a history of non-
compliance with warnings from the regulator (aggravating circumstance), and 
reduced if it implemented an effective compliance programme. 
 
The next question to consider is whether compliance programmes advance 
rehabilitation or are merely a factor that determines the gravity of the offence (based 
on deterrence). Diana Murphy states that encouraging the implementation of 
compliance programmes and providing guidance for doing so is a positive step to 
achieve deterrence and encourage compliance with the law.757 Baker puts forward a 
persuasive argument regarding the authority of the government to ‘reform 
companies’ through attempting to create ‘good citizens’ out of companies by 
influencing them to enforce compliance programmes.758  
 
It is important to note that the ‘good citizenship’ compliance programme guide is, 
prima facie, voluntary to enforce. Nevertheless, it has a great impact on sentencing 
if companies are convicted of engaging in a criminal act.  The thesis sees this as a 
benefit rather than a detriment to encourage compliant behaviour within companies. 
Having considered Lee’s corporate criminal liability theory, corporate decisions in 
many cases consist of group decisions. Corporate culture is created by the decisions 
of the group, and management is subject to change. The existence of a programme 
specifying how decisions are made is essential to the company’s success in the short 
and long terms. Since punishment is a response to crime, companies could be 
required to report certain matters to committees of outside directors; sign consent 
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decrees with regulatory agencies; establish internal compliance groups to report 
individuals that do not adhere to corporate policies; and/or acquire approval for 
specified actions.759  
 
Additionally, it could be validly argued that issuing guidelines relating to compliance 
programmes may enhance public confidence in the criminal justice system. They 
provide early detection of misconduct and help prevent misconducts by discovering 
and addressing problems before they become serious. Accordingly, this helps in 
building ‘consumer confidence and can counteract any negative publicity that may 
result from the unfortunate acted of isolated employees [in the case of American 
federal law].’760 This supports reducing the level of offending.  
 
For rehabilitation to work, companies who have been convicted of crimes require 
further support from an executive department on how to change their programmes 
and practices to minimise the probability of reoffending in the future. Companies, 
thus, are less likely to engage in cost-cutting measures, following conviction, by not 
enforcing these programmes. 
 
5 Conclusion  
 
The chapter aimed to gain a better understanding of rehabilitation theories in theory 
and practice, and how its principles have been applied to control crime historically 
and in modern criminal law practices.  
 
Section 2 historically examined rehabilitation as a penal aim in the United States and 
England and Wales. Section 3 discussed potential challenges to modern approaches 
to rehabilitation in the non-corporate context. Section 4 identified an approach to 
rehabilitation that could contribute to a theory of punishment for companies.  
 
The laws in England and Wales and the United States have shifted towards a 
deterrent and retributivist-based model of punishment, but still, incorporate 
processes that reflect and advance rehabilitation. Many rehabilitation approaches 
compellingly aim to reduce crime, and advantageously accept methods of 
punishment beyond imprisonment. Accordingly, a non-moral approach to 
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rehabilitation has the potential to deal with certain types of corporate offenders. 
Thus, incorporating rehabilitation as a penal aim is essential. 
 
 
  
148 
Chapter Five 
 
Restorative Justice 
 
 
1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapters advanced approaches to retribution, deterrence, and 
rehabilitation, arguing that each contributes to partial understandings of what drives 
companies to violate the law; the aims of punishing companies; and how punishment 
ought to be distributed (i.e. a TOP for companies).  
 
Deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation proponents fail to account for the rise of 
international transactions and emerging types of companies and goods/services 
offered by companies, which bring on new challenges to controlling corporate crime. 
Accordingly, an innovative and multi-dimensional response to crime, which 
centralises building norm-compliant behaviour by companies, is required under 
these circumstances. The chapter assesses the potential of restorative justice, 
advanced as an innovative approach to dealing with crime,761 to address these gaps. 
 
The chapter aims to explore relevant literature and current practices to reach an 
understanding of how far restorative justice could contribute to addressing corporate 
crime.  
 
Section 2 examines the use of the term ‘restorative justice’ in literature and practice 
to advance a distinctive definition of restorative justice that contextualises it as an 
instance of punishment not an alternative to punishment. Section 3 evaluates the five 
principles of restorative justice: accessibility, voluntarism, neutrality, respect, and 
restoration.762 Section 4 explores the existent literature on restorative justice in the 
corporate context (including individual criminal liability and self-regulation of 
corporate bodies, environmental crimes, and foreign bribery), and assesses the 
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limitations and advantages of restorative justice for corporate crimes. Section 4 
presents all the proposals set out in the chapter, particularly how restorative justice 
could contribute to a theory of punishment for companies. 
 
2 What is Restorative Justice? 
 
The starting point to any objective assessment of restorative justice is recognising 
that there is no uniform definition of restorative justice.  
 
This view may be criticised for attempting to avoid the overwhelming body of 
literature that conceptualises restorative practices in a certain way. Yet, many key 
restorativists, like Zehr and Braithwaite, have offered contradictory accounts on 
what the term actually means over the years.763  This provides scope to contribute to 
an original understanding of restorative justice.   
 
Accordingly, the section aims to reach a unique understanding of restorative justice 
through investigating accounts of its historical significance, and its 
conceptualisations in theory (academic literature) and in practice (restorative justice 
programmes). 
 
2.1 The History of Restorative Justice 
 
The term ‘restorative justice’ has been traced back to the 1880s, often used in a 
religious context, ‘without its meaning being explained.’764 For example, the 
Christian Examiner and Church of Ireland Magazine in 1834 considered ‘restorative 
justice’ to be a ‘great act’ and an ‘importance [circumstance] which has…been 
mainly instrumental …beneficial to the clergy, and to the people.’765 Braithwaite 
notes that it ‘has been the dominant model of criminal justice throughout most of 
human history for all the world’s peoples.’766 He argues that it is the traditional 
method of resolving conflicts before modern criminal justice processes developed. 
Moreover, he asserts that restorative practices trace back to ancient Arab, Greek, 
African, Native American, and Roman civilisations; German public assemblies; 
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Curry, Jun and Company 1834) 2-3. 
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Indian Hindus in the Vedic civilisation (6000-2000 B.C.); and ancient Buddist, 
Taoist and Confucian traditions in Asia.767 It was inserted in the Code of Hammurabi 
(c.2000 B.C.). In England, it formed the basis of Anglo-Saxon law before the 
Normans arrived. William the Conqueror moved away from these practices through 
defining crime as a violation against the state and communities that required 
intervention by the state to restore the peace through punishment, which included 
fines for reparative justice for financial and political reasons.768 
 
Weitekamp, following examination of legal anthropology and practices of ancient 
indigenous communities, further emphasises,  
 
[Restorative] justice has existed since humans began forming communities…it 
is kind of ironic that we have… to go back to methods and forms of conflict 
resolution that were practised some millennia ago by our ancestors who seemed 
to be much more successful that we are today.769 
 
Under this view, individuals have historically managed their conflicts and restored 
balances of power through ‘restorative justice;’ restorative justice defines crime as a 
victim vs defendant conflict rather than a state vs defendant conflict. This was later 
replaced by retributive and other justice systems that excluded the involvement of 
victims in the process of obtaining justice.770  
 
Daly emphasises, ‘[there] are many stories [to restorative justice] and no real one.’771 
Restorative justice is often defined what it is not, and what it means is often left open 
for interpretation. Sylvester, in an examination of Weitekamp’s sources that have led 
to his conclusions on the dominance of restorative justice in old communities, argues 
that ‘there is little doubt that restorative scholars have only scratched the surface of 
the anthropological literature and…have been highly selective in the examples 
expressed.’772  Although restorative practices have existed in ancient or pre-modern 
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communities, they existed alongside a diverse range of other practices, including 
retributive practices.773 
 
There are competing and contradictory histories of restorative justice. Many 
questions arise from looking back at the 1881 use of the term restorative justice, and 
other historical accounts of restorative justice: What is the ‘act’ of restorative justice? 
How is it instrumental and beneficial to ‘the people’?  What are the defining 
parameters of restorative justice? Is it simply a process or an ‘act’ or a ‘theory’? Did 
it exist prior to or alongside retribution and deterrence?  If it existed prior to 
retribution and deterrence and worked effectively, why was it replaced? The history 
of restorative justice is contested, yet there is scope for exploring both views as a 
potential for reforming current laws and policies for a better ‘administration of 
justice’ today. 
 
2.2 Modern Restorative Justice  
 
The modern use of the term ‘restorative justice’ has been largely influenced by 
literature from the 1950s, including publications by Eglash, Barnett, Christie, and 
Zehr.774  Despite the large influence of these publications, restoravists did not adopt 
a uniform understanding of the term, including whether restorative justice should be 
contextualised as an ‘instance of punishment’ or an ‘alternative to punishment.’ 
Again, this provides scope for a broad interpretation of restorative justice. 
 
Howard Zehr named the ‘grandfather of restorative justice' by The Zehr Institute of 
Restorative Justice,775 advances an influential definition of restorative justice: 
 
[An] alternate [framework, philosophy or lens] for thinking about crime and 
justice…Restorative justice is a process to involve, to the extent possible, those 
who have a stake in a specific offence to collectively identify and address harms, 
needs and obligations in order to heal and put things as right as possible.776 
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Restorative justice provides a new way of thinking about the crime through 
collective action. Zehr advances three central concepts to restorative justice: 
 
(a) focusing on the harms and consequent needs of the victims, offenders, and 
communities (families and societies);  
(b) addressing the resultant obligations, or in other words, addressing the harm 
and causes of the harms to the victims, offenders, and communities (families and 
societies) using collaborative processes; and  
(c) involving those who have a stake in the situation (offenders, victims, 
communities; otherwise known as the stakeholders).777 
 
How does restorative justice provide a unique understanding of crime and justice? It 
particularly places the focus on the victims, offenders, and other parties, rather than 
view crime as a state and offender conflict. His understanding of restorative justice 
as an alternative ‘framework, philosophy or lens’ for thinking about crime and justice 
provides scope for wide interpretation of what restorative justice actually means and 
the context in which it ought to operate to deal with crimes.  
 
From here, how does Zehr contextualise restorative justice? what is the difference 
between restorative justice as an instance of punishment or an alternative to 
punishment?  
 
2.2.1 Restorative Justice as an Alternative to Punishment  
 
Restorative justice as an ‘alternative to punishment’ means that restorative justice is 
not punishment and does not fall within the category of punishment. Accordingly, it 
could translate to one or more of the following: 
 
(a) an informal alternative to punishment or a diversion from prosecution, as a 
way of dealing with non-criminal conflicts or specific criminal conflicts 
outside the traditional criminal justice system; and/or  
(b) a pre-sentence or post-sentence add on, or in other words, a practice or 
process applied prior to a sentence, or after a person is sentenced; or 
(c) a complete replacement of the traditional criminal justice system or the only 
viable way to deal with conflicts.  
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In his early works, notably ‘Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice’, Zehr views 
restorative justice as a contrast to retributive justice. He discusses restorative justice 
in the context of the Old Testament’s concept of Shalom, which emphasises ‘making 
things right, of living in peace and harmony with one another in right relationship.’778 
Restoration of relationships should be prioritised over punishment. He argues that 
one roadblock to implementing restorative justice in practice is the politicised 
criminal justice system. He states, 
 
[Make] no mistake: the criminal justice industry is big business, shot through 
with all kinds of self-interest, and will not be changed easily. Can such a model 
actually work? …But are there limits? What are they? It is our responsibility to 
find out….Will [it] be just another alternative [programme], an alternative that 
becomes [institutionalised], ossified, coopted until it is just another 
[programme], and perhaps not an alternative at all? Or will [it] be a means of 
exploring, communicating, embodying an alternative vision? Will it demonstrate 
that there is another way? Could it even be the beginning of a quiet revolution?779  
 
Here, Zehr views restorative justice as a complete alternative to punishment (form 
(c)). Nevertheless, he acknowledges that his theoretical ideals would be difficult to 
translate to practice given the ‘big business’ of the criminal justice industry, hence 
the application of restorative justice may be limited to institutionalised programmes 
within the criminal justice system (forms (a)-(b)). As discussed in further detail in 
Section 2.3, forms (a) and (b) are the predominant ways in which restorative justice 
applies in practice today (although this does not forgo the possibility of looking at 
restorative justice in a different way).  
 
These arguments are parallel to Christie’s influential article ‘Conflicts as 
Property.’780 Christie advances a ‘lay victim-oriented court’ to resolve conflicts, to 
‘help [restore] the participants’ rights to their own conflicts.’781 He argues that 
individuals have the right to participate in resolving their conflicts. The process is as 
follows: the starting point concerns identifying whether a law is broken, and the 
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individual(s) are responsible for the crime. The court would systematically apply a 
procedure that considers the victim’s account of the crime and other circumstances, 
whether legally relevant or not, and their views on how it could be resolved. 
Following that, a judge would impose punishment. After sentencing, a discussion of 
the offender’s options for ‘restoring the victim’s situation’ would take place after 
understanding the offender’s circumstances.782  
 
At first instance, Christie advances a very persuasive idea: a ‘court’ system that 
centralises the rights of the victim and allows them to communicate the impact of 
the crime before sentencing. This could be formalised through reforms to the law in 
relation to the type of evidence that could be admitted, and the process used to admit 
the evidence. Victim impact statements, for instance, are currently used by courts for 
some crimes after conviction but before a sentence is imposed, similar to form (b).783 
After a sentence is imposed by a judge, the offender is provided with a chance to 
discuss their circumstances may offer the chance to resolve the impact of the crime. 
Community penalties, like education and/or treatment, are alternative ways to 
dealing with crimes (form (a)); and/or are currently imposed as an additional step 
after punishment (form (b)).784 Section 2.3 will evaluate (a) and (b) in more detail. 
 
However, a closer reading of the article reveals Christie’s abolitionist views, or in 
other words, his view of restorative justice as a complete replacement to punishment 
(form (c)). He states,   
 
‘Maybe we should not have any criminology. Maybe we should rather abolish 
institutes, not open them. Maybe the social consequences of criminology are 
more dubious than we like to think…[Specialising] in conflict resolution is a 
major enemy…let us reduce specialisation and particularly our dependence on 
the professionals within the crime control system to the utmost…the ideal is 
clear; it ought to be a court of equals representing themselves, no judges are 
needed…should lawyers be admitted to court?... Maybe they should be 
admitted…where it decided if the man is guilty. I am not sure. Experts are as 
cancer to any lay body.’785 
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There are apparent contradictions in Christie’s work when his ‘court’ procedure 
replaces the traditional criminal justice system. Leaving the issue of resolving 
criminal ‘conflicts’ to the lay public, particularly the victim, comes with a risk of an 
inconsistent sentencing process, where sentences would depend on how vindictive 
or forgiving the victim is.786 Dismissing a public criminal justice system because it 
is the ‘enemy,’ and viewing experts specialising in conflict resolution as ‘cancer to 
any lay body’, is dubious. It is not theoretically nor practically coherent for 
restorative justice to apply to all types of crimes and criminals: offenders may not 
wish to take part in the process or plead guilty; and may not be able to meet the 
victim’s long term medical, psychological or financial needs.787  
 
For serious crimes like sexual offences and domestic abuse cases, the victim may be 
harmed if pressured to enter into a restorative justice process without appropriate 
psychological treatments and counselling, whilst an offender that pled not guilty may 
also be reluctant to participate or understand the restorative justice process. Although 
there may be flaws to a public criminal justice system, there are dangers in forgoing 
independent and impartial judgements and a system that advances processes and 
sentences in accordance with the rule of law.  
 
2.2.2 Restorative Justice as an Instance of Punishment  
 
In later publications, Zehr changed his views on contextualising restorative justice 
as an alternative to punishment. He acknowledges that it may be a ‘surprise’ to those 
influenced by one of his earlier publications, but there is a potential of collaboration 
between restorative justice and retributive justice,788  
 
‘Restorative justice is neither a panacea nor necessarily a replacement for the 
legal system. By no means is it the answer to all situations. Nor is it clear that it 
should replace the legal system. A restoratively-oriented [legal system] would 
be needed as a backup and as guardian of basic human rights…on the philosophic 
or theoretical level, I no longer see restoration as the polar opposite of 
retribution…[Restorative] justice advocates may dream of a day when justice is 
fully restorative but whether this is realistic is debatable, at least in the immediate 
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future. More attainable, perhaps, is a time when restorative justice is the norm 
while some form of the legal or criminal justice system provides the backup or 
alternative. Attainable, perhaps, is the time when all our approaches to justice 
are restoratively oriented’789  
 
Zehr adopts a broader view of restorative justice – it can work alongside retribution, 
it can be the main mechanism to respond to crime, or states could enforce laws and 
respond to crime with a restoratively oriented legal system. In Zehr’s proclaimed 
‘last contribution to a book’ on restorative justice in 2019, he welcomed the 
expansion of the theory and practice of restorative justice, despite potential 
challenges and pitfalls, and praised its recent inclusion into the law in Colorado in 
the USA.790 Although Zehr does not explain how a ‘restoratively oriented legal 
system’ would be structured, the idea of restorative justice as a core of a legal justice 
system, which includes retribution and other penal aims, is compelling.  
 
Another innovative view of restorative justice is its view as an ‘incomplete theory of 
punishment’.791 Brooks states, ‘the idea is that a complete theory of punishment 
would offer an account applicable to all crimes. The problem is that restorative 
justice offers us a partial account that is applicable to some crimes, but not all 
crimes.792 Brooks defines punishment as a ‘response to crime…that must be 
administered and imposed intentionally by an authority with a legal system, such as 
the state.’793 He follows Hart’s classification of any theory of punishment, 
particularly that ‘any theory of punishment must first satisfy the definition of 
punishment. We must then identify the general justifying aim of punishment and 
how this aim may be achieved through the distribution of punishment.’794 
Correspondingly, restorative justice is imposed as a response to an individual 
breaking the law or committing a crime, and the state determines whether the 
restorative justice would apply, and in what form. It is not a ‘complete’ theory of 
punishment because it cannot apply to all types of offences and offenders.795 Brooks 
argues that this view is consistent with what many restorivists argue. Restorative 
justice proponents do not state that restorative justice applies to all crimes. 
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Restorative justice may not theoretically or practically work for all types of crimes 
and criminals: offenders may not wish to take part in the process or plead guilty; may 
not be able to meet the victim’s long term medical, psychological or financial 
needs.796 For instance, for serious crimes like sexual offences and domestic abuse 
cases, the victim may be harmed if pressured to enter into a restorative justice process 
without appropriate psychological treatments and counselling, whilst an offender 
that pled not guilty may also be reluctant to participate or understand the restorative 
justice process. 
 
Brooks alternatively advances a ‘distinctive approach to restorative justice called 
punitive restoration.’797 His first account of punitive restoration in 2012 is 
persuasive. He states, ‘our aim is to achieve rights restoration, but our restorative 
effort is also punitive; it is a project of punitive restoration. Punitive restoration 
places burdens on offenders in consultation with other stakeholders in the 
outcome.’798  
 
In 2018, he states:  
 
My focus on restorative justice will be on approaches used as an alternative to 
the criminal trial and traditional sentencing by the court…[Punitive restoration] 
is a single type of approach taking a conference setting where the victim, the 
offender, their support networks, and some local community members are 
represented. Punitive restoration is restorative insofar as it aims to achieve the 
restoration of rights infringed or threatened by criminal offences.799 
 
Brooks envisions ‘punitive restoration’ to be a practice taking the form of a 
conference. Punitive restoration does not reject imprisonment as a sentence if it 
advances restoration of the rights violated. Imprisonment could be used in 
conjunction with ‘restorative justice conferences as a common feature of 
punishments’800 Gardner understands Brooks’ view of punitive restoration as ‘an 
alternative to formal sentencing’ where ‘hard treatment’ is permitted.801 His view 
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centralises instilling public confidence in the criminal justice system and reducing 
offending.802  
 
Zehr and Brooks’ views are a stepping stone to an original definition of restorative 
justice, set out in Section 2.4. The next step is to examine how restorative justice 
theories have translated into different practices. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Restorative Justice in Practice 
 
Ashworth states, ‘the theory of restorative justice has to a large extent developed 
through practice and will probably continue to do so.’803 The variety of restorative 
justice forms mask the answers to the aims of restorative justice and how these aims 
could be achieved in practice.804  
 
Restorative forms include formal and informal programmes applied in schools, 
workplaces, prisons, and other settings, to deal with criminal and non-criminal 
conflicts.805 Particularly, processes that advance ‘restoration’ have also been applied 
in England and Wales and the United States. They include (a) victim impact 
statements in court to determine appropriate sentences and to judge the impact of the 
crime on the victim; (b) community penalties like education and training, curfew and 
residence requirements, and/or treatment; and (c) shame punishment. Shame 
punishment includes ‘disintegrative shaming’, where the purpose of sentencing is to 
humiliate, and ‘reintegrative shaming’, where the purpose is to restore or change the 
offender.806 These processes, as discussed in other chapters, could advance particular 
approaches to penal aims (rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence). 
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Additionally, restorative justice has been the centre of the ‘#metoo’ movement in 
2018, to express dissatisfaction with current laws relating to the possession of 
firearms, the punishment of juvenile offenders including school shootings and knife 
crimes, sexual offences committed by celebrities, and marijuana legalisation 
processes.807 Restorative justice is defined by its practices, which is highly evident 
by the rise of ‘restorative’ movements, often without specifically articulating the 
purpose(s) of the programme, policy, and/or law, and how the purpose(s) ought to 
be achieved. The implementation of methods parallel to restorative justice could 
offer a creative and multi-dimensional way of addressing the risks of crime yet may 
be compromised by a lack of understanding of the theoretical groundings of 
restorative justice theories.  
 
The section discusses various restorative justice models, focusing on three prominent 
models: (a) victim-offender mediation, (b) conferencing, and (c) sentencing circles. 
Variations to victim-offender mediation, conferencing, and circle sentencing exist in 
practice. These include victim-offender conference, community conferences, shuttle 
restorative justice, street restorative justice or police-led restorative justice, and 
neighbourhood justice panels.808  
 
2.3.1 Victim-Offender Mediation  
 
Victim-offender mediation, otherwise known as victim-offender conferencing or 
victim-offender dialogue, is the most common form of restorative justice in Northern 
America and Europe, including the United States and England and Wales.809 It can 
be broadly understood as a process where the victims and offenders collectively 
discuss the crime and its impact in a safe environment, with the aim of correcting the 
wrong(s) resulting from the crime.810  
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There is no uniform form to victim-offender mediation programmes. The first form 
of victim-offender mediation emerged in Canada in 1974, though a programme 
named Victim Offender Reconciliation Program, later replicated in Indiana in 1978. 
In England and Wales, victim-offender mediation programmes could be traced to the 
early 1980s to tackle juvenile and adult offenders (community dispute resolution 
schemes; police-based reparation schemes; court-based reparation schemes; and 
victim assistance schemes).811  
 
Today, offenders and victims have been referred to mediation programmes by 
judges, probation officers, victim advocates, prosecutors, defence attorneys, and law 
enforcement.812 Victim-offender mediation is used to address a range of offences 
(from minor assaults to murder) and offenders (juvenile and adult offenders).813 In 
2018, there are more than 300 reported forms of victim-offender mediation 
programmes in the United States.814  
 
In contrast to other restorative justice programmes, victim-offender mediation 
strictly defines the stakeholders of the offence as ‘the victim(s)’ and the 
‘offender(s)’. It thereby focuses on the relationship between the offender and the 
victim, rather than the crime.815 It aims to empower the victim(s) and offender(s) to 
have the opportunity to discuss the crime in a safe environment and reach resolutions 
(e.g. financial compensation) on how to repair the harm resulting from the crime.816  
 
The victim-offender mediation process varies depending on the stage it applies 
within the criminal justice process and the offence at hand. It primarily includes the 
following: referral of the case to a facilitator; preparation of the case by the 
facilitator; the meeting; and preparation of the file following the meeting. First, the 
mediator, a trained third party, takes steps to ensure that the victims and offenders 
have the capacity and willingness to participate. Second, the mediator meets 
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separately with the offenders and victims to explain the process and the expectations 
of the programme. Third, the mediation session(s) take place, where the victims and 
offenders, with the support of the mediator, explain their views of the events in 
question and ask questions. The victim will often have the chance to communicate 
the financial, physical, and/or emotional impact of the crime on them, acquire 
answers about the crime and offender, and are directly involved in constructing a 
restitution plan for the offender, if relevant.817  
 
The process is dialogue driven (not settlement driven) and focuses on encouraging 
the victims and offenders to share their narratives, to maximise the potential for 
‘healing’ following a crime and reaching an agreement on how to remedy the harm 
done. This could take place through a face-face meeting or ‘shuttle type interactions’ 
through the mediator.818 Direct apologies are a common outcome of victim-offender 
mediations in England and Wales and the United States, but an agreement on next 
steps to be taken to resolve the impact of the offence is an important part of the 
process in certain cases.819 Lastly, the mediator contacts the victim and offender to 
ensure the agreements reached in the mediation, if any, are being carried out until 
the process is finalised.820  
 
2.3.2 Conferencing    
 
Conferencing is another restorative justice model encompassing a number of 
practices, including family group conferencing, youth justice conferencing, and 
police-led conferencing.821 Although there are variations within each model, 
conferencing generally includes more parties in the process.822 
 
One notable model is a ‘family group conference’, otherwise known as family group 
decision making, which developed in New Zealand through Maori whanau 
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(extended family) meetings, and family therapy meetings.823 The Children, Young 
Persons and Their Families Act in 1989 was consequently passed to deal with 
juvenile offenders through restorative processes.824 Under this model, stakeholders 
in family group conferencing extend to family members and other third parties, 
including lawyers, social care workers, and any other individuals requested by the 
family members.825 It is a statutory restorative justice disposal system, directed by 
the court before or after hearing the offence, reflecting forms (a) and (b) above.826 
The Youth Court must refer the cases to a family group conference unless it is a 
murder or manslaughter offence.827 The structure of the family group conference 
varies, and the outcomes may include making decisions, recommendations, and 
plans on resolving conflicts as it sees fit. The decision, recommendation, and/or plan 
is recorded, even where no agreement is reached, and made available to all the 
stakeholders. An official copy is left at the relevant government department.828 An 
impartial facilitator usually ensures that everyone with a stake of the crime is 
satisfied with the outcome of the conference.829 
 
Variations to the model have been adopted in many jurisdictions, including the 
United States and England and Wales. Similar to victim-offender mediation, 
flexibility is needed to tailor for the specific needs of the stakeholders, and to deal 
with the specific crime. Nevertheless, this has blurred the differences between family 
group conferencing and other forms of restorative justice.830 
 
In England and Wales, conferences are often led by the police and organised by a 
trained facilitator from the Restorative Justice Council.831 However, the degree of 
involvement of the victim(s), victim supporters, offender(s), and offender supporters 
are different in each case. Offenders could be accompanied by legal representation 
but are required to personally speak for themselves. The aim of the conference is to 
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reach an agreement, usually through a signed contract, on how the victims and 
offenders will be restored. This could include orders targeting the risks of the 
offence, like mental health or anger management issues; payment of compensation 
and/or community service; and/or providing an opportunity for the offenders to 
express remorse to the victims. Fulfilling these conditions would result in the 
offender being ‘restored’. Failure to abide by the conditions of the agreement may 
result in drafting a less favourable contract, and/or the offenders going to trial and 
being imprisoned.832 
 
The Northern Ireland youth conferencing model is a ‘mainstream’ model of 
restorative justice for juvenile offending, hence worthy of discussion.833 The Justice 
(Northern Ireland) Act 2002 introduced Victim Information Schemes in probation 
and prison, and importantly, a restorative justice youth conference scheme. When a 
case is referred to the Public Prosecution Service, they determine whether the 
offender will be prosecuted, diverted from prosecution where he admits to the 
offence and agrees to the diversion, or whether the case ought to be dismissed. If the 
case is diverted, the offender may receive an ‘informed warning, a restorative caution 
or a diversionary youth conference.’834 which can be ordered by the court before or 
after sentencing (‘court-ordered youth conferences’), or diverted by the police or 
Public Prosecution Service as an alternative to the court process.835 Importantly, 
youth conference orders issued by the Youth Court are sentences by the court and 
constitute a criminal conviction.836 Nevertheless, the court may not issue a youth 
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justice conference order without the consent of the offender, making it a voluntary 
and consensual process.837 
 
Youth conference meetings are held to ‘[consider] how the child ought to be dealt 
with for the offence.’838 They aim to control youth offending and encourage children 
to understand the impacts of a crime and take accountability for their actions.839 The 
required participants are a youth-conference co-ordinator; chairing the meeting(s); 
the child; a police officer; and the child’s parent, guardian, social worker, or a 
responsible adult over the age of 18. Other eligible participants are the victim or an 
individual representing the victim if the victim is not an individual; a legal 
representative of the child; and the supervising officer if a community or youth 
conference order is in force; and any other persons allowed by the youth conference 
coordinator to participate.840 The coordinator proposes a ‘youth conference plan’ 
after the conference is completed, where an order for one or more of the following 
are issued: an apology, a reparation order, a compensation order, submission to an 
adult, community service, treatment, order to report location and/or conduct for a 
period of time, and/or an order to participate in educational or training activities. The 
plan has to be approved by the District Judge.841 
 
2.3.3 Sentencing Circles    
 
Sentencing circles broadly aim to resolve conflicts and restore order between the 
offender, victim, and the community.842 They emphasise ‘support and 
accountability’ through the inclusion of all the stakeholders to have a say in the 
sentencing of the offender, particularly through identifying the necessary steps to 
assist in healing all the impacted parties and prevent future crime by the offender, 
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and reaching a consensus on a sentencing plan that would be beneficial to all the 
stakeholders. In comparison to other restorative justice models, the stakeholders of 
the offence are a broader group of individuals, beyond the victim(s), offender(s), and 
their families.843 The stakeholders could include friends of the victim and offenders, 
justice social service personnel, lawyers, judges, police offenders, and/or residents 
in the community. Follow up circles may be arranged to monitor the progress of the 
offender in achieving ‘restoration', however, defined by the conference.844 
 
Sentencing circles emerged in the early 1990s by Canadian native communities. The 
first case, R v Moses,845 involved a repeat-offender pleading guilty of carrying a 
weapon with the purpose of assaulting a police officer. Sentencing was based on four 
factors: ‘protection of the public, deterrence (general and specific), rehabilitation, 
and denunciation or retribution.’846 The judge chose to depart from these factors and 
invited the family and friends of the offender to gain an understanding of the wishes 
of the community in dealing with this particular habitual offender. Rearranging the 
courtroom to a circle, he called community members, prosecutor and defence 
counsel, the victim, the offender, and their families, to participate in determining the 
sentence. Each shared their role in the process, their perspective on the problem, and 
their recommendation for a solution. The court order was consistent with the wishes 
of the stakeholders. The order was a two-year probation that included referral to 
alcohol treatment.847  
 
Today, the use of sentencing circles is common in Canada and the United States, 
particularly by Native Americans and First Nations People, and are present as 
‘alternative measures’ provisions of the Criminal Code.848 There is no uniform 
structure to sentencing circles. The Founder of the International Institute for 
Restorative Practices states that the structure of restorative justice may be sequential 
or non-sequential. Sequential circles are guided by a facilitator to ask different 
questions to different participants in the meeting, each speaking in turn. Non-
consequential circles are less structured, and the facilitator only has a role of 
recording the inputs and decisions emerging from the meeting.849 
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2.3.4 Restorative Justice Models and the Criminal Justice Process 
 
Building on the discussion of the contextualisation of restorative justice in academic 
literature, restorative justice has been used as an alternative to punishment in practice 
(England and Wales and the United States), particularly as, 
 
(a) an informal alternative to punishment or a diversion from prosecution, as a 
way of dealing with non-criminal conflicts or specific criminal conflicts outside 
the traditional criminal justice system; and/or  
(b) a pre-sentence or post-sentence add on, or in other words, a practice or 
process applied prior to a sentence, or after a person is sentenced.  
 
Gavrielides argues that ‘UK restorative justice has historically been practised in the 
shadows of the law and through the community.'850 This changed when The Criminal 
Justice Act 2003, amending Section 1 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) 
Act 2000, gave the courts the power to defer a sentence to require the offender and 
victims to complete ‘restorative justice requirements.’ The victim is defined as ‘a 
victim of, or other person affected by, the offending concerned.’851 This is a 
requirement for the offender and one or more of the victims to participate in an 
activity that ‘aims to maximise the offender’s awareness of the impact of the 
offending concerned on the victims, and …which gives an opportunity to a victim or 
victims to talk about, or by other means express experience of, the offending and its 
impact.’852 The restorative justice requirements are implemented in accordance with 
official guidance issues on that activity, and the requirement will only be 
implemented if the participants' consent.853 Additionally, the Code of Practice for 
Victims of Crime, established by the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 
2004, provides victims with the right to information about restorative justice 
schemes.854 
 
In the United States, restorative justice programmes also developed through 
community practices, like Native American practices. Although restorative justice is 
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not used at the federal level, many states have adopted policies and laws ‘to advance 
their commitment to restorative justice and justice reforms.’855 Seventy percent of 
states use the term ‘restorative justice’ to describe alternative programmes and 
practices.856 For instance, Article 2 of the Colorado Revised Statutes states,  
 
(1) … [The] intent of this article is to protect, restore, and improve the public 
safety by creating a system of juvenile justice that will appropriately sanction 
juveniles who violate the law and, in certain cases, will also provide the 
opportunity to bring together affected victims, the community, and juvenile 
offenders for restorative purposes…  
(2) The general assembly finds that the juvenile justice system should seek to 
repair such harm and that victims and communities should be provided with the 
opportunity to elect to participate actively in a restorative process that would 
hold the juvenile offender accountable for his or her offence.857 
 
Colorado has adopted a structured formal approach to restorative justice; it 
incorporated restorative justice into the law to deal with juvenile offenders. This is 
advantageous given the definitional ambiguities to restorative justice in theory and 
practice. A number of states only refer to ‘restorative justice’ in the code or 
legislation without specifying how it would translate into practice.858 Similar to 
England and Wales, restorative justice measures exist primarily as a diversionary 
tool for adult and juvenile crime but have been applied as a post-sentence measure 
or as part of a sentence for crimes committed by adults.859  
 
Could it be argued that the operation of restorative justice as an alternative to 
punishment in practice makes the interpretation of restorative justice ‘as a broad term 
about punishment’ practically incoherent?   
 
Marshall argues that there is scope for the implementation of restorative justice at 
the federal level through The Crime Victim Rights Act 2004 because it gives victims 
the right to be ‘reasonably heard in a public proceeding,’860 which if interpreted 
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broadly, ought to allow victim participation in the sentencing process, at a federal 
level.861  
 
The United Nations further encourages the incorporation of restorative justice. It 
outlines the principles of restorative justice programmes in criminal matters, as 
follows, 
 
1. "Restorative justice programme" means any programme that uses restorative 
processes or aims to achieve restorative outcomes.  
2. "Restorative outcome" means an agreement reached as the result of a 
restorative process. Examples of restorative outcomes include restitution, 
community service and any other programme or response designed to 
accomplish reparation of the victim and community, and reintegration of the 
victim and/or the offender.  
3. "Restorative process" means any process in which the victim, the offender 
and/or any other individuals or community members affected by a crime actively 
participate together in the resolution of matters arising from the crime, often with 
the help of a fair and impartial third party. Examples of the restorative process 
include mediation, conferencing and sentencing circles. 
4. "Parties" means the victim, the offender and any other individuals or 
community members affected by a crime who may be involved in a restorative 
justice programme.  
5. "Facilitator" means a fair and impartial third party whose role is to facilitate 
the participation of victims and offenders in an encounter programme… 
6. Restorative justice programmes should be generally available at all stages of 
the criminal justice process… 
21. There should be regular consultation between criminal justice authorities and 
administrators of restorative justice programmes to develop a common 
understanding of restorative processes and outcomes, to increase the extent to 
which restorative programmes are used and to explore ways in which restorative 
approaches might be incorporated into criminal justice practices.862  
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The United Nations’ broad definition of restorative justice as a programme that uses 
restorative ‘processes’ or ‘aims’, and could apply at any stage in the criminal justice 
process, strengthens the view of restorative justice as a broad term that could be 
incorporated into a theory of punishment. Restorative justice can be a process that 
involves the stakeholders of the offence, or a goal or outcome of a model based on 
deterrence, retribution, and/or rehabilitation. The ability of restorative justice to 
apply at all stages within the criminal justice means that it could also be 
conceptualised as an instance of punishment, to be formalised or incorporated into 
legislation.  
 
Having discussed a wide range of views on restorative justice in literature and 
practice, and advanced proposals that support restorative justice as an instance of 
punishment, the next step is to build on these propositions to convey the author’s 
understanding of restorative justice in more detail. 
 
2.4 Restorative Justice Defined 
 
Restorative justice is a conception of justice, and justice can be reached through 
punishment. It is best understood as a broad term describing a conglomerate of 
principles that provide a multi-dimensional lens for understanding the justifying 
aims of punishment and how punishment ought to be distributed. Restorative justice 
can be an instance of punishment because it provides a well-rounded understanding 
of crime and punishment. 
 
The starting point lies in recognising that the relationship between the justification 
of punishment and the distribution of punishment is dependent. One informs the 
understanding of the other. Restorative justice is not necessarily an ‘incomplete 
theory of punishment’863 because it informs one’s understanding of the causes and 
impacts of crime and punishment. In other words, it offers a broader understanding 
of crime and punishment, where stakeholder interests ought to be taken into account.  
 
Restorative justice provides a multi-dimensional understanding of crime and 
punishment – it seeks to understand and take into account the causes of crime, the 
impact of a crime, and how the harm resulting from a crime can be remedied. 
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This has an impact on the liability standards set by the law (answering the questions 
of ‘what to punish?’ and ‘whom to punish?’) and sentencing processes and practices 
(‘how do we prosecute offenders?’ and ‘what punishment should be imposed?’). 
Restorative justice ought not to be reduced to a single type of approach taking a 
conference setting.864 Restorative justice offers a new understanding of the 
justification of punishment and how it ought to be distributed, and the latter can take 
many forms.  
 
As to the distribution of punishment, one ought to take into account the process of 
sentencing the company and the amount of punishment it will incur. The focus is on 
resolving the conflict resulting from the crime, which is a broader view than simply 
dealing with the offender. 
 
Some may argue that this view goes against the ‘spirit of restorative justice.’ In 
response, it may be worth considering Aersten’s view on restorative justice in 2018,  
 
[Restorative] justice is a field of ongoing development, both in theory and 
practice, which does not need one uniform definition of its approach that is 
applicable worldwide and for all types of crime…restorative justice cannot be 
reduced to its well-known models of victim-offender mediation, conferencing 
and peacemaking.’865  
 
The definition of restorative justice should not be reduced to a ‘practice’ or a model 
like victim-offender mediation, conferencing, or circle sentencing. Current practices 
predominantly apply restorative justice as an informal alternative to punishment or 
as a step prior to or after punishment. This contextualises restorative justice as an 
alternative to punishment, yet utilises it within a framework based on achieving other 
penal aims. This shows potential for further incorporation of restorative justice 
within a theory of punishment that aims to achieve different aims.866 In Northern 
Ireland, youth justice conferencing orders afford offenders a criminal conviction. 
This aligns with the view of restorative justice as an instance of punishment. The 
principles of restorative justice encourage implementing policies, laws, and/or 
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processes (including liability standards and sentencing practices) that identify and 
address the needs of the stakeholders.  
 
It may also be worth considering that this conception of restorative justice does not 
completely deviate from existent descriptions of restorative justice in literature. First, 
Gavrielides, O’Mahoney and Doak, and Maruna have described restorative justice 
as a ‘theory of justice that gravitates around the core notion of restoration.’867 Justice 
could be attained through punishment. Second, Roger and Miller have defined 
restorative justice as ‘a broad term that encapsulates an alternative philosophy for 
the administration of justice and entails a wide range of practices and 
[programmes].’868 An alternative philosophy for the administration of justice could 
incorporate  ‘restoratively-oriented’ sentencing practices, set liability standards and 
sentencing practices to achieve restoration in short or long term, depending on the 
case and offender. More importantly and lastly, Karp and Frank further describe 
restorative justice as a ‘philosophy of punishment that focuses on stakeholder 
dialogue and efforts toward reparation and reconciliation as a response to the harm 
caused by crime and misconduct.’869 Restorative justice does not equate to penal 
abolition. 
 
The following principles of restorative justice should be adopted: restoration; 
voluntarism; neutrality; safety; accessibility; and respect.870 Restoration should be 
an aim to be achieved within a law, process, and/or practice, resulting in a 
restoratively oriented law, process, and/or practice. A process or law could aim to 
achieve the ultimate goal of restoration, even if there is recognition that not all 
stakeholders wish to be ‘restored’. If restorative justice is applied through a 
programme, participation ought to be voluntary. To achieve restoration, laws, 
processes, and practices should be fair and non-discriminatory, afford protection and 
a safe environment for all stakeholders to be given the opportunity to participate; and 
be respectful to the dignity of all the stakeholders.871 On this basis, the principles of 
restorative justice could also be translated into programmes that act as informal 
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alternatives or conducted before or after sentencing. This does not forgo the 
understanding of restorative justice as punishment; the existence of restorative 
justice models can fit within a restoratively-oriented legislative framework. 
 
3 Evaluating Restorative Justice 
 
The section evaluates the definition and conceptualisation of restorative justice 
advanced in in Section 2.4, particularly in relation to the principles of accessibility, 
voluntarism, neutrality, respect and restoration. 
 
3.1 Accessibility, Voluntariness, Neutrality, and Respect: Identifying and Involving 
Stakeholders 
 
Involving the stakeholders is a unique feature of restorative justice, yet defining what 
counts as a stakeholder is a major challenge to restorative justice’s legitimacy.  
 
First, all approaches to restorative justice distinctively ‘provide new avenues for 
incorporating a greater public voice in sentencing.’872 Looking at the current 
implementation of restorative justice principles in practice, studies on victim-
offender mediation report high levels of satisfaction for offenders and victims and 
are consistent across cultures and offences.873 A review of research on restorative 
justice in comparison to conventional criminal concluded that it has worked more 
effectively with serious crimes.874 Sherman states,  
 
[It has] substantially reduced repeat offending for some but not all offenders; it 
doubled the offences brought to justice; reduced crime victims' post-traumatic 
stress symptoms and related costs; provided both victims and offenders with 
more satisfaction with justice; reduced crime victims' desire for violent revenge 
against their offenders; and reduced costs of criminal justice.875  
 
The listed benefits evidence a greater need for considering the interests of 
stakeholders. Restorative justice advantageously includes stakeholders in the 
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criminal justice system, which may contribute to improving public confidence.876 
Nevertheless, one ought to acknowledge that empirical studies have suggested that 
the evidence is limited with regards to the consistent effectiveness of restorative 
justice.877 There are mixed empirical results on restorative justice programmes, 
especially with regards to re-offending. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that 
restorative justice helps victims more than it helps offenders because it reduces the 
victim to fear, post-traumatic stress symptoms, victim anger, vengefulness, victim 
beliefs that victim rights have been violated; and increases victim feelings of 
personal safety.878 Studies on sentencing circles were positive but with no clear 
results on recidivism rates.879 A study by Hayes concluded that conducting youth 
conferences has high levels of offender and victim satisfaction, yet there are mixed 
results regarding reoffending.880  
 
Does this diminish the attractiveness of involving the stakeholders in the criminal 
justice process? Looking back at the definition of restorative justice may help 
address this challenge. These restorative justice programmes use different processes 
and protocols, apply in different settings, and manage dialogues differently. These 
mixed empirical results may be due to the lack of agreement on what restorative 
justice theory encompasses and does not encompass, which makes measuring the 
consistent effectiveness of restorative justice programmes difficult.881 For instance, 
McCold and Wachtel state that the measures of restorative justice should include ‘(1) 
the [percentage] of victims and offenders expressing satisfaction with the way their 
cases [were] handled, (2) the [percentage] of victims and offenders who rate their 
experience as fair and (3) the balance of ratings between victims and offenders.’882 
They do not include the essential variable of recidivism as a measure of the 
effectiveness of restorative justice programmes.883 An appropriate comparison of all 
these studies needs to consider the methodologies and elements of effectiveness used 
by all these studies. As Brooks states, ‘the structure by which restorative conference 
participants agree to contract with offenders is purposefully vague but within a clear 
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framework.'884 Flexibility is needed to address the needs of different groups and is 
viewed as a strength of restorative justice given that restoration is tailored to the 
specific situation.885  
 
Second, applying the principles of ‘neutrality' and ‘respect' are essential to achieving 
the ultimate goal of restoration. However, Ashworth argues that incorporating 
restorative justice in the criminal justice process may violate the rule of law and the 
principles of independent and impartial judgement.886 Ashworth argues that the 
principle of proportionality may not be as important to a criminal justice process 
based on restorative justice theories.887 Nevertheless, respect, neutrality, and 
impartiality are central to restorative justice. Restorative justice theories emphasise 
centralising the rights of stakeholders, because that may help the offender understand 
the impact of their criminal acts. Restorative justice recognises and applies 
‘proportionality’. This may be communicated in different ways depending on the 
restoratively oriented-law, process, or programme.  
 
Third, as established in Section 2, there are different approaches to restorative justice 
in theory and practice, resulting in different definitions and interpretations of 
‘stakeholders’. Are the differing definitions of a stakeholder an advantageous feature 
of restorative justice or a hindrance to achieving the goal of restoration?  
 
Wichtel argues that the question of what counts as a stakeholder ‘is more oblique 
within restorative justice.’888 He identifies three groups of stakeholders: the victims, 
the offenders, and the community.889 The primary stakeholders are the victim(s), 
offender(s), and the families. The secondary stakeholders are neighbours and 
officials. The primary stakeholders incur direct harm and have specific needs, 
requiring an active response. The secondary stakeholders incur indirect harm and 
have aggregate needs, requiring a supportive response.890 Wachtel draws a 
distinction between restorative justice and restorative practices, with restorative 
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justice being a subset of restorative practices.891 The extent of the involvement of 
stakeholders determines whether a practice is or is not restorative.  
 
O’Mahoney and Doak agree with McCold and Wachtel in drawing a distinction 
between ‘restorative justice’ and ‘restorative practice.’ Under this view, the former 
involves all the primary stakeholders, whilst the latter ‘falls short of the restorative 
ideal.’892 They argue that restorative justice meets ‘all the core elements of 
restorative justice’ as defined by Marshall. Marshall defines restorative justice as a 
‘process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to 
resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications 
for the future.’893  
 
There is no benefit to distinguishing between ‘restorative justice’ and ‘restorative 
practices’ and stating that some practices fall short of the restorative ideal. Looking 
back at the definition of restorative justice in section 2.4, restorative practices are an 
illustration of how restorative justice plays out in practice. The impact of a crime on 
a stakeholder is different in each case and cannot be resolved through a defining a 
universal set of stakeholders for all cases. A strict interpretation of a stakeholder 
would limit the stakeholders to the victims and offenders, whilst a broad 
interpretation of stakeholders would take into account the interests of the community 
at large. Restorative practices are one-way restorative justice has been applied in 
practice, not vice versa. The context would define who the stakeholders are. A 
process of defining who the stakeholders are in each case, through national 
guidelines, is the way forward. This already exists in practice. In Northern Ireland, 
the Youth Conference Coordinator has the discretion to allow certain parties to 
participate in the youth conference meeting.894 Different restorative justice 
programmes have defined stakeholders differently to target the specific type of crime 
and criminal.  
 
Restorative justice provides that crime impacts different groups. The law should take 
account of that. The criminal justice system should also implement processes that 
take account of the rights of different individuals who are impacted by the crime.895 
Guidelines could be developed to identify primary, secondary, and tertiary 
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stakeholders. Not all these groups of stakeholders may be present in all cases. 
However, an understanding that there is a possibility that a crime may impact a wider 
group of individuals is in itself influential; a crime is moved from a state against a 
defendant conflict to a conflict impacting the victim and other parties. Formalising 
this idea and aiming to draw laws, policies, and processes to restore the rights of 
those impacted is advantageous. 
 
Fourth, when viewing restorative justice as an instance of punishment, implementing 
processes, policies, and laws to account for the rights of further parties assumes that 
stakeholders have confidence in the criminal justice system, and that all parties are 
willing to participate in the process, have parallel interests, and have knowledge of 
the appropriate procedures and direction of the criminal justice system. The same 
argument is advanced when restorative justice is viewed as an alternative to 
punishment. Referring to forms (a), (b), and (c) identified in section 2.1, viewing 
restorative justice as a complete replacement of the punishment model (form (c)) 
means that it requires a unified view and full confidence of a system that resolves 
conflicts outside ‘a punishment-based model’. Victims in some cases may agree to 
participate in the process of restoration. Even if restorative justice is interpreted as 
forms (a) and (b), offenders may agree to engage in restorative justice programmes 
to avoid punishment. They may not always admit their responsibility and guilt, 
which are two conditions that are central to achieving restoration. Ashworth states,  
 
[If] the broad aim is to restore the ‘communities affected by the crime’… as well 
as the victim and the victim’s family, this will usually mean a geographical 
community; but where an offence targets a victim because of race, religion, 
sexual orientation, etc., that will point to a different community that needs to be 
restored.896 
 
Members of one community may have conflicting interests. Achieving restoration 
with conflicting interests is difficult. In practice, there may not be a conflict between 
the interests of the victims and the community. If there is, guidelines could be 
adopted where experts are appointed to collect information about the stakeholders’ 
interests and develop, and enforce guidelines where a balance between all these 
interests could be made, to ensure that the restorative justice principle of neutrality 
is met.897  
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Overall, the core elements of restorative justice emphasise involving all the relevant 
parties of the offence to discuss the offence and find solutions that will remedy the 
harms resulting from the offence. The decision of how to resolve the conflict is 
carried out by lay individuals and legal actors.898 Restoration could be the ultimate 
aim to be achieved from a criminal process, law, or programme (a case disposal 
programme implemented in response to a crime).  
 
3.2 Achieving Restoration: Restorative justice and Other Penal Aims  
 
As an instance of punishment, restorative justice is a separate idea from deterrence, 
retribution, and rehabilitation, but is essential to a comprehensive theory of 
punishment that advances deterrence, retribution, and/or rehabilitation. The 
subsection evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of viewing restorative justice 
as distinct from rehabilitation, and how restorative could work alongside retribution, 
deterrence, and/or rehabilitation. 
 
Is restoration ‘rehabilitation by another name’?899 Raynor and Robinson discuss 
rehabilitation theories of punishment that aim to involve the offender in the 
community through the criminal justice process. They state, ‘[rehabilitation] should 
not be seen simply as meeting offenders’ needs or correcting their deficits, but as 
harnessing and developing their strengths and assets.’900 Assisting the offenders 
through focusing on their strengths will rehabilitate them in the short term, which in 
the long term, helps reintegrate the offenders back into the community. The 
‘strengths-based’ approach advocated justifies the aim of punishment as enabling the 
offender to contribute to the community as needed.901  
 
Additionally, Eglash views restorative justice as a technique to achieve ‘creative 
restitution,’ understood broadly as an instance of rehabilitative punishment.902 He 
explains creative restitution a ‘correctional technique in aid in the rehabilitation of 
criminal offenders…found in such disciplines [like] psychoanalysis, religion and 
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law, but with some differences in meaning.’903 In practice, it can be accomplished 
when the offenders go ‘beyond simple repair, by offering to resituate despite 
punishment, or by helping others like himself.’904 It can aid in repairing and restoring 
the harm between the offender and the victim, by helping the offender make amends 
to the harm done.905 Therefore, centralising the rights of the defendants and how they 
could be reintegrated into the community can be viewed as an aim of both 
rehabilitation and restorative justice. 
 
There are distinctive differences between rehabilitation and restoration: although 
they both aim at offender reformation, rehabilitation is offender centric whilst 
restorative justice is stakeholder-centric. Moreover, rehabilitation theories aim to 
rehabilitate offenders within prison settings in some circumstances, whilst many 
restorative justice approaches reject the use of imprisonment. Therefore, restorative 
justice and rehabilitation offer distinctive approaches in pursuit of different goals but 
include the reformation of offenders.906  
 
Having established the distinction between restorative justice and rehabilitation, this 
may lead one to think about how restorative justice could not work with 
rehabilitation, deterrence, and/or retribution. Restorative justice distinctively 
integrates victims back into the criminal justice system. Giving victims an integral 
role in determining sentences may be inconsistent with modern legal criminal justice 
systems that have replaced or displaced the role of victims in sentencing with the 
state.907 Nevertheless, section 2.3.4 addressed this point, showing potential for 
restorative justice to apply within a system that advances retribution, deterrence, 
and/or rehabilitation. The next chapter will further examine how those aims could be 
collated into one framework.  
 
4 Restorative Justice and Corporate Crime  
 
This section firstly engages with existent literature on restorative justice as an 
alternative to punishing companies that have violated the law. This will assist in 
reaching a better understanding of whether some kinds of corporate misbehaviour 
are especially well-suited, or especially badly-suited, to being addressed, through 
                                                           
903 Albert Eglash, ‘Creative Restitution: A Broader Meaning for An Old Term’ (n 902). 
904 Albert Eglash, ‘Creative Restitution: Its Roots in Psychiatry, Religion and Law’ (n 774). 
905 Albert Eglash, ‘Creative Restitution: A Broader Meaning for An Old Term’ (n 902). 
906 Brooks, Punishment (n 13) 68-9. 
907 ibid 70. 
  
179 
restorative justice. Secondly, the section applies the general theorising on restorative 
justice to address the potential strengths and limits of restorative justice in the 
specific context of companies. Lastly, the section presents a compelling argument 
regarding the potential for restorative justice to address corporate crime. 
 
4.1 Restorative Justice for Corporate Misbehaviour in Literature and Practice 
  
4.1.2 Braithwaite and Fisse on Restorative Justice, Corporate Regulation, and White-
Collar Crime  
 
Braithwaite and Fisse have published on restorative justice; corporate self-
regulation, civil and criminal liability; and how restorative justice could address 
white-collar crime. They are discussed in turn.  
 
In relation to individual accountability and corporate criminal liability, Braithwaite 
and Fisse brand themselves as ‘dogged [individualists].’908 They reject corporate 
criminal liability (corporate crime) in favour of individual liability (white-collar 
crime). They state, ‘the solution to problems of accountability for corporate crime is 
simple: we should abandon reliance on corporate criminal liability and rely instead 
on individual liability.’909 Prosecuting individuals within companies are more 
effective than prosecuting the corporate entity.  
 
Particularly, enforcing corporate criminal liability faces two issues: (a) ‘individual 
accountability is frequently displaced by corporate liability, which now serves as a 
rough-and-ready catch-all device.’910 Targeting companies undermines the 
accountability of members within the corporate body acting on behalf of the entity. 
(b) If companies are prosecuted for an offence, the impact of enforcement does not 
ensure that the company is changing its ‘internal disciplinary systems to sheet home 
individual accountability.’911 Not prosecuting individuals within the company is 
likely to reduce public confidence and promote a criminal justice system where 
defendants with resources can avoid liability.912  
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To resolve these issues, they propose ‘enforced accountability’, which aims to 
monitor individuals within the company that is responsible for the crime and force 
companies to enforce changes at the individual level following prosecution.913 In 
practice, provided it has the appropriate statutory powers, the court would require 
companies to ‘(a) [conduct] its own enquiry as to who was responsible within the 
organisation, (b) [take] internal disciplinary measures against those responsible, and 
(c) [return] a report demonstrating that due steps had been taken to discipline those 
responsible.’914  
 
If the court finds that the company took due steps to discipline individuals within the 
company, criminal liability would not be enforced. Otherwise, criminal liability 
would be enforced on both the company and the individuals, which will include 
methods like ‘court-ordered adverse publicity, community service, and punitive 
injunctive sentences.’915  
 
Having introduced Braithwaite's views in relation to corporate criminal liability and 
individual criminal liability, the next steps are to discuss his publications on 
restorative justice in the corporate context. 
 
In 2002, Braithwaite writes on restorative justice and corporate misbehaviour. He 
understands restorative justice to be ‘a process where all the stakeholders affected 
by an injustice have an opportunity to discuss how they have been affected by the 
injustice and to decide what should be done to repair the harm.’916 Restorative justice 
is a non-punitive measure that can come in many forms, one which Braithwaite 
argues has always existed to address criminal wrongs by companies.917  
 
Similar to his claims on restorative justice as the ‘traditional way’ of dealing with 
conflicts between individuals, he states, ‘the regulation of companies in most 
countries was rather restorative. The reasons for this were far from ennobling, being 
about corporate capture combined with high costs of complex corporate crime 
investigations that states were unwilling to pay.’918 Restorative justice has always 
been used as a cost-effective way of regulating companies. Braithwaite illustrates his 
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assertions through four examples: nursing homes, Asian community policing, trade 
practices, and regulatory inspections.919 They are summarised below. 
 
First, Braithwaite and others evaluate nursing home regulations. Historically, 
regulations defined a set of quality of care inputs, and companies that violated the 
set would be prosecuted. When the Australian Federal Government took over in 
1988, they implemented measures that Braithwaite interprets as restorative. 
Particularly, they appointed representatives from the industry and major stakeholders 
(consumer groups, union, aged care interest group) to create thirty-one outcome 
standards that are victim-centred. It aimed to shift regulation to a resident-centred 
process. A conference consisting of the inspection team, management, and 
representatives of owners, residents, and family members, was conducted to discuss 
the thirty-one standards. The appointment of different stakeholders to develop and 
discuss nursing home standards improved the quality of life of clients and the rates 
of compliance by Australian nursing home facilities.920 
 
Second, Braithwaite investigates the reasons behind high levels of compliance by 
Japanese companies. He finds that resources are invested in implementing processes 
to encourage dialogue about collective obligations and relationships rather than on 
investigating crimes.921 
 
Third, Braithwaite discusses a process invoked to regulate an Australian insurance 
company that violated civil insurance laws by misrepresenting their policies. To 
respond to the violation, top-management was ordered to meet with the local 
community council, the regulators, local officials of the Department of Social 
Security, and some consumers in a community impacted by these violations. 
Following that, meetings were held with insurance regulators, industry associations, 
and the Prime Minister about follow up regulatory reforms. A list of remedies was 
created, including establishing a funded consumer education programme to reduce 
future attempts of misconduct and generating an internal investigation team to 
examine the company's compliance programme and to identify the responsible 
parties for the crime. Additionally, eighty agents of the company were dismissed, 
and a new internal compliance policy was created. Braithwaite commends this 
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problem-solving strategy because it avoided formal court processes and involved 
many knowledgeable actors to resolve the legal violation.922 
 
Fourth, Braithwaite observes studies on Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration inspectors and Mine Safety and Health Administration inspectors in 
the United States, and studies on pollution inspectors and coal and mining safety 
offences in the United Kingdom.923 He concludes that regulatory inspectors having 
dialogues with workers impacted by violations and managers responsible for safety 
problems on how to fix the issues and be compliant with the law was more effective 
than threats of punishment and/or punishment.924   
 
Throughout these studies, Braithwaite argues that ‘dialogue’ and ‘persuasion’; 
measures he interprets as restorative, are more effective than traditional punishment, 
but should only be applied if backed up by traditional punishment.925  
 
In 2004, he develops his proposals to a ‘theory of democratic professionalism' and 
model entitled ‘toward an integration of restorative, deterrent, and incapacitative 
justice.'926 Braithwaite argues, ‘while persuasion works better than punishment, 
credible punishment is needed as well to back up persuasion when it 
fails…Deterrence and incapacitation are needed, and needed in larger measure than 
these regimes currently provide, when restorative justice fails'.927 Braithwaite views 
restoration as a non-punitive and a cost-effective measure that has to be backed up 
by a ‘responsive regulatory strategy’ based on deterrence and incapacitation 
theories.928 Using the combination of ‘persuasion' and ‘different forms of 
punishment' as more effective than solely using restorative justice and a one-size-
fits-all approach is unlikely to deter or have an impact at individual and corporate 
levels.929   
 
Braithwaite proposes to integrate restorative justice, deterrence, and incapacitation 
under one model: restorative justice applies as an alternative to punishment for the 
‘virtuous [actors]’; deterrent punishment applies to ‘rational [actors]’; and 
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punishment based on incapacitation applies for ‘incompetent or irrational 
[actors].’930 He argues that while restorative justice works well with corporate crime 
(the corporate entity), it would not be able to effectively deal with white-collar crime 
(business executives who do not acknowledge how they have hurt their victims).931 
When restorative justice does not work for certain business executives, deterrence 
measures are enforced on the corporate body to target change at the individual level. 
If the corporate body that the business executives may be inversely impacted by a 
deterrence measures, for instance, may lead for the company to go bankrupt, 
incapacitation can apply to remove the license of white-collar criminals within the 
company and enforce prison sentences. Overall, Braithwaite argues that moving 
away from restorative justice strategies towards ‘interventionist strategies’ is 
necessary when restorative justice fails to protect communities from injustice.932   
 
4.1.2 Spalding on Restorative Justice for Foreign Bribery   
 
Spalding proposes that foreign bribery is best addressed through restorative justice. 
In his article, Restorative Justice for Multinational Companies, Spalding does not 
trust the ability of deterrence to deal with corporate crime, especially with the rise of 
international commerce. Using quantitative methods, he finds that deterrence is 
likely to increase rather than decrease the levels of corporate crime in developing 
countries.933 He states,  
 
The ever-increasing power of multi-national companies thus calls for a new 
theory of punishment, one that uses criminal enforcement to address the 
systematic causes of crime. That theory, quite ironically, is restorative 
justice. By involving the perpetrator, victim, and community in the 
sentencing process, restorative justice does not merely punish the 
wrongdoer, but remedies the harm caused by the crime prevents future harm 
and reintegrates the defendant into the very community it violated.934 
 
Moreover, he argues,  
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[Literature] is not typically associated with the multinational corporate 
practice. But might it be? Can multinational companies, who have 
committed crimes, heal social wounds? Can corporate defence counsel, and 
federal prosecutors, be peacemakers?935 
 
Spalding argues that his theory of punishment on restorative justice is already 
embedded in sentencing guidelines for companies; Chapter 8 of the Sentencing 
Commission Guidelines include restorative justice principles. Additionally, 
sentencing practices for white-collar crime in the context of domestic environmental 
law also apply restorative justice principles through ‘supplemental sentences.'936 
Particularly, corporate bodies understand the benefits of community service over 
simple fines for long term profits and personal reputation; and judges prefer the 
benefits of settlement funds being paid back to the community, rather than being 
deposited to the U.S. Treasury.937 Additionally, he provides a number of examples 
of supplemental sentences. First, a gas company convicted of illegally storing 
mercury was ordered to pay $6 million criminal fines and $12 million in payments 
for local communities to support education projects, children health initiatives, and 
environmental remediation.938 BP paid $4 billion for criminal misconducts from a 
spill, where more than 50 percent was ordered to fund projects in communities 
harmed by the spill, including The National Academy of Sciences. They are also 
required to appoint monitors; and complete audits, internal reforms, and training 
programmes.939 These supplemental orders reflect ways to deal with crime through 
supplementing deterrence theory with practices that reflect restorative justice 
principles.940 
 
His theory focuses on regulating multinational companies for international 
corruption and bribery crimes.  
 
When allegations arise, the companies would retain a law firm to perform an 
independent investigation and report its factual findings. The company would 
receive a ‘cooperation credit’ when they voluntarily disclose the investigation report. 
The prosecution would invite the company to enter a DPA with conditions on how 
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the companies could remedy the damages done by the crime including a fine ‘range' 
(e.g. thirty-five million to sixty-five million). The prosecution would grant a thirty 
percent downward departure through requiring the defendant to pay approximately 
twenty-four million when it agrees to adopt a number of policies to minimise the risk 
of further violations. This includes hiring an independent corporate monitor and 
reforming compliance programmes.941 
 
Furthermore, the company would develop three projects with anti-corruption 
experts, with specific deadlines and costs for each. That could lead to a further 
reduction of the allocated fine. First, a small business loan programme for merchants 
that have been materially impacted due to the company's crimes. Second, funding 
towards training centres for local businesses, attorneys, and government officials to 
avoid violating anti-bribery laws, with certifications for graduates of these 
programmes. Third, the company would be required to complete a report on its 
experience of paying bribes in the foreign jurisdiction where the crime was 
committed; including the bribes paid and the reasons they were paid. The report 
would be publicised in the foreign jurisdiction and translated into the local 
language.942 The report would explain the reasons for the bribes and behaviour of the 
company in relation to governmental officials, and the conduct of local and foreign 
competitor companies.943 
 
Overall, restorative justice is viewed as a viable alternative to punishing companies 
who commit bribery through a deterrence-based sentencing practice. Engaging a 
restoratively oriented DPA would assist in paying a fine that is appropriately 
allocated to remedy the harm incurred by many stakeholders.  
 
4.1.3 British Columbia: Restorative Justice for Environmental Offences  
 
In Canada, The Ministry of Environment in British Columbia initiated the 
Community Environmental Justice Forum944 Based on restorative justice, the process 
provides opportunities for ‘participants to engage in meaningful dialogue, 
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collaborative problem-solving, and relationship building.’945 The Ministry of 
Environment enforces the Compliance and Enforcement Policy, which provides 
guidance to staff to address any non-compliance with the law, and whether a 
restorative justice forum is an appropriate avenue946 The forum is one tool available 
to ensure compliance with the law, and investigation review processes exist to ensure 
that the company is willing and has the capacity to participate.947  
 
The process aims to deal with companies who have committed certain environmental 
offences outside the criminal justice system. It is a voluntary process and only 
applies in cases where the offenders want to take responsibility for the crime, and 
members of the community and ministry enforcement staff agree to participate.948 
The stakeholders of the offence are community members impacted by the offence, 
the enforcement agency, and the offender- a party regulated by environmental 
legislation.949  
 
A trained impartial facilitator conducts a pre-forum meeting with the stakeholders to 
understand their views and explain the structure and expectations of the forum.950 A 
meeting takes places (2-2.5 hours), where the stakeholders discuss the cause of the 
incident and its impact on all stakeholders, including the company. The group agrees 
on a restitution plan, and it is recorded in a written signed agreement. Monitors are 
appointed to ensure the company completes the terms of the agreement. This may 
include ‘environmental restoration projects, financial penalties, community service, 
and a public declaration by the company of their responsibility and remorse.'951  
 
A notable example is Trail Teck Metals. In 2010, Trail Teck Metals participated in 
a restorative justice process, following a spill of mercury into Stoney Creek, resulting 
in violations of the Fisheries Act 1985 and the Environmental Management Act 
1999.952 The conclusion of the forum included payment of a financial penalty to be 
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used for community environmental initiatives;  and reviewing the company’s 
sanitary sewer system and piping configuration processes.953  
 
The process is theoretically expected to result in the following outcomes:  
 
[Restore] or compensate for harm done to the environment; promote a sense of 
responsibility in the offender; acknowledge and repair harm done to a 
community; improve long term compliance (reduce the likelihood of 
recidivism); build positive relationships between the offender, the community 
and regulators; [and] promote general deterrence.954  
 
It is notable that the process is limited to offences where a company ‘unintentionally 
commits non-compliance.’955 Guidance for when a case should be referred to 
restorative justice may be referred to restorative justice, and would not be referred to 
restorative justice is published. Particularly, restorative justice is not suitable in the 
following circumstances: intent crimes; the offender takes no responsibility for the 
offence; the impact extends beyond a single community; restorative justice would be 
expected to do ‘more harm than good’; or ‘it is felt that a more public forum (courts) 
would provide better deterrence than a closed forum, even if the prosecution is not 
successful.’956 Additionally, the regulatory history of the offender, the public 
interests, and implications for other operations are taken into account to determine 
whether a case is suitable for restorative justice.957 
 
4.2 Evaluating Restorative Justice for Corporate Misbehaviour  
 
The section sets out the potential benefits and limitations of using ‘restorative justice 
for corporate crime’, particularly through evaluating the models and propositions set 
out by Spalding, Braithwaite, and The Ministry of Environment in British Columbia, 
Canada. This will be followed by the potential advantages of using restorative justice 
to address corporate crime. 
 
4.2.1 The Disadvantages of Applying Restorative Justice Corporate Crime 
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The subsection focuses on three potential limitations that potentially male restorative 
justice badly suited for dealing with corporate crime.  
 
The first limitation builds on previous discussions on the potential limitations of 
restorative justice in theory and practice. If there is no uniform theory of restorative 
justice, why should it be used to regulate and/or punish serious crimes?  
 
Bromwich states,  
 
[Restorative] practices developed in contemplation of natural person may not be 
easily applicable to the corporate context. Where an [organisation] wrongs a 
community, as is the case when environmental harm is effective by a company, 
the notional circle model of restorative justice becomes more complex.958 
 
Restorative justice is continuously developing in theory and practice. Corporate 
criminal laws have also developed from borrowings of criminal law as applied to 
individuals rather than a clear assessment of the objectives of imposing punishment 
and how these objectives could be achieved. Hence, there is a danger of regulating 
and/or punishing serious and complex crimes committed by companies through 
practices that are not theoretically coherent. 
 
There are clear gaps in the models and proposals presented in the previous sections, 
suggesting the importance of agreeing on the theoretical groundings of restorative 
justice before advancing restorative justice as a practice. 
 
Looking at the programme in Canada, it is arguable whether restorative justice 
processes targeted at unintentional non-compliance with the law will promote 
general deterrence. Companies may adopt policies in compliance with the law, yet 
violations of the law can occur without fault (strict liability offences). In these 
circumstances, it doubtful whether companies who choose to engage in the 
wrongdoing are ‘restored' by engaging in a restorative justice process to 
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acknowledge the responsibility of the corporate body and be ‘remorseful and 
demonstrate a sincere interest in ‘repairing the wrong.'959 
 
Additionally, Spalding misunderstands and does not clarify which theoretical 
approach to restorative justice he is basing his framework on, nor defines what 
approaches to deterrence are currently being followed under the law, except stating 
that it is based on a cost-benefit analysis.960 For instance, he fails to distinguish 
between rehabilitation and restoration. He asserts,  
 
The criminal theory provides three basic possibilities: deterrence, retribution 
and rehabilitation/restoration…(RJ) emerged in the 1970s in response to 
widespread perceptions that the criminal justice system ‘neither effectively 
deterred crime nor successfully rehabilitated offenders.'961  
 
Using ‘rehabilitation/restoration' evidence that Spalding has not carefully examined 
existent theories of punishment. As Chapter 1 discussed, it is clear that the 
Sentencing Commission Guidelines do not include restorative justice principles. 
Additionally, he argues that deterrence is one-dimensional because it is offender-
centric whilst restoration is three-dimensional.962 As discussed in previous chapters, 
a number of modern rehabilitation theories of punishment are offender-centric, 
whilst modern deterrence theories of punishment aim for specific and general 
deterrence. Applying retribution theory (without identifying which retributive theory 
of punishment he is referring to), he states that companies would be punished 
because they deserve punishment, rather than due to an activity where the costs to 
society are higher than benefits to society as a result of the crime (deterrence theory). 
He states that just desert fails in the context of bribery, where crime reduction and 
taking count of general deterrence is essential.963  
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Additionally, many difficulties arise from Braithwaite’s proposals. His early 
publication, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation, advances the general 
premise of ‘all conflicts have always been resolved through restorative justice',' 
‘restorative justice works – it worked in Japan, Australia, the UK, and the USA!' He 
advances the advantages of ‘restorative justice' through existent practices, naming 
them ‘restorative measures'. Any practice defined as a restorative practice or fitting 
within the restorative justice label should define its aims and how its aims ought to 
be achieved, and how it fits within the criminal justice system, to have the potential 
of being a restorative measure. Do all case studies define ‘dialogue' and ‘persuasion' 
the same way, and are the outcomes parallel? That is important for assessing their 
effectiveness. 
 
Looking back at his definition of restorative justice, it is  ‘a process where all the 
stakeholders affected by an injustice have an opportunity to discuss how they have 
been affected by the injustice and decide what should be done to repair the harm.’964 
Many questions emerge: How is ‘dialogue and persuasion’ a form of restorative 
justice, and if it is a new form of restorative justice, do all the case studies meet the 
theoretical foundations of this new form of restorative justice? What is the process 
of restoration? Is there a consistent process of identifying the stakeholders? How is 
restoration achieved? Are these restorative measures used to address civil wrongs or 
criminal wrongs?  
 
Braithwaite does not explain the laws of the jurisdictions he is assessing (Japan, 
Australia, United States, United Kingdom) to clarify whether the companies were 
violating a civil law or a criminal law, and how restorative justice ‘dialogues’ and 
‘persuasion’ were a better mechanism than enforcing formal sanctions and/or 
punishment in some of the circumstances. Additionally, Braithwaite fails to explain 
how ‘persuasion’ and ‘dialogue’ are restorative measures, and generalises their 
application to reach a conclusion that ‘restorative justice’ has always been used to 
regulate companies and prevent corporate crime.  
 
Braithwaite argues that restorative justice was the traditional way to deal with 
conflicts before that right was displaced by the state, implying that restorative justice 
could appropriately deal with all conflicts, and should work to deal with all conflicts, 
including serious and complex crimes. If this stands true, then that creates many gaps 
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in his hybrid theory that integrates restorative justice, deterrence and incapacitation, 
advanced in a later publication in 2004.965 It is even more incoherent to claim that 
restorative justice was the traditional way that societies dealt with their conflicts, and 
then advance a theory that uses deterrence and incapacitation as a back-up measure 
when restorative justice does not work.966 
 
He states that ‘it is not a static triage theory that says these are the cases that are 
suitable for restorative justice, and these are the more serious matters we must deter 
or incapacitate,’967 yet the hierarchy of his model suggests otherwise. Restorative 
justice would be applied in cases where the actor is ‘virtuous,'968 followed by 
deterrence-based measures applied to ‘rational actors', and lastly, incapacitation 
would be enforced for ‘incompetent or irrational actors.'969 It is not clear why 
incapacitation is seen as a tougher approach than deterrence and restoration.  
 
If Braithwaite emphasises the importance of persuasion and dialogue in preventing 
corporate misbehaviours,970 why is it an alternative informal measure rather than an 
integral part to a theory of punishment? Additionally, incapacitation is not a theory 
of punishment because it fails to recognise that crime may occur following 
prosecution, amongst other reasons. Incapacitation is a form of deterrence alongside 
reform and fear.971  
 
Accordingly, the theory can be interpreted as a deterrence theory of punishment. In 
other words, Braithwaite’s model is better understood as a deterrence theory of 
punishment to address white-collar crime. It is not a hybrid theory of punishment 
and does not address corporate crime.  
 
It is also worth noting that Braithwaite highlights the importance of rehabilitation to 
a theory of punishment for companies in some of his other scholarly articles.972 In an 
article rejecting retribution as a penal aim, he proposes,  
 
                                                           
965 Braithwaite, ‘Restorative Justice and De-Professionalization’ (n 916). 
966 See Braithwaite ‘Restorative Justice’ (n 766). 
967 Braithwaite, ‘Restorative Justice and De-Professionalization’ (n 916) 29. 
968 Braithwaite implies that companies owe moral duties like individuals. 
969 J Braithwaite, ‘Restorative Justice and De-Professionalization’ (n 916) 29. 
970 Braithwaite does not clarify whether the corporate misbehaviours are civil law or criminal law 
violations. 
971 See Chapter 3, section 2.2.2; Brooks, Punishment (n 13) 37. 
972 Braithwaite and Geis (n 303) 309. 
  
192 
Even though rehabilitation has failed as a doctrine for the control of 
traditional crime, it can succeed with corporate crime…it has been argued 
that the largely discredited doctrines of crime control by public disgrace, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation could become highly 
successful when applied to corporate crime.973  
 
Rehabilitation is not recognised or rejected in his later publications on the 
‘democratic de-professionalization' theory and punishment model, nor is ‘public 
disgrace' explained or defined in the article. Is that a form of restorative justice or 
another theory? Not acknowledging rehabilitation as a penal aim and failing to define 
‘what counts as a restorative justice measure' are the main flaws in Braithwaite's 
proposals. 
 
As Daly states, ‘there are many stories to [restorative justice] and no real one.’974 
The gaps in existent models place limitations on advancing a broader application of 
restorative justice, through restoratively-oriented policies, laws, and programmes, to 
address corporate misbehaviour. Nevertheless, as this thesis has sought to achieve, 
finding answers to the justifying aims of punishment and how punishment ought to 
be distributed is profound to presenting a compelling liability and sentencing model 
to address corporate crime. A theory of punishment for companies should define 
when the corporate entity and when individuals within the corporate entity will be 
held liable. Defining the aims of the restoratively-oriented process, programme, or 
legal measure, in theory, is important to its practical coherence and in understanding 
how restorative justice will operate in practice.  
 
Having justified corporate crime as ‘team member responsibility’ in Chapter 1, this 
thesis defines circumstances in which violations of the law would be imputed to the 
corporate entity.975 This thesis focuses on prosecuting the corporate entity. There are 
also circumstances where individual criminal liability would be imposed in addition 
to corporate criminal liability. Companies should not be put in a position that enables 
them to pay their way out of a crime. Braithwaite's ‘extended accountability' 
proposal suggests ‘selling out' individuals within the company to avoid criminal 
prosecution. It is also not viable to reject corporate criminal liability or limit its 
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applications to avoid complex investigations and save costs.976 It is better to set the 
foundations through defining whether the corporate entity should be responsible and 
when a violation of the criminal law warrants corporate punishment and then work 
on ways to improve its enforcement. Additionally, defining the understanding and 
conceptualisation of restorative justice could help in providing a multidimensional 
understanding of why companies commit a crime and how they can be sentenced. 
The same applies to agree on the viable approaches to retribution, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, to form an understanding of the appropriate standards of liability and 
sentencing processes. The next chapter of the thesis will address the latter point.  
 
The second limitation relates to the current categorisation of restorative justice as an 
alternative to punishment, hence if used, will allow companies to avoid a criminal 
conviction.  
 
Braithwaite views restorative justice as an informal alternative to punishment, 
demonstrated through self-regulation methods and regulation through expert 
bodies.977 Spalding offers a restoratively-oriented DPA that considers stakeholder 
interests, including the offender’s interests. The company would not be charged with 
a criminal conviction if it meets its duties under the contract.978  
 
Should companies be provided with the opportunity to avoid punishment when they 
commit crimes?  Braithwaite states that certainty of punishment is more deterrent 
than the severity of punishment. Risk of exposure and loss of reputation incur social 
costs on the senior managers of the company.979 The community’s involvement in 
the restoration process will deter both the specific company from committing future 
crimes (specific deterrence) and other companies within the industry (general 
deterrence).980 Moreover, Braithwaite has placed restorative justice as one way of 
targeting corporate crime. He recognises that restorative justice does not work for all 
types of offenders. His theory of ‘democratic professionalism’ uses deterrence and 
incapacitation as a backup when restorative justice does not work.981  Even if the 
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process results in no criminal conviction, recognition of wrongdoing in a public 
forum and public apologies can be punitive.982  
 
The Ministry of Environment in British Columbia markets Trail Teck Company’s 
restorative justice forum as a notable example of how restorative justice is beneficial 
to addressing corporate crime, stating ‘[i]n the end, Teck agreed to all 
recommendations sought by the Ministry of Environment and Climate Strategy and 
then looked internally for additional actions to avoid future discharges. What could 
have taken years in the criminal justice system took only 33 days to complete.’983 An 
informal avenue to resolving a crime that Teck did not intent on committing resulted 
in benefits to the community and the company. A simple search of the company, 
Teck Metals Ltd., however, reveals various violations by the company in Canada 
and other jurisdictions since 2010.984  
 
Going back to the inquiry above- should companies be provided with the opportunity 
to avoid punishment when they commit crimes? Companies can manipulate the 
restorative justice process to avoid a criminal conviction. Corporate crime is often 
more serious than crimes committed by individuals.  George Manbiot compellingly 
argues for prosecuting companies for environmental crimes,  
 
There are no effective safeguards preventing …companies…from wreaking 
havoc for the sake of profit or power. Though their actions may lead to the 
death of millions, they know they can't be touched. When governments 
collaborate…how can such atrocities be prevented? Citizens can pursue civil 
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suits if they can find the money and time, but the worst a company will face 
is fine or compensation payments. None of its executives [are] prosecuted, 
though they may profit enormously from murderous destruction. They can 
continue their assaults on the living planet.’985  
 
There are two different justice systems for companies and individuals; companies 
can acquire distinctive political and legal positions. Serious crimes like corporate 
crime deserve harsh punishment, and companies should not be able to ‘talk’ their 
way out of a crime. Recent research reveals that following the Paris Agreement, the 
five largest publicly traded oil and gas companies have invested funds to mislead 
climate-related branding to maintain their licenses to operate and grow their 
operations.986 BP continuously advances a message of providing a ‘cleaner, greener, 
smarter energy,’ yet evidence shows that it has lobbied the Trump Administration 
against methane regulations.987  
 
Chapter 1 discussed difficulties in prosecuting companies under current corporate 
criminal liability laws.  Laws that provide avenues to companies to avoid a criminal 
conviction is counterproductive to increasing public confidence in the criminal 
justice system and narrowing the equality gap between individuals and companies. 
Companies can manipulate the opportunities provided by restorative justice and use 
them as a marketing strategy to further their own interests. It is difficult to assess 
their whether they are engaging in the process in an honest manner, to be held 
accountable for their wrongdoing, and empower dialogue if such exists in an 
informal setting and an alternative to punishment.  
 
The conceptualisation of restorative justice as a theory about punishment could help 
overcome the view of restorative justice as a ‘soft option’ and as a diversion from 
the criminal justice system. While deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and 
‘cooperative approaches to social control may be thought of as opposing or 
contradictory systems…they are best regarded as complementary or viewed as ends 
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of a continuum where there is some shared or common middle ground.’988 Section 
3.4 and Chapter 6 will seek to address this in more detail. For now, restorative justice, 
if conceptualised as a theory about punishment, is not necessarily a soft option for 
companies; they are required to actively resolve the harms resulting from the crime 
instead of ‘buying their way’ out of an offence. 
 
The last limitation to restorative justice relates to centralising the rights of ‘powerful’ 
offenders as stakeholders of the offence. One may argue that goes against the spirit 
of restorative justice to consider the rights of ‘large companies’ and balance them 
with the rights of individuals and communities impacted by the offence. In other 
words, restorative justice should not take into account the rights of ‘the offender’, 
here the company, but rather just centralise the rights of the ‘people and 
communities.’989 Umbreit et al. argue that Spalding's framework ‘lacks a central 
component that gives restorative processes their primary power, namely, empowered 
dialogue between the parties…[to] generate the internal motivation for offenders to 
make positive amends and not repeat future [offences].'990 Spalding does not clarify 
the process of communicating the needs of the victims and other stakeholders to 
reach conclusions on how restoration would be achieved.  
 
Nevertheless, these limitations could be addressed and ‘simply [invites] further work 
in the context of actual practice.’991 Going back the conceptualisation of restorative 
justice in Section 2.4 is a preliminary way of addressing this concern. Restorative 
justice provides a multi-dimensional way of understanding crime, justice, and 
punishment. As Umbreit et al states, ‘restorative justice is grounded in [humanising] 
the justice process.’992 Restorative justice allows the legal process, policy, or 
programme to consider the rights of all the stakeholders. In Canada, a trained and 
impartial facilitator is appointed by the Community Environmental Justice Forum to 
select the stakeholders of the offence. He conducts a pre-forum meeting with 
company representatives and interviews with prospective community members.993 
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Thus, a framework could be developed to appoint neutral expert facilitators and 
adopt guidelines that balance the rights of all the stakeholders. Taking into account 
the rights of offenders should be afforded by the law and is also beneficial for the 
long-term success of the company and other companies in the industry. These 
benefits include lowering the chances of further violations of the law and 
encouraging norm compliant behaviour by companies.  
 
4.2.2. The Benefits of Applying Restorative Justice to Corporate Crime  
  
The subsection focuses on two benefits of applying restorative justice to corporate 
crime.  
First, restorative justice ‘could be expanded throughout all levels of the justice 
system…[and] has found applications for situations of community problem-
solving.’994 Restorative justice theoretically provides a better understanding of the 
rights and needs of the victims and other stakeholders impacted by the crime 
committed by a corporate body.  
 
As discussed above, Corporate misbehaviours often impact individuals at a macro-
level and may have a direct and indirect impact on the victims and community. A 
noteworthy example is the case of Navassa County, where environmental law 
violations resulted in the largest fine settlement between the United States 
Government and a company. It resulted in a $13 million clean-up fund, and possibly 
an additional $9 million to help restore wildlife and natural resources in a small town 
in North Carolina, named Navassa County. However, it did not involve the 
community affected in collaborating with the state on how the funds ought to be 
allocated to restore the damages done by the company. The impacts included 
financial losses, loss of heritage of the citizens as farmers, health impacts on crops 
and citizens of the community, and continuous violations by further companies. The 
citizens were still left unsettled after the Government has decided on how the funds 
should be spent. Residents requested information on the impact of the contamination 
on their health and water quality, whether jobs related to the clean-up would be given 
to residents, and whether the process would be transparent. One resident stated, ‘right 
now we're concentrating on the fish and the bugs and the birds, and all of that is 
good, but we are concerned about the humans that have been affected by this 
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contaminant.’  Another resident who was a seventh-generation resident expressed, 
‘rice plantations produced our culture... We're trying to save some of that heritage.’ 
However, officials responded that such inquiries are beyond the scope of their 
duties.995  
 
Restoratively oriented policies and laws would aim at bridging the ‘disparities in 
outcome and injustice,’ and effect a change in a ‘system that relies heavily on inside 
information and testimonies’ to collect evidence on the wrongdoing.996 As Aersten 
states, ‘all victims want to talk to the [company].’997 Harm by corporate 
misbehaviour, which results from violations by companies of civil and criminal law 
(however categorised by the law in the specific jurisdiction), results in different types 
of harm: physical harm (‘death, disability, disease’),998 financial or economic harm 
(‘costs of medical care and revalidation, and loss of income’),999 and/or 
psychological harm (‘uncertainty of the consequences, lack of clarity and 
transparency with regard to responsibilities and accountability, and the prolonged 
absence of financial compensation').1000 From here, a quote by Spalding is worth 
noting. He asserts, 
 
A restoratively oriented process and sentencing practice will facilitate ‘a 
process of dialogue and reform [that] can educate the public on the nature of 
corruption, induce the company to implement necessary reforms, [penalise] 
the company in ways that benefit the local community, and work toward 
creating a set of [norm compliant] business practices.1001  
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Spalding validly argues that involving the stakeholders will assist in understanding 
the impact of the crime and finding solutions to remedy the harms resulting from the 
bribery. Hence, ‘restorative justice processes offer non-monetary restoration for 
victims as well.’1002 The measures suggested by Spalding would assist in forcing the 
companies to confront the stakeholders it has harmed. Victims are restored through 
remediation (loan programme) and prevention (training centre and political 
pressure). Through these measures, victims' rights are remedied and the company 
would be able to repair its reputation and goodwill in the jurisdiction it committed 
the criminal act in.1003 The fine is greater than a traditional fine but is reduced by 
projects that are paid towards the community and the steps the company takes to 
remedy its wrongs.1004 His propositions could also apply in practice to deal with other 
criminal law violations, and contributes to ideas on developing restoratively oriented 
processes, policies, and programmes for criminal law violations by companies. 
 
Second, as well as securing the rights of the victims and other stakeholders impacted 
by the offence by involving them in the process, restorative justice also has benefits 
to the offender in the long term. Devi-McGleish and Cox advocate for restorative 
justice as an alternative to punishing white-collar criminals and fraud within 
companies. They state,  
 
If utilised efficiently, [restorative justice] could provide… behavioural 
change for corporate and business cultures…[and] encouraging businesses 
to consider their offending behaviour and the harm it has caused may inspire 
some behavioural change and provide more reasonable and ethical work 
practices and behaviour resulting in community-wide benefits.1005 
 
Holding companies accountable for their actions by actively taking steps to 
understand the impact of the harm caused by their actions has the potential to build 
public confidence in the company and influence their decision-making processes. 
Building on corporate criminal liability as team member responsibility, it could help 
members within companies reassess their priorities and whether they want to 
continue being part of the corporate entity.1006  
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Thomas further argues that restorative justice could also allow companies to achieve 
further goals, like corporate social responsibility.1007 Corporate social responsibility 
‘[encourages] dialogue, participation and development of initiatives to improve the 
societal conditions that result from a company’s actions.’1008 The company's 
performance long-term profitability requires active involvement in society. Zadek 
identifies five stages to achieve ‘corporate responsibility': defensive, compliant, 
managerial, strategic, and civil. At the defensive stage, the company does not take 
responsibility for addressing any issues that will impact short-term performance. At 
the civil stage, the company recurrently invests in promoting its brand to ‘enhance 
its long-term economic value and [realise] gains through collective action.’1009 
Restoratively-oriented legal mechanisms could help companies that violated the law 
and other companies understand the impact of restoring and building long term 
relationships with the community. 
  
Future business decisions may not be solely based on cutting costs and maximising 
profits. Expectations from companies change with time, given the emergence of new 
services and technological developments, hence presenting further challenges for 
companies to comply with the law. The growth of the company also brings upon new 
challenges in maintaining the standards expected by the law. Involving expert bodies 
to reinforce the expected standards of the company, specific to its current stage of 
growth and industry it operates in, to prevent future violations, is advantageous to 
all stakeholders. Involving the stakeholders to encourage a greater understanding of 
the circumstances that led to the wrongdoing, the impact of the wrongdoing on 
different parties, and how the conflict could be resolved to remedy the harm resulting 
from the wrongdoing, will likely maximise the chances of implementing changes in 
compliance with the law by the company and other companies in the same industry. 
 
Overall, section 4.2 evaluated the potential benefits and limitations of applying 
restorative justice to address corporate crime. The limitations of restorative justice 
were addressed. If restorative justice is set within a clear theoretical framework, it 
has the potential to positively contribute to understanding corporate crime and how 
it should be punished.  
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4.3 How Can Restorative Contribute to a Theory of Punishment for Companies? 
 
This section collates the discussions in the chapter to convey how restorative justice 
is well suited for dealing with corporate crime and could contribute towards 
improving corporate behaviour. 
 
Restorative justice provides a multi-dimensional understanding of corporate crime 
and how it should be punished –by taking into account the interests of all 
stakeholders, it seeks to reach an understanding of the causes of corporate crime, the 
impact of a corporate crime on the identified stakeholders, and how the short- and 
long-term harm resulting from the crime can be remedied. As to the distribution of 
punishment, one ought to take into account the process of sentencing the company 
and the amount of punishment that should be imposed. The focus is on resolving the 
conflict resulting from the crime, which is a broader view than simply dealing with 
the offender. This opens the door to gaining knowledge on the various factors that 
may lead the company to commit a crime, rather than accepting one view. This is 
crucial in the context of companies: companies change their behaviour in response 
to economic circumstances, and the decisions of a company vary in accordance to 
the type of company and the industry it operates in, thus, to be meaningful, 
punishment ought to identify and target the cause(s) of the offence. 
 
With regards to the imposition of punishment, it should aim to advance the ‘project 
of restoration’,1010 and to amend the harmed relationships between the stakeholders 
of the crime. Restoration should be an aim reflected in liability standards set out in 
the law, processes of sentencing and sentencing guidelines, and not be a diversion 
from the criminal justice system. This requires punishment that aims to encourage 
the offender to comply with the law, thereby contributing to a reduction in the levels 
of crime in the long term. With regards to the prosecution process, encouraging input 
from various stakeholders places the resulting problem, rather than the offender, at 
the centre of the discussion. This advantageously lessens the power imbalances 
between the company and other stakeholders, because all stakeholders can be 
involved in the criminal justice process.1011  
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Incorporating restoration means that offenders would have to acknowledge their 
responsibility to the offence and express remorse for their crimes. There are 
promising potentials to Spalding’s proposals: imposing a downward fine on 
companies in combination with completing a report that is publicised to 
acknowledge the reasons for committing the offence; investing in projects in the 
community related to the criminal activity; hiring independent monitors and 
completing required changes to compliance programmes; and/or writing a report can 
help the company comply with laws in the long run.1012 This could inspire a 
sentencing model that is based on restoration. This programme would be 
advantageous in circumstances where the company is a willing participant and 
acknowledges the guilt of the crime.  
 
Thus far, the thesis has addressed the potential for specific approaches to retribution, 
deterrence, and rehabilitation to contribute to a theory of punishment for companies. 
Restoration could also be an integral principle in a theory of punishment for 
companies. The next chapter will unravel how these propositions could be structured 
and implemented within a legal framework. 
 
5 Conclusion  
 
The chapter aimed to understand restorative justice, and how its principles could 
apply to control corporate crime. Current laws have failed to effectively create norm 
compliant behaviour by companies, and the emergence of various structures and 
priorities of companies have increased the difficulty for regulation and 
enforcement.1013 Attitudes of companies towards compliance and non-compliance 
with criminal laws vary with changing economic circumstances, and responding to 
corporate crime with a restoratively-oriented multi-dimensional model is more 
suitable than simply advancing deterrence/retribution.1014 
 
Section 2 discussed the historical significance of restorative justice, and the 
contextualisation of restorative justice in literature and practice – as a theory of 
punishment or an alternative to punishment. It discussed three restorative 
                                                           
1012 Spalding (n 933) 404-5. 
1013 Hope M. Babcock, ‘Corporate Environmental Social Responsibility: Corporate “Greenwashing” or 
a Corporate Culture Game Changer?’ (2010) 21 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 10. 
1014 Heinz Messmer and Hans-Uwe Otto (eds), Restorative Justice on Trial: Pitfalls and Potentials of 
Victim-Offender Mediation—International Research Perspectives (Springer Science & Business Media 
2013) 1. 
  
203 
programmes: victim-offender mediation, conferencing, and sentencing circles. 
Accordingly, it presented a working definition of restorative justice.   
 
Section 3 evaluated the five principles of restorative justice in light of the definition 
advanced in Section 2.4. Section 4 engaged with existent literature on restorative 
justice and the regulation or punishment of corporate misbehaviour. It explored and 
evaluated three propositions and models relating to restorative justice and corporate 
misbehaviour, and illustrated how the understanding of restorative justice outlined 
in Section 2.4 could overcome the limitations of the models.  
 
The last subsection collated the proposals presented throughout the chapter to 
illustrate how restorative justice is well suited to understanding and dealing with 
corporate crime and improving corporate misbehaviour. The aim of restoration 
accounts for changing criminal behaviour and aims at resolving the harm from the 
crime through a multi-dimensional and problem-solving angle.  As to the distribution 
of punishment, the penal aims discussed in the previous chapters could be targeted 
to advance the aim of restoration. The next chapter considers how the different penal 
aims can work together with restoration under a single framework. 
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Chapter Six 
 
The Unified Theory of Punishment  
 
 
1 Introduction  
 
Previous chapters explored the various theoretical groundings and practices of 
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and restoration. It is now clear that a ‘one size 
fit approach’ to punishment is problematic. Previous chapters have explored hybrid 
theories of punishment, defined as ‘alternative theories [of punishment] that bring 
together elements of the theories… into new combinations.’1015 They distinctively 
bridge theories of punishment that aim to advance one goal.1016 The hybrid theories 
explored are Rawls and Hart's negative retribution theory combining deterrence and 
retribution; Duff’s communicative theory of punishment combining deterrence and 
retribution; Jean Hampton’s moral education theory; and Braithwaite’s hybrid theory 
of punishment that includes restorative justice.1017 The theories have failed to 
demonstrate how the goals of punishment could work under one single framework, 
resulting in the possibility of being construed as advancing one aim of punishment. 
Notably, Jean Hampton’s moral education theory is clearly a rehabilitation theory 
rather than a hybrid theory of punishment. 
 
The chapter will collate the proposals in previous chapters to advance a theory of 
punishment for companies. The need for a theory of punishment that is theoretically 
and practically coherent, i.e. responds to crime in a multidimensional manner; takes 
account of the fast-changing nature of corporate misconduct and rise of international 
transactions and types of companies; and encourages norm-compliant behaviour, is 
pivotal.  
 
Restorative justice, defined in section 2.4 of Chapter 5, can address these concerns. 
Moreover, there is potential for this understanding of restorative justice to fit within 
an alternative hybrid theory of punishment, named the Unified Theory of 
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Punishment (Hereinafter ‘the UTP’).1018 Distinctively, the UTP collates retribution, 
deterrence and rehabilitation under one framework. Punitive restoration is advanced 
as one form that the theory might take.1019 The chapter will look back at proposals 
and discussions in previous chapters to study the merits of the UTP in the context of 
corporate crime. Section 2 explores the foundational principles of the UTP in the 
context of companies. It recommends changes to the aims of punishments and the 
sentencing process. Section 3 discusses potential challenges to the UTP. 
 
2  SOC: Restorative Justice, The Theory, and Corporate Crime   
 
Brooks advances an alternative theory of punishment named the UTP.1020 To 
philosophically support the UTP, he explains that Hegel, often misinterpreted as 
advancing a retributivist theory, innovatively collates different penal aims including 
retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation, under one broad theory of punishment.1021 
Additionally, he finds support to his theory through the works of Bosanquet, Bradley, 
Green, and Seth (The British Idealists) in the late Nineteenth century. Each rejects 
the idea that different penal aims are mutually exclusive and support Hegel's 
proposal that punishment should collate multiple penal aims.1022  
 
Brooks develops a theory that ‘offers a compelling hybrid theory of punitive 
restoration that brings together multiple penal goals into a coherent and unified 
theory.’1023 It structures a framework to unify these goals. He states,  
 
[Punishment] need not be either retributivist, deterrent, or rehabilitative, but all 
at once. Punishment aims at the restoration and protection of our rights. The 
penal outcome justified is what best enables restoration to be secured.1024 
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One form that the UTP might take is ‘punitive restoration’ or ‘restoring rights in the 
context of a stakeholder society.’1025 In 2018, Brooks states that punitive restoration 
is a ‘single type of approach taking a conference setting.’1026 Deterrence, retribution, 
and rehabilitation should be seen as ‘different components of one unified theory of 
punishment…that fit together in an unequal way.’1027 The UTP demonstrates how 
multiple penal aims are compatible rather than showing how different theory of 
punishment could be combined under a single framework.1028 Compellingly, 
punishment is not imposed to protect the rights of the state at the expense of the 
rights of individuals within the state.1029  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, a distinctive view of restorative justice is adopted, in 
line with the definition of restorative justice defined in section 2.4 of Chapter 5. 
Restorative justice is a conception of justice. It can be contextualised as an instance 
of punishment. It seeks to understand the causes of crime, the impact of a crime on 
different parties (the offender, victim, and the community, if applicable), and how 
the harm resulting from a crime can be remedied. The principles of restorative justice 
are restoration; voluntarism; neutrality; safety; accessibility; and respect.1030 The 
principles of restorative justice encourage implementing policies, laws, and/or 
processes (including liability standards and sentencing practices) that identify and 
address the needs of the stakeholders. Accordingly, restorative justice is not 
necessarily an incomplete theory of punishment nor is punitive restoration reduced 
to one form, particularly a conference setting.1031 Restorative justice is better 
understood as a conglomerate of principles providing a multidimensional and 
broader understanding of the justifying aims of punishment and the distribution of 
punishment, where stakeholder interests ought to be taken into account.  
 
The understanding of The UTP in line with the advanced restorative justice 
definition reflects a SOC approach to punishment. It is the starting point to any 
meaningful reforms to corporate criminal liability standards, and sentencing 
processes and methods. Referring back to the elements of a theory of punishment in 
the introduction of the thesis, the discussion progresses to examine these elements in 
the context of corporate crime. 
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2.1 The Aims of Punishment 
 
The UTP aims to build a new framework that combines persuasive ideas from 
retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation to achieve a broader aim that involves 
different parties to address the impact of the criminal act. According to restorative 
justice and the UTP, a restoratively-oriented legal system requires identifying the 
causes of crime and responding to a crime in the context of a broad goal of protecting 
the rights of individuals in a stakeholder society. 
 
2.1.1 Why do Companies Commit Crime? 
 
Crime is related to ‘failure of individuals to see themselves as having a stake in their 
political community.’1032 Offenders believe laws do not relate to them because of 
their distinctive legal and political positions or the lack of legal and political 
positions in the community. These propositions find support through Hegel, who 
states that disassociation of individuals from their community may stem from 
poverty or excess wealth.1033 This may lead some, but not all individuals, to opt out 
of their position in the society.1034 The ‘stakeholder society' idea would propose 
viewing crime as violations against individuals in society rather than solely against 
the state and would help individuals to not disassociate from society. In other words, 
the state, through its laws, should aim to protect the rights of individuals and not set 
laws that compromise such rights nor solely aim to protect the state. In the long term, 
this would lessen the proportion of individuals not perceiving themselves as lacking 
a stake in the community, increase public confidence, and reduce recidivism.1035  
 
Companies have domestic and international legal rights, and also have the ability to 
operate in virtual locations and obtain material and political resources beyond a 
single individual in society. Companies also have political influences in the 
government, can fund campaigns, promote social causes, and advertise their 
products and services.1036 This theoretically gives some companies distinctive legal 
and political positions that may lead them to disassociate from the society, and 
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believe that they could avoid prosecution. This may also be enhanced by the current 
difficulties of prosecuting companies under current corporate criminal liability laws. 
Chapter 1 discussed reforms to current liability standards in consideration of these 
arguments.  
 
This idea is broader than the current causes of crime as perceived by other theories 
of punishment. Retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence theories of punishment 
provide partial understandings of what drives some companies to commit crimes, 
and all fit in within a common and broader idea explained above. According to many 
deterrence theoretical approaches, companies engage in crime because they calculate 
the potential benefits of crime to be higher than its costs.1037 Companies may violate 
criminal laws due to defective compliance systems and internal procedures, leading 
to interference with the rights of others, and punishment should correspondently be 
imposed as just deserts.1038 Rehabilitation informs the theory by stating that crime 
could arise from defective control systems, insufficient accounts, poor 
communication, and inadequate operating procedures. This may be due to turning a 
blind eye or taking cost-saving measures reflecting managerial negligence or 
intent.1039 Therefore, the understanding of restorative justice has allowed a 
multidimensional rather than a partial understanding of the causes of punishment. 
Moreover, the UTP includes ideas from other approaches to punishment and adopts 
them collectively under one framework.   
 
2.2.2 Why Should Companies be Punished? 
 
Punishment is a response to crime, and crime and punishment should be understood 
in relation to each other. Brooks states, ‘if we cannot justify a particular act or 
omission, then we cannot justify its punishment. There can be no just punishment to 
an unjust crime.’1040 Justifying the aims of criminalising conduct results in just 
punishments. The aim of punishment is to restore and protect individuals' rights 
while making offenders feel they have a stake in society. Brooks emphasises that 
crimes are ‘violations that threaten the substantial freedom protected by law.'1041 Any 
community requires a legal system, set through procedures and rules, to mediate 
conflicts between members of the community. The legal system aims to protect 
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individual legal rights as members of the community. It follows that some rights, 
like the right to life, affords more protection than other rights like the protection of 
private property.1042 From here, laws should aim to protect individual legal rights 
rather than be based on morality.1043 These ideas are parallel to what is argued by 
James Seth, as referred to in Brooks’ article. He states,  
 
[The] view of the object of punishment gives the true measure of its amount. 
This is found not in the amount of moral depravity which the crime reveals, but 
in the importance of the right violated, relatively to the system of rights of which 
it forms a part.1044  
 
The UTP is different from what is argued by British Idealists that understand crimes 
as ‘threats to individual rights’ requiring punishment to protect such rights and 
safeguard the public from criminal conduct.1045 Rather, there is interconnectivity 
between rights, where criminalisation and punishment makes crime necessary but 
not a sufficient condition to punishment, and should only be imposed when justified. 
This view would exclude punishment of conduct just because it is immoral.1046 
 
Accordingly, the UTP adopts principles recognised by some theoretical approaches 
to retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation principles. The law punishes companies 
that fail to respect the rights of individuals.1047 Legal retribution punishes companies 
that violate the law regardless of whether it was intentional or not, as long as it 
interfered with the rights of other individuals. According to deterrence, companies 
should be punished to ensure they do not commit future crimes at the expense of the 
political community. Rehabilitation also informs the theory because companies 
should also be punished in a way that would allow them to redress their wrongdoing 
and remediate any rights violations. Companies who do not have norm compliant 
processes should be punished if it results in the violation of the rights of other 
individuals. Deterrence and rehabilitation justify punishment for the reduction of 
future levels of crime. This comes in line with ideas explored in Chapter 1 relating 
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to Lee’s Corporate Criminal Responsibility.1048 Parallel to the stakeholder theory, 
corporate criminal responsibility is not related to companies owing moral 
responsibilities. It is the ‘shared responsibility of the members of the incorporated 
enterprise for wrongdoing by one or more of its members, [and where] under certain 
conditions, the members of a team bear shared responsibility for the wrongdoing of 
their teammates.’1049 Corporate criminal liability is ‘team member responsibility’. 
The purpose of criminalising corporate misconduct is to alert companies that 
misconduct could create a setback to the achievement of corporate goals.1050  
 
 
2.2.3 What Wrongs Should Be Criminal? 
 
Acts should be criminal if they violate the rights of individuals in a stakeholder 
society.1051 Brooks argues, ‘punishment… [is] a reaction to crime, not a reaction to 
immorality.’1052 Some traffic offences are justified as criminal not because they are 
immoral but because they may lead to rights being violated.1053 Consequently, 
punishment is distributed in accordance with the rights violated and should be set in 
proportion to the centrality of rights violated. In the context of ‘standard’ offences 
like murder, assault, or theft, it is assumed, at first instance, that assault should incur 
a higher sentence than theft. There are still circumstances in which theft could afford 
a higher sentence than assault.1054 Brooks finds support for his ‘centrality of rights’ 
proposal through Seth’s statement, as referred to in Brooks article: ‘the measure of 
punishment is, in short, the measure of social necessity, and this measure is a 
changing one.’1055 This comes in line with a later argument of imposing criminal 
laws only when necessary. Moreover, as opposed to legal moralism approaches, 
murder would always be punished more severally than theft but not because of its 
higher degree of immorality, but rather for violating a more central right. Punishment 
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of murder has changed over time from the death penalty to various imprisonment 
terms, reflecting that the centrality of rights is appropriately subject to change.1056 
 
There are circumstances where punishment would not be a sufficient response to 
criminal conduct, and the protection of individual fundamental rights, hence, should 
only be imposed if necessary, for the protection and restoration of rights. Punishing 
companies for violating the rights of individuals in a community considers and 
accepts different types of mens rea. This includes strict liability offences, negligence, 
knowledge, and intent. This is advantageously consistent with current laws in 
England and Wales and the United States. 
 
Additionally, it comes in line with proposals in Chapter 1 relating to separating 
morality from illegality, team member responsibility, and the broad identification 
doctrine for non-strict liability offences. The justification of punishment and 
standard of liability is set in accordance with Lee's Corporate Criminal 
Responsibility.1057 This is a standard of liability that accounts for the responsibility 
of team members acting as part of a team. Chapter 1 advanced a parallel corporate 
criminal liability standard model. 
 
The model is as follows: in relation to crimes requiring a mens rea of negligence, an 
organisation is a party to an offence if a senior officer departs from the reasonable 
standard of care expected to prevent a representative or representatives of the 
organisation, by way of act or omission, from being party to the offence. In relation 
to crimes with mens rea standards other than negligence, an organisation would be 
party to an offence if, with the intent to benefit the organisation, (a) a senior officer 
acting within the scope of their authority is party to the offence; (b) with the mental 
state required to be party to the offence and acting within the scope of their authority 
directs another representative of the organisation to act or make the omission 
specified in the offence; or (c) knowing the representative of the organisation is or 
about to be party to offence, does not take all reasonable measures to stop them from 
being a party to the offence.1058 
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The standard accounts for different types of corporate crimes and corporate 
offenders. Parallel to team member responsibility, it takes into consideration the 
possibility of delegation of duties by senior managers to avoid liability. It also rejects 
holding criminally liable for intended and unauthorised acts of employees, which 
may lead companies to be in positions where they could not be rehabilitated within 
the society or be encouraged to have a stake in the community. This addresses the 
lack of consideration by the American federal standard for reasonable steps that 
companies have taken to avoid violating the law. The balanced approach for mens 
rea offences is consistent with punitive restoration. It would encourage norm 
compliant behaviour and increase public confidence in the criminal justice system in 
the long term. 
 
2.3 Distribution of Punishment 
 
2.3.1 The Sentencing Process and Types of Punishment  
 
This subsection collates proposals in previous chapters to understand how the state 
deals with companies who have violated criminal laws and methods of punishment 
that are parallel to the UTP. As reiterated, punishment is a response to crime; crime 
and punishment should be understood in relation to each other.1059 Punishment is 
distributed through a restoratively oriented law, policy, and/or programme, in line 
with the understanding of restorative justice in section 2.4 of Chapter 5. Companies 
could commit crimes as a result of negligence, intent, or recklessness. Companies 
may also commit strict liability offences. The decision whether or not to prosecute 
lies on whether it is in the public interest to prosecute, informed by evidential 
sufficiency. Prosecutors would decide the following: no charge, proceed with a 
restorative agreement or prosecute through trial.   
 
Following the decision to charge a company, a company could be offered to enter 
into a restorative agreement. The company would retain a law firm to perform an 
independent investigation and report its factual findings. If agreement on the terms 
is not reached and/or a company does not wish to proceed with the agreement, the 
case would proceed through a normal trial. A company being aware of violating a 
criminal law can self-report, which would positively impact the process of 
prosecution through a restorative agreement. This would be in cases where the 
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companies genuinely adopt a proactive approach when the violation of the law 
became apparent to corporate management.1060  
  
Importantly, restorative agreements would replace current DPAs and would apply to 
advance punitive restoration.  Previous chapters have illustrated the changing nature 
of criminal law in the context of companies. Early cases recognising corporate 
criminal liability may have not theoretically explained its recognition, but saw it as 
an additional safeguard, in the interests of public policy, to ensure that companies 
are bought to justice and are stigmatised when subject to ‘punishment' when they fail 
to adhere to the laws of the state. The recognition of DPAs in the early 1990s in the 
United States, and in 2014 in England and Wales, reflects that the role of the criminal 
law is expanding. Companies are encouraged to self-report and settle rather than be 
prosecuted through a normal trial. This positively reflects the alignment between 
current measures and the UTP, through acceptance of a broader aim of punishment 
and different methods of punishment distribution, and advancing penal aims beyond 
retribution and deterrence. However, the current structure of DPAs in the context of 
a theoretically incoherent deterrence and retribution punishment model, 
disadvantageously allows companies to buy their way out of a crime. In other words, 
the process of DPAs as it stands focuses on the ability of companies to ‘payback', 
without holding any members of the companies accountable, nor is there consistency 
on how they are executed. As has been continually argued, enforcement of DPAs 
and sentencing practices without theoretical explanation has hindered the 
development of the law.  
 
In accordance with the understanding of restorative justice as an instance of 
punishment, the thesis advances the use of a new regime of ‘restorative agreements' 
as part of the sentencing process. They are distinctive from ‘deferred' prosecution 
agreements because they apply in a broader sense as part of the criminal justice 
process. This means that restorative agreements should no longer act as a method of 
disposal that falls short of a criminal conviction. For companies who do not wish to 
engage in such a process, the case would proceed to a normal trial process.  
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The motivation of being involved in a restorative agreement is as follows: The 
company would receive ‘cooperation credit’ through voluntarily disclosing the 
investigation report. If companies agree to self-report, disclose their wrongdoings 
from the outset, that would avoid lengthy proceedings. The prosecution would invite 
the company to enter an agreement with conditions on how the companies could 
restore the rights violated. Prosecutors would assign a fine ‘range’ which could be 
reduced in the long-term subject to the company agreeing to adopt a number of 
policies and taking a number of steps.1061 
 
The next question to consider is how restorative agreements work in practice. They 
would be based on the following preliminary guideline.  
 
When allegations arise, the prosecution would invite the company to enter into 
negotiations. The invitation letter would detail the alleged criminal misconduct, 
would invite the company to enter into a restorative agreement, and set a preliminary 
fine to inform the company that engagement in the restorative agreement may result 
in an incremental reduction of the fine or allocation of the fine as decided from the 
results of the findings of the investigation and the conference.  The company would 
have a deadline for replying to the negotiation invitation and acknowledging a 
willingness to engage in the process, with the understanding that choosing to not 
engage in the process would result in prosecution through a normal trial.  
 
The process of identifying the victims, offenders, and other stakeholders is uniform, 
yet it is important to acknowledge that each crime involves different stakeholders, 
and the number of stakeholders may differ from case to case. The process involves 
establishing a new governmental body, named the Corporate Justice Board 
(Hereinafter ‘CJB’). The new governmental body would recruit facilitators to 
conduct independent investigations, and prepare a report with their factual findings. 
The facilitators would also identify the respective victims and stakeholders of the 
particular crime. This would advantageously enable all parties, including the 
offenders, the victims and other stakeholders, to communicate the particulars of the 
offence and the impact of the crime on their particular interests. The company will 
likely appoint its own independent counsel to communicate with the respective 
facilitators. When appropriate, facilitators can hold a public inquiry in cases with 
large corporate misconducts to collect information regarding the impact of the crimes 
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on the victims and stakeholders, and report back prior to the conference with the 
appropriate actions to take to remedy the rights violated. 
 
Assuming that the company agrees to engage in the restorative process, the 
prosecutor's office would schedule the date of the conference and set deadlines for 
the CJB to appoint facilitators, and submit the report with its findings.   
 
The participants of the conference are as follows: the appointed facilitator from the 
CJB, independent counsel from the company, representatives from the company who 
are party to the crime, and where appropriate, a select of identified victims and 
stakeholders, as chosen by the facilitators.  
 
The conference would aim to and advice on actions that could be taken to remedy 
the harm done by the crime. Particularly, it aims to address reasons that led the 
company to engage in the criminal misconduct, ensure the company publicly 
acknowledges their wrongdoing in a statement and members of the community 
speaking for the purpose of reaching an understanding of the event. The prosecutor 
would hear the findings of the report and set terms of the restorative agreement, 
importantly identifying how the funds would be allocated. The terms of the 
agreement would also require the company to identify the specific representatives of 
the companies responsible for the crime. 
 
As discussed above, prosecutors would assign a preliminary fine when it invites the 
company to be involved in the negotiations. During the agreement, the prosecutor 
would reach an agreement on how punishment would be distributed. The next 
subsection discusses the application of proportionality in the prosecution process.  
 
The process would only be applicable in situations where victims, individuals within 
the company who are involved in the crime, and other stakeholders are identified; 
and the company in question would be willing to engage in the conference through 
admitting guilt. The process is punitive because it is part of the criminal justice 
process rather than a way for the company to avoid criminal prosecution.   
 
Companies that do not want to engage in restorative agreements would proceed 
through a normal trial. The next subsection discusses changes to sentencing in the 
trial. 
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2.3.2 Proportionality    
 
Punishments are set in proportion to the rights violated. This would depend on how 
the particular punishment would best protect and maintain the rights of individuals 
in a community. In other words, the principle of proportionality is applied in 
accordance with the centrality of the rights violated or threatened with the violation. 
The more central the rights are, the more severe the punishment.1062  
 
One important consideration is determining how central the rights are. The centrality 
of rights is subject to change with time, and the severity of punishment would depend 
on the type of crimes and corporate offenders.1063 Proportionality has ordinal and 
cardinal variants: ordinal proportionality provides that crimes that have the same 
level of seriousness should receive similar punishments, whilst cardinal 
proportionality broadly ensures that punishments are not too harsh or lenient.1064 
Each jurisdiction would define how such would be set, keeping in mind these 
principles. Although it may be argued that this flexibility creates uncertainty in the 
law, defining the framework for justifying the aims of punishment and how it would 
be distributed advantageously provides a long-term solution for addressing the vast 
amount of crimes and types of offenders. In other words, responding to crimes in a 
multidimensional manner is advantageous given the vast amount of corporate 
crimes, the heightening levels of corporate internationalisation, and the fast-
changing nature of corporate development and the increasing size, power and variety 
of corporate structures.1065  
 
Previous chapters have demonstrated that the principle of ‘proportionality' is 
inherent in all penal aims. Legal retribution provides for punishment to be 
proportional to the gravity of the offence (rather than the gravity of immorality as 
other approaches to retribution confer). In practice, this translates to the removal of 
gains derived through the commission of the offence.1066 Some approaches to 
deterrence set punishment in accordance with the seriousness of the crime, keeping 
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in mind the financial circumstances of the offender, harm, and culpability factors.1067  
Some rehabilitation approaches set punishment in accordance with the seriousness 
of the offence and in the context of a determinate sentence.1068 This supports the view 
that proportionality could be applied in a modified manner to ensure that offenders 
are ‘restored', and the rights of identified stakeholders are ‘restored'. This would 
depend on the circumstances, but limited punishment to the removal of gains 
committed by the offence and applying fines in accordance with culpability and harm 
will unlikely to achieve these goals for all offenders. This overrides current over-
reliance on fines set to remove the gains committed by the offence, and seriousness 
of the offence judged in accordance with harm and culpability, keeping in mind the 
financial circumstances of the offender. This structure does not work in the long term 
for companies that have vast and continuous access to financial resources. 
 
With regards to the fine range, the prosecution could grant a percentage departure 
equal to a guilty plea in a normal criminal trial for cooperation in the conference. 
The conferences, run by a facilitator, would be targeted towards how this downward 
departure would apply, having heard statements of the victims and stakeholders. 
Punishment is distributed through fines, restitution orders, probation orders like 
changing compliance programmes, and public notices. One or a combination of the 
methods would be applied when appropriate towards achieving the broad goal of 
restoration. No method of punishment would preside in importance over the other, 
but it is likely to be fines in combination with other methods rather than just solely 
fines. Depending on the circumstances of the crime, methods of punishment would 
respond to target the cause. As discussed above, some companies may violate the 
law without intent or knowledge with a result that impacts the rights of other 
individuals in the community (retribution). This may be applicable in strict liability 
offences, and punishment is still appropriate in this situation. Other companies 
violate the law in pursuit of their self-interests as utility maximisers (deterrence). 
Companies may have committed crime due to systematic failures or improper 
processes within the firm (rehabilitation). These causes fit within the broader cause 
of disassociating from society and not taking any political or legal responsibilities. 
 
Distribution of punishment parallel to suggestions by Spalding could be suitable in 
some cases: small-business loans for stakeholders that could evidence that they have 
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been materially impacted due to the company’s crimes; funding towards training 
centres for local businesses, attorneys, and government officials related to the 
crimes; and completing reports on the crime itself that are publicised to explain the 
reasons the company engaged in the crimes.1069 To ensure that the safeguards 
afforded to offenders in a normal criminal trial are guaranteed, the terms of the 
agreement would be signed by a judge to ensure the process is fair and in the interests 
of justice. This advantageously ensures the company does not simply pay a fine but 
rather be forced to confront the victims it has harmed. Victims are restored through 
remediation (loan programme) and prevention (training centre and political 
pressure). Through these measures, victims’ rights are theoretically remedied and 
the company would be able to repair its reputation and goodwill in the jurisdiction it 
committed the criminal act in.1070 The fine is reduced by projects that are paid 
towards the community and the steps the company takes the remedy its wrongs.1071 
Theoretically, punitive restoration aims to change corporate behaviour by applying 
a downward fine that could be paid towards helping the victims and involving the 
community. This would help resolve criminal misconduct if companies admit guilt 
and want to participate in the process. 
 
Previous chapters have discussed that the existence of measures beyond the 
imposition of fines, like requiring companies to restructure their compliance 
programmes and restitution orders. They are also essential to safeguard against 
widening the justice gap between companies and individuals and hindering the 
violation of the rights of individuals in society. Changing the compliance 
programmes would help prevent companies from recidivism, address issues leading 
to companies engaging in corporate behaviour, help create norm compliant 
behaviour by companies, and foster public goodwill and a positive image of the 
company.1072 Restitution orders advantageously correct the rights violated by crime 
because they would send a message to offenders, through removing the gains from 
the offence and compensating the victims and other stakeholders, to understand the 
impact of their wrongdoings on other parties.  
 
The distribution of punishment through trial would still include and enforce the same 
methods of punishment without the ability to reduce the fine for a ‘guilty plea’ or 
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enforcing a departure in the fine for completing certain methods of punishment 
beyond the fine. The criminal justice system still attempts to achieve punitive 
restoration to protect the rights of individuals in the community. This system would 
provide incentives for companies to cooperate with the prosecution and be 
incentivised in a model that ensures their rights are protected, and that steps are being 
taken to ensure that companies are compliant with the law in the long run. 
 
2.4 Legitimacy of Restorative Justice, the UTP, and the Sentencing Model  
 
Chapter 5 addressed challenges to the understanding of restorative justice and its 
contexualisation as an instance of punishment. The interpretation of the UTP in line 
with this particular understanding of restorative justice has theoretical and practical 
legitimacy if applied in England and Wales and the United States. Compellingly, it 
reflects a SOC approach, which is imperative for meaningful reforms to corporate 
criminal laws in England and Wales and the United States. 
 
It overcomes the flaws of Spalding's non-punitive restorative justice model for 
foreign bribery. Spalding incorrectly asserts, when he advances a new theory based 
purely on non-punitive restoration for companies facing prosecution for committing 
briberies in foreign jurisdictions, that restorative justice is already embedded in 
Chapter 8 of the Sentencing Commission Guidelines for companies. The Guidelines 
clearly limit the goals of punishment to deterrence and retribution. Spalding 
advances compelling proposals on how restorative justice could translate to practice, 
yet the significance of his proposals are minimized because he does not clarify of the 
theoretical foundations to his arguments and how restorative justice could be a 
complete theory of punishment. The current punitive model would diversify the way 
in which companies are punished. It considers approaches to deterrence, retribution, 
and rehabilitation as penal aims and through the prosecution process and applies 
proportionality when distributing punishment. 
 
The proposals require legislative changes to become restoratively oriented laws and 
policies. First, there needs to be an alignment between the purposes of punishment 
for companies and individuals. Second, restorative justice agreements need to be set 
under a statute, and binding guidelines need to be passed to ensure transparency 
within the process and that all internal issues that have led a certain company to 
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commit misconduct are resolved to minimise the potential of reoffending. Third, 
restorative justice agreements would have to be approved by the court when the 
company is invited to engage in them and when finalised, to ensure that the interests 
of justice are not compromised and that the proposals are fair, reasonable, and 
proportionate. Similar to DPAs in England and Wales and the United States, failure 
to comply with the requirements of a restorative justice agreement could be used in 
evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings.1073 
 
Overall, the model is theoretically and practically coherent. It aligns with a 
persuasive hybrid theory of punishment, the UTP, and considers approaches to 
deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation. Restorative justice, as conceptualised in 
this thesis,  emphasises identifying stakeholders impacted by the crime to understand 
how the rights of individuals have been impacted by a law violation, and how 
sentencing would assist in restoring these rights. Companies would need to identify 
individuals responsible for the wrongdoing to be eligible for a restorative agreement, 
and such individuals would be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Moreover, 
restorative agreements would only apply where the company has demonstrated a 
willingness to reform and cooperate with prosecutors. The Theory, through collating 
different penal aims under one framework, provides a better understanding of the 
aims and causes of punishment. It allows corporate criminal frameworks to account 
for these various causes through providing new modes of punishment distribution 
that would be targeted towards addressing the various types of corporate structures, 
types of crimes, and corporate offenders. It changes the perception of restoration 
being ‘non-punitive' and shows its potential to address corporate crime. 
 
 
 
 
3 Challenges to Restorative Justice and the UTP 
 
Chapter 5 defended and addressed potential challenges relating to the definition and 
contextualisation of restorative justice. This section builds on these views and 
identifies and addresses some challenges to using restorative justice and the UTP to 
address corporate crime.  
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3.1 Is it a Hybrid Theory of Punishment? 
 
One potential argument against the UTP, in general, is its status as a hybrid theory 
of punishment. Is the theory ‘unified' and ‘coherent'?  As provided in previous 
chapters, a well-defended theory of punishment would provide its definition, 
justifications, and punishment distribution methods. The principles relate to each 
other because no justified punishment can be imposed for an unjustified crime.1074 If 
they are not defined or clearly articulated, the theories have the potential to advance 
contrary goals and methods of punishment. Any hybrid theory would be theoretically 
incoherent if it suggests aims that contradict the methods of distribution.1075 Previous 
chapters have explored the weaknesses to a number of hybrid theories of punishment, 
citing their inability to explain how the aims could work under one framework, 
and/or explain conflicts to perceptions of the various theories of punishment. 
Accordingly, the theories incoherently advanced an aim in accordance with one 
theory, yet distributed punishment in accordance with another theory. This is 
illustrated, as detailed in previous chapters, through current hybrid theories of 
punishment in practice. Robinson considers the aims of the United States MPC and 
Sentencing Commission Guidelines. He states,  
 
[One] would wish for such legislative direction in all jurisdictions in the form of 
an articulated distributive principle that can assure rationality and internal 
consistency in drafting penal codes and sentencing guidelines and the exercise 
of judicial discretion in interpreting statutes and imposing specific sentences.1076  
 
The ‘laundry list’ approach of the MPC and current purposes governing the 
Sentencing Commission Guidelines fail to explain how the aims work together, for 
instance by providing no more guidance than that the aims should be ‘justly 
harmonised’ if they are at conflict, which leaves discretion for decision makers to 
make decisions based on their own priorities, reflecting an inconsistent criminal 
justice system.1077 Applying a hybrid theory of punishment by addressing various 
sentencing aims and imposing ‘the most severe punishment' does not necessarily 
work. For instance, if the theoretical approach to deterrence recommends the longest 
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prison sentence, the theory of punishment would advance deterrence.1078 In other 
words, the aims of punishment lack unity because there is no justification for why 
these goals are set under the specific framework nor how they may work together. 
Justifying a practice without consideration on how each of the penal aims works 
together is a major flaw.1079  
 
The MPC still advantageously incorporates goals of retribution, deterrence and 
rehabilitation.1080 This is consistent with the UTP as it supports penal pluralism and 
does not go against but develops what is already applied in practice in England and 
Wales and the United States. It also overcomes the difficulties of applying pure 
theories of punishment as discussed in previous chapters. From here, the UTP, as a 
hybrid theory of punishment, should aim to provide such through combining the 
chosen principles in a coherent and principled manner.1081 Dempsey argues that it is 
not clear how the Theory is ‘coherent’, and how coherence advances a ‘successful 
theory of punishment’, nor is it clear how the theory is ‘unified’ through the 
combination of multiple goals under one unified framework.1082 Tunick argues that 
there is an internal tension between the competing goals and that the UTP fails to 
explain how the goals could be set under one coherent framework.1083  Moreover, he 
argues that the UTP cannot be unified because the purposes of ‘restoring rights’ and 
‘preventing future rights violations’ can conflict.1084 He explains that Brooks’ 
emphasis on the importance of ‘desert, culpability, punitive measures, and punitive 
measures in a criminal justice system’ could be construed as leading back to a 
retributive standpoint.1085 He also states that Hegel’s account of punishment does not 
completely depart from morality.1086  
 
The arguments fail on a number of grounds. Looking back at the definition of 
restorative justice and the definition, justifications, and methods of punishment 
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distribution articulated by the UTP would help explain why. Crime is understood as 
a ‘right violation’ and the justification of punishment is to restore and maintain those 
rights. Punishment is justified as just deserts if it results in a right being violated 
(legal retribution). The aims of crime reduction and reforming the offenders could 
contribute to restoring the rights (deterrence and rehabilitation). The imposition of 
crime would be in proportion to the centrality of rights violated, as defined by the 
community. This is subject to change and would vary over time.1087 The goals only 
clash in the absence of a framework that unifies them.1088 Tunick misunderstands 
that restoring rights and preventing future rights being violated cannot clash, as the 
Theory justifies punishment as an infringement of individual rights with an 
overarching aim of restoring rights.1089 It follows that the Theory could reject 
punishments that do not reduce re-offending (as those against the aim of restoring 
rights and reflects a recurring infringement of the same individual rights), and that 
proportionality in relation to the right infringed by the crime would advance the aim 
of restoring rights.1090 As to the potential of the UTP being retributivist, looking back 
at Hegel’s proposals would show how Tunick’s claims are based on 
misinterpretations of Hegel’s and Brooks’ propositions. Hegel, as referred to in 
Brooks’ article, states,  
 
The fact that an injury to one member of society is an injury to all others 
does not alter the nature of crime in terms of its concept but in terms of its 
outward existence… its danger to civil society is a determination of its 
magnitude…This quality or magnitude varies, however, according to the 
condition of civil society.1091 
 
Hegel rightly asserts that crimes are not punished as moral wrongs (i.e. a view of 
crime's outward existence rather than its inner moral existence), and the 
understanding of desert is that an individual who commits a crime deserves to be 
punished.1092 Like the British Idealists, Brooks opposes traditional retribution 
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theories that impose ‘pain in return for pain’ and proposed a system of law that 
attempts to protect rights.1093 Furthermore, as referred to in Brooks’ article, he states,   
 
Punishment…has various determinations: it is retributive, a deterrent 
example as well, a threat used by the law as a deterrent, and also it brings 
the criminal to his senses and reforms him. Each of these different 
determinations has been considered the ground of punishment, because each 
is an essential determination, and therefore the others, as distinct from it, are 
determined as merely contingent relatively to it. But the one which is taken 
as ground is still not the whole punishment itself.1094 
 
Hegel states that retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation are components of 
justified punishment. The correct approaches to deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
retribution, are as follows: deterrence approaches arguing that just punishment 
should reduce recidivism; rehabilitation approaches that argue that punishment 
should assist offenders in reforming themselves and reducing recidivism; and 
retribution approaches that argue that punishment is justified when deserved and set 
in proportion to their crime. The thesis has demonstrated how a theory of punishment 
can be built to accommodate the core principles of the aforementioned approaches 
and coherently combine them to build a broader theory of punishment.1095 The gaps 
between theory and practice are bridged through the thesis’ proposals on restorative 
justice and the UTP.  
 
3.2 Is Punishment Distributed Consistently?  
 
One important consideration is whether punishment is distributed consistently. This 
relates to the methods of punishment, and whether the aims of punishment are 
achieved by a certain method(s) of punishment.   
 
3.2.1 Treating Similar Crimes and Offenders Differently  
 
One concern is whether treating similar offenders and crimes differently and not 
having fixed sentences may have an impact on legal certainty. The application of 
proportionality overcomes this issue: punishments are set in accordance with the 
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‘penal perception', or perceptions about threats to right.1096 The more central the 
rights violated are, the more severe the punishment. Brooks states that ‘some 
difference is permitted within a fixed range to be determined in light of 
circumstances subject to future revision and review.’1097 This is advantageously 
already in line with sentencing guidelines in England and Wales and the United 
States. Brooks differentiates between the crimes and the circumstances of the crimes. 
If punishment is aimed at the restoration of rights, it has to be tailored to the specific 
circumstances and address the specific cases.1098 One offender may have committed 
a crime due to drug abuse, whereas the second offender committed the same crime 
because they didn’t think they would be caught. Different punishments are sufficient 
in the circumstances given the varying circumstances of the offence.  
 
It follows that legal certainty may also be impacted if the punishment is recurrently 
changing in accordance with the circumstances. Brooks contends that ‘penal realism' 
may lead different communities to punish the same criminal act differently, because 
of the varying perceptions of the centrality of rights being violated.1099 This may not 
be a disadvantage because different communities may have different perceptions of 
the centrality of rights.1100  
 
Therefore, punishments should not be fixed but should be viewed in the context of 
the specific crime and offender to be justified in a particular circumstance. They are 
subject to judicial review.1101  
 
Third, another challenge to the UTP is identifying the community members to be 
restored. This challenge was addressed in section 3.1 of Chapter 5. Particularly, it 
was acknowledged that there are difficulties in identifying the stakeholders in a 
specific circumstance. Yet, building a framework to identify the stakeholders of a 
specific crime is a possible option that would still afford all parties their rights. 
Stakeholders differ from one case to another, but that should not be a reason to depart 
from the advantages of a broader theory of punishment that centralises improving 
public confidence and reducing recidivism. Stakeholders could be identified through 
defining ‘those who have a stake in penal outcomes’ in the particular case. In other 
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words, it includes individuals who are directly affected like the victim and their 
support network; individuals and groups that claim that they have been impacted by 
the crime, which may include the general public (this may work through 
representation and kept to a small number to facilitate constructive dialogue and 
focus on the needs of those with the largest stake).1102 The use of a new governmental 
body, the CJB, would help in appointing and training facilitators, and developing 
guidelines, that would ensure consistency in the selection of the stakeholders of a 
particular offence. 
 
3.2.2 When is Restoration Achieved?  
 
The second point to address is when punitive restoration and protection the rights of 
individuals occurs. Lippke states that the Theory fails to define how protection and 
restoration of rights would be achieved. He provides and criticises three possible 
ways of achieving restoration: restitution, censuring, and ensuring that individuals 
who do not wish to abide by laws would understand that they ‘cannot get away with 
it’ and would suffer ‘censure and hard treatment.’1103  
 
He states that restitution is not relevant in cases where no one’s rights are violated, 
and civil law is better equipped than criminal law to deal with these circumstances. 
Nevertheless, previous chapters have illustrated how restitution could be targeted to 
address criminal laws when it is just, would deter the company, and/or help them 
understand the consequences of their conduct as part of rehabilitation. Current 
sentencing practices in England and Wales and the United States already apply 
restitution as ancillary orders. As argued in the previous section, restitution is 
essential. 
 
Furthermore, Lippke contends that it is unclear how censuring is ‘punitive’ if it does 
not collectively resolve the issue, and would lead to crime reduction in the long 
term.1104 Censuring involves communicating the importance of rights to offenders, 
victims, and other individuals. Corporate criminal liability as team member 
responsibility ensures that punishment would communicate a set back to the team’s 
goals. The company’s goals are impacted by its ability to engage in contracts with 
clients and partners. Chapter 5 emphasised how public notices as punishment would 
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ensure the company explains what led to the wrongdoing; the behaviour of the 
company to governmental officials; and the impact of their conduct on stakeholders 
and victims.1105 This is parallel to the idea of ensuring that the company would not 
disassociate from the community. It is likely to speed up the process of companies 
achieving their long-term goals; lessen the impact of a crime on the company's future 
engagement in contracts and maintenance of clients, and provide the company with 
the opportunity to acknowledge and understand the implications of its crime. This is 
more advantageous than being in a cycle of companies settling or paying fines and 
engaging in continuous criminality. 
 
Additionally, Lippke states that the lack of incentives to abide by the law may lead 
to the destabilisation of a community. Individuals may attempt to take matters into 
their own hands by engaging in vengeful actions to deal with lawbreakers. The 
protection of rights would be achieved by ensuring companies do not ‘get away with 
the crime’. However, the arguments fail on the ground that the process of achieving 
punitive restoration could be defined within certain parameters that ensure that 
incentives for abiding with the law are in place, and that companies that violate the 
criminal law would still go through a criminal trial, and distribution of punishment 
would be in accordance with a mix of fines and other methods that would 
communicate the state’s effort at involving stakeholders and reducing re-offending 
in the long term. The model sets the foundation for enforcing a criminal justice 
system that holds corporate bodies legally accountable for violating other 
individual’s rights, and where punishment is distributed in proportion to the violation 
of these rights. Such could be enforced in a way that ensures fundamental principles 
like procedural safeguards and legal certainty are not violated. 
 
3.2.3 Justifying and Identifying the ‘Stakeholder Community’  
 
One possible theoretical and practical challenge to the Theory is the justification and 
identification of the ‘stakeholder community’. Brooks states,  
 
[How] much voice, if any, should the public have regarding sentencing 
decisions? Which institutional framework should be constructed to better 
incorporate public opinion without betraying our support for important penal 
principles and support for justice?1106  
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As proposed above, parties to the offence (individuals within the company, members 
of the community and victims) would be identified in each case. To reiterate, this is 
subject to change. There may be difficulties in defining ‘stakeholders’, and applying 
a consistent process of identifying ‘stakeholders’ when a crime is committed.  
 
One argument against stakeholder sentencing is that involving the public in the 
criminal justice process may lead to more punitive measures that are disproportionate 
to the centrality of rights violated.1107 This argument runs in line with victim 
displacement in current criminal justice processes to preserve the rule of law and 
impartiality in sentencing.1108 Brooks points out that disproportionate sentences may 
be due to the lack of public confidence.1109 Public opinions on sentencing outcomes 
may be influenced by the lack of information; sentencing decisions are more likely 
to be subject to a lack of consistency if handled by the public rather than judges and 
trained lay magistrates; and lack of public confidence may support the punishment 
that may, for example, support retribution, and undermine rehabilitation.1110 
 
On the other hand, one should not assume a link between public confidence and the 
severity of punishments.1111 Moreover, public participation in sentencing is not a 
new idea in England and Wales and the United States’ sentencing practices. Lay 
magistrates determine the punishment of less serious crimes in England and Wales; 
juries are used to determine issues of fact in more serious crimes in England and 
Wales and the United States, and judges are allowed to consider victim impact 
statements to determine penal outcomes (although have a limited extent to 
sentencing preferences).1112 Current practices like victim statements in trials, enable 
victims to voice their opinions on the impact of the crime on their wellbeing, without 
it necessarily impacting the offenders’ sentence nor having an impact on an offender 
that did not plead guilty.1113 This may be counterproductive to increasing public 
confidence. In such circumstances, the inclusion of other methods of punishment 
within an overarching measure of achieving punitive restoration would be better 
suited for the parties in the circumstances. That comes in hand with distributing 
different punishments to the same crime. Restorative measures would be used in 
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cases where offenders agree to participate in the assigned model of restorative justice 
and acknowledge their guilt.1114    
 
Overall, institutional reforms could be implemented to ensure consistency in 
identifying stakeholders and their roles in the case, and how restoration would be 
achieved. This would require processes that give the public opportunities to collect 
information and make better decisions.1115 Restorative justice and the UTP 
advantageously consider the importance of public confidence in sentencing to 
achieve punitive restoration, thereby reducing recidivism and creating norm 
compliant behaviour by individuals within the stakeholder community. The 
stakeholder is supported by British Idealist theories in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. They emphasise the importance of minimising political 
alienation by providing opportunities for individuals to engage in the community, 
thereby creating a social and political space to find a common identity.1116   
 
4 Conclusion  
 
The chapter collates proposals from the previous chapters and advances a 
restoratively-oriented theory of punishment for corporations. Section 2 defined UTP 
in line with the understanding of restorative justice advanced in Chapter 5. It 
advanced changes to punishing companies who have been alleged of committing a 
crime, through introducing a ‘restorative agreement’ process and implementing 
changes to the process of sentencing companies. Section 3 addressed potential 
challenges to the restoratively oriented theory of punishment, including potential 
challenges to its status as a hybrid theory of punishment, and whether the process of 
sentencing and sentencing methods are consistent.   
 
Attitudes towards compliance and non-compliance with criminal laws vary with 
changing economic circumstances. There is also skepticism on the effectiveness of 
current laws in creating norm-compliant behaviour by companies, especially given 
the emergence of various structures and priorities of companies that have increased 
the difficulty for regulation and enforcement.1117 The current hybrid deterrence and 
retribution-based model in England and Wales and the United States have failed to 
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identify the causes of crime and how punishment should be distributed to achieve 
the aims of deterrence and retribution. 
 
Therefore, a SOC approach requires a restoratively-oriented model of punishment 
that encompasses viable approaches to retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. 
The UTP; interpreted in line with the definition and contextualisation of restorative 
justice in Chapter 5, successfully collates all the aforementioned penal aims 
effectively and presents convincing arguments to address corporate crime. The 
chapter provided a comprehensive understanding of the following: why corporations 
commit crimes? Why they should be punished? and how they should be punished? 
This is the starting point to meaningful and practical reforms to corporate criminal 
liability and sentencing policies in the future
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Conclusion 
 
 
Courts in England and Wales and the United States have recognised, over a century 
ago, that companies, like individuals, should be held criminally accountable when 
they violate the law. Current policies, processes, and laws governing corporate crime 
have failed to achieve their identified goals of retribution and deterrence. This is due 
to three interlinking reasons: (a) uncertainty surrounding the theoretical 
justification(s) for holding companies liable under the law; (b) the divergence of 
views regarding suitable standards of liability; and/or (c) current methods of 
punishment and existent alternative processes for bringing companies to justice once 
they have violated the law.  
 
The thesis contributes to knowledge on corporate crime and restorative justice 
through moving away from the ‘tough on crime’ vs. ‘soft on crime’ debate, and 
towards a SOC approach. The arguments and contributions of the thesis are thereby 
summarised. 
 
1. Corporate criminal liability is necessary but was not theoretically 
justified in early cases. 
 
Chapter 1 places the thesis in a historical context. The development of corporate law 
and civil liability laws for companies could not coherently regulate companies and 
combat rising economic and social harms.1118 Courts in England and Wales, followed 
by the United States, recognised corporate criminal liability for strict-liability and 
non-strict liability offences.1119 The challenges of proving the mens rea elements of 
intent and negligence were overcome by creating an exception for public policy 
reasons.1120 Respondeat superior and the identification doctrine, tort law principles, 
were extended to criminal law to prove the mens rea elements of crimes committed 
by corporate bodies.1121  The recognition of corporate criminal liability because of 
‘shifting legal trends’, without coherently assessing the goals of law and how they 
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ought to be achieved, has contributed to scepticism on the basis of corporate crime, 
and stagnant development of the law, even a century later.1122 
 
2. Corporate criminal liability is ‘team member responsibility’.  
 
This necessitated exploring the theoretical basis for corporate criminal liability. The 
group moral agency approach, which argues that companies should be held to 
criminal law for owing obligations as individuals do, does not align with the 
development of corporate law and criminal law as applied to companies.1123  
 
The thesis alternatively advances Lee’s proposal, which justifies corporate criminal 
liability as team member responsibility.1124 Companies should be criminally 
responsible for the wrongdoing of one or more members if it is partially or 
completely motivated by the team’s norms; and/or team member(s) contribute to or 
commit the unlawful act or omission in pursuit of the team’s goals. In the latter case, 
the team members who committed the act and/or were responsible can incur personal 
liability. These acts reflect violations of the rights of others, regardless of whether 
the acts conducted are moral or immoral. It would be just to impose liability in these 
circumstances to restore the rights of individuals, create a setback to the company’s 
goals, and help team members re-evaluate their commitment to the team, thus 
preventing further legal violations.  
 
Lee's model advantageously provides a non-moral basis for corporate criminal 
liability. It also reinforces the necessity of criminal law in addition to civil law to 
regulate corporate misconduct.  It clarifies the role of members in a corporate entity 
and identifies situations where personal liability and corporate liability would be 
imposed, which overcomes difficulties of justifying the extension of respondeat 
superior and the identification doctrine to criminal law. It is theoretically and 
practically coherent, and appropriately bridges the gap between the theoretical 
foundations of the criminal law and possible arguments against the historical 
recognition of corporate criminal liability. Therefore, any reforms to the law should 
seek to modernise corporate criminal laws rather than abolish them.1125  
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3. The Canadian framework overcomes flaws of current liability 
standards for non-strict liability offences. 
 
The second part of Chapter 1 contextualises the findings of the first part through 
exploring the current scope of the law in England and Wales and the United States. 
Having considered Lee’s proposals, the respondeat superior standard for non-strict 
liability offences is too broad and does not consider that companies have varying 
sizes and management structures. It is not justifiable that an employee’s criminal act, 
not motivated by the team’s norms, would be imputed to a company, even if a due 
diligence defence exists. The ‘due diligence’ standard and requirements are subject 
to change and may be uncertain.1126 On the other extreme, the identification doctrine 
also fails to recognise the variety and varying nature of corporate structures; the 
larger the company is, the more difficult it is to identify the individuals responsible 
for the crime. It also encourages companies to decentralise responsibilities to avoid 
liability.1127 
 
The thesis advances the Canadian framework. It adopts standards of liability created 
by statute for non-strict liability offences and has two different liability standards 
(for crimes requiring proof of negligence and other offences requiring mens rea other 
than negligence). The standards distinctively account for delegation within 
companies. The Canadian framework aligns with Lee's basis for corporate criminal 
liability and is more theoretically and practically coherent than current frameworks 
in England and Wales and the United States. Reforms to current liability frameworks 
are a welcomed step, provided that careful consideration is given to align liability 
standards with sentencing practices.1128 
 
4. Sentencing guidelines, processes, and laws do not identify the 
theoretical approaches to retribution and deterrence.  
 
Retribution (removal of gain derived through the commission of the offence) and 
deterrence are prominent penal aims. Accordingly, the distribution of punishment is 
primarily through the payment of fines. In England and Wales, courts may enforce 
confiscation orders, compensation orders, and/or other ancillary orders. Fines are 
                                                           
1126 Baer (n 81) 5; Desio (n 247). 
1127 Tariq (248); Wells, ‘Corporate Liability for Crime: The Neglected Question’ (n 104) 44; Ministry 
of Justice (n 35); see Chapter 1, section 3.1.3. 
1128 See Chapter 1, section 3.1.3.1. 
  
234 
determined by harm and culpability, whether the company assisted the prosecution, 
and whether the company pleaded guilty.1129 In the United States, courts may issue 
remedial orders, orders of notice, and restitution orders.1130 
 
A wide disparity exists between the goals of punishment in theory and what they 
have been translated to in practice. The aims of punishing individuals are not parallel 
to the aims of punishing companies, and it is not clear why rehabilitation and 
restoration are not penal aims. The identified goals of retribution and deterrence are 
not theoretically studied to a great extent. There are many theoretical approaches to 
each penal aim, and it is not clear whether sentencing guidelines advance one aim in 
a way that would not contradict another aim.  
 
5. Legal Retribution, Deterrence, and Rehabilitation Can Work 
Together as Part of a Broader Theory of Punishment that Aims at 
Restoration  
 
5.1. Legal retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation each provide partial 
understandings of the aim of punishment and the distribution of punishment  
 
Chapters 2 to 5 explored the viability of retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
restoration, to advance an understanding of corporate crime and the punishment of 
corporate bodies. The chapters (a) historically examine the development of the 
theoretical foundations of each penal aim; (b) evaluate various modern 
interpretations of the penal aims, including hybrid theories of punishment that 
include one of the penal aims; (c) critique the compatibility of the penal aim in the 
context of companies; and accordingly, (d) advance proposals relating to the 
justifying aim of punishment and how punishment should be distributed. 
 
Legal retribution specifies that companies may break the law, with or without fault, 
resulting in economic and personal consequences on other individuals. Punishment 
should be imposed when it is just. It is just to punish conduct that violates the rights 
of other individuals, whether the law is immoral or moral, and whether the company 
                                                           
1129 Sentencing Council, ‘Environmental Offences: Definitive Guideline’ (n 31); Sentencing Council, 
‘Fraud, Bribery and Money Laundering Offences: Definitive Guideline’ (n 31); Sentencing Council, 
‘Health and Safety Offences, Corporate Manslaughter and Food Safety and Hygiene Offences: 
Definitive Guideline’ (n 31). 
1130 United States Sentencing Commission, ‘Guidelines Manual 2016’ (n 11) Ch.8, 525. 
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was at fault or was not.1131 Many approaches to deterrence provide that companies 
engage in crime because they calculate the benefits to be higher than the costs.1132 It 
follows that many approaches to rehabilitation argue that crime could arise from 
defective control systems, insufficient accounts, poor communication, and 
inadequate operating procedures.1133 It is also just to impose punishment in these 
circumstances as a response to crime. As to the distribution of punishment, the 
principle of ‘proportionality’ is inherent in the aforementioned penal aims.1134  
 
Each of the penal aims provides partial contributions to the understanding of 
corporate crime and punishment and could be collated under a hybrid theory of 
punishment. 
 
5.2 Restorative Justice is a Theory about Punishment: It Provides a 
Multidimensional Understanding of the Justifying Aims of Punishment and How 
Punishment Ought to Be Distributed  
 
In Chapter 5, a theoretical and historical analysis of restorative justice reveals many 
misunderstandings of what restorative justice means in theory and practice: it is 
speculative whether it has achieved its theoretical aims; it is often perceived as an 
alternative to punishment and not a theory of punishment, and there are difficulties 
in understanding how it would work with other penal aims.1135  
 
Nevertheless, restorative justice offers many compelling principles that could 
contribute to a theory of punishment for corporations. Restorative justice is advanced 
as a theory about punishment, articulated through five principles: restoration; 
voluntarism; neutrality; safety; accessibility; and respect.1136  
 
Chapter 5 advances the following understanding and contextualisation of restoration 
justice. Restoration should be an aim to be achieved through law, a process, and/or 
practice, resulting in a restoratively oriented law, process, and/or practice. 
                                                           
1131 Brooks, ‘Punishment: Political, not Moral’ (n 402) 434. 
1132 Kennedy (n 461) 8. 
1133 Braithwaite and Geis (n 303) 309. 
1134 The Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 164; Sentencing Council, ‘Environmental Offences: Definitive 
Guideline’ (n 31); Sentencing Council, ‘Fraud, Bribery and Money Laundering Offences: Definitive 
Guideline’ (n 31); Sentencing Council, ‘Health and Safety Offences, Corporate Manslaughter and Food 
Safety and Hygiene Offences: Definitive Guideline’ (n 31). 
1135 Brooks, Punishment (n 13) 64. 
1136 Restorative Justice Council (n 762). 
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Restorative justice provides a multi-dimensional understanding of crime and 
punishment – it seeks to understand and take into account the causes of crime, the 
impact of a crime, and how the harm resulting from a crime can be remedied. Thus, 
it considers that corporate behaviour may change in response to economic 
circumstances, and the need to respond to crime in accordance with the 
circumstances presented. Restorative justice advocates for effective communication 
about the crime, which would lessen the power imbalances between companies and 
individuals, because all stakeholders would be involved in the decision-making 
process of what remedies would be applied to the particular corporate 
wrongdoing.1137  
 
This has an impact on the liability standards set by the law (answering the questions 
of ‘what to punish?’ and ‘whom to punish?’) and sentencing processes and practices 
(‘how do we prosecute offenders?’ and ‘what punishment should be imposed?’). 
Restorative justice ought not to be reduced to a single type of approach taking a 
conference setting.1138 Restorative justice offers a new understanding of the 
justification of punishment and how it ought to be distributed, and the latter can take 
many forms. Going back to the issues presented at the beginning of the thesis in 
relation to corporate crime, restoration should be an integral part of any theory of 
punishment. 
 
5.3 Restorative Justice and The Unified Theory of Punishment  
 
Restorative justice and the UTP can provide a comprehensive understanding of 
corporate crime and the punishment of corporate bodies. One form that the theory 
might take is punitive restoration, which is restoring the rights of individuals as part 
of a stakeholder society.1139 The UTP is interpreted in line with the definition and 
contextualisation of restorative justice advanced in Chapter 5. Deterrence, 
retribution, and rehabilitation are different components that equally fit within one 
theory of punishment.1140  
 
Accordingly, the thesis advanced new interpretations of the justification of 
punishment and how punishment should be distributed. 
                                                           
1137 Braithwaite, Restorative Justice & Responsive Regulation (n 917) 82. 
1138 See Brooks, ‘Restorative Justice and Punitive Restoration’ (n 165) 131, 136-7. 
1139 Brooks, Punishment (n 13) 148; Brooks, ‘Stakeholder Sentencing’ (n 32) 183. 
1140 Brooks, Punishment (n 13) 126-7. 
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Companies commit crimes because of their distinctive political and legal positions. 
They may have distinctive legal and political positions in the community in 
comparison to individuals in non-corporate settings. This may be due to obtaining a 
wealth of resources, adopting political positions in recurrent community debates, 
influencing human behaviour through their products and campaigns, and obtaining 
local and international rights, amongst other reasons.1141 Having a distinctive 
political and legal position is a broad idea that encompasses the justifying aims of 
punishment provided by retribution (violation of laws without fault and/or decisions 
leading to a violation of rights of other individuals), deterrence (costs of committing 
a crime is lower than the benefits), and rehabilitation (cost-saving measures resulting 
in poor communication, insufficient accounts, and defective control systems).  
 
Punishment is a response to crime and is justified when it violates the rights of 
individuals in a community.1142 According to legal retribution, punishment ensures 
that the rights of individuals who have been impacted by a criminal act are restored. 
Deterrence provides that companies would not commit future crimes and reap 
benefits at the expense of individuals in the community. Rehabilitation provides that 
companies should be punished in a way that would allow them to address their 
wrongdoing, remediate rights violated, and change their internal processes to ensure 
that they do not re-offend in the future.  
 
Parallel to the proposals of Lee, the UTP and restorative justice support the 
imposition of punishment for strict liability and non-strict liability offences 
(requiring negligence, recklessness, or intent). It also does not contradict proposals 
of the Canadian framework supporting a broad standard of liability that accounts for 
different types of corporate misconducts and corporate structures, thereby 
responding to crimes in a multidimensional manner and overcoming difficulties of 
prosecution.   
 
The thesis argues that the role of the criminal law has broadened to ensure that 
companies adopt norm compliant behaviours to reduce the overall levels of crime in 
the long term. Bringing companies that have violated the law to justice does not 
always require punishment through a trial. The thesis advances a ‘restorative 
agreement’ proposal in place of DPAs to advance its interpretations of restorative 
                                                           
1141 Taslitz (n 1036) 73. 
1142 Brooks, Punishment (n 13) 6, 127. 
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justice and the UTP. This advances the stakeholder community proposal, which 
emphasises the involvement of members of the public that are impacted by the crime 
in the criminal justice process.1143 
 
Distinctively, restorative agreements are not a method of disposal falling short of a 
criminal conviction. Companies that do not want to engage in restorative agreements 
would proceed through a normal trial. The criminal justice system still attempts to 
achieve punitive restoration to protect the rights of individuals in the community. 
Restorative agreements are targeted at changing corporate behaviour and culture. 
This is evident through the following: First, the downward fine range and corporate 
credit through voluntary disclosure. The downward fine would be impacted by the 
steps taken by the company and the fine could be used to fund business loans to 
stakeholders in the industry impacted by the crime, or funding towards training 
centres for local businesses, attorneys, and government officials related to the 
crimes. Second, the ability to impose restitution orders, reforming compliance 
programmes, and/or completing reports on the crime that would be publicised, where 
relevant. Third, a new body is created, The CJB, to recruit facilitators to conduct 
independent investigations and prepare a report with the factual findings in relation 
to the crime, identify the respective victims and stakeholders, to communicate the 
particulars of the offence and specific impact of the crime on their particular 
interests. Fourth, a conference is conducted to resolve the crime and would include 
the appointed facilitator from the CJB, independent counsel from the company, 
representatives from the company who are party to the crime, and where appropriate, 
a select of identified victims and stakeholders, as chosen by the facilitators.  
 
Overall, the thesis contributed to a distinctive understanding of restorative justice 
and corporate crime. It approached the contested issue of corporate crime through a 
SOC approach, particularly by considering the existent philosophies of punishment 
and responses to crime to gain an understanding of corporate misbehaviour and how 
the criminal justice system could be reformed to address it. The outcomes of 
approach produced a new understanding of restorative justice, arguing that 
restoratively oriented liability standards and sentencing policies are the starting point 
in responding to corporate crime. In practice, this may translate to a ‘restorative 
agreement' sentencing model, which requires the establishment of the CJB. The 
thesis comparatively studied the laws in England and Wales and the United States 
                                                           
1143 Brooks, ‘Stakeholder Sentencing’ (n 32) 183. 
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because many common law jurisdictions have adopted models similar to theirs. This 
thesis thereby proposed needed reforms to corporate criminal liability laws at an 
international level and assisted in evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of 
different standards of liability and sentencing models.1144 It provided new insights to 
current restorative justice thinking and applied it in a new context, corporate crime, 
and generated back new interpretations and perspectives to restorative justice and 
the UTP.
                                                           
1144 Tolaini (n 17). 
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List of Abbreviations  
 
 
 
1. CID Company’s internal decision structure 
2. CJB Corporate Justice Board 
9. Commission Guidelines  
3. Definitive Guidelines  The Sentencing Council’s definitive 
guidelines 
4. Deputy Attorney General 
Guidelines 
Deputy Attorney General guidelines for the 
enforcement of DPAs 
5. DPA Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
7. Mixed model, hybrid model Theory that advances retribution, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, or restoration 
6. MPC The American Law Institute’s Model Penal 
Code 
8. Pure model Theory that advances retribution, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, or restoration 
12. Sentencing Commission United States Sentencing Commission 
10. SOC Smart on Crime approach, Smart Justice 
13. UK United Kingdom 
14. USA, United States United States of America 
15. UTP Unified Theory of Punishment 
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